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Abstract 
Nowadays, verification of programs is gaining increased importance.  The software industry 
appears more and more interested in methods and tools to ensure security in their applica-
tions. Java Modeling Language has been successfully used in the past by programmers to ex-
press their intentions in the Design by Contract fashion in sequential programming. One of 
the design goals of JML was to improve the functional software correctness of Java applica-
tions. Regarding the verification of security properties, JML was mostly successful in Java 
Smart Card applets due to the specifics of these applications.  
In this thesis work we investigate the feasibility of JML to express high-level security 
properties in Java applications that have more realistic requirements and are implemented in 
the object oriented technology. We do a threat analysis of a case study regarding a medical 
clinic and derive the required security properties to secure the application. We develop a 
prototype application where we specify high-level security properties with JML and use a 
runtime assertion checking tool to verify the code.  
We model the functional behavior of the prototype that establishes the security proper-
ties as a finite state automaton. Our prototype is developed based on this automaton. States 
and state transitions modeled in the automaton are expressed in the prototype with JML an-
notations and verified during runtime.  
We observe that currently available features in JML are not very feasible to capture the 
security related behavior of Java programs on the level of the entire application. 
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Chapter I 
1. Introduction 
Today when private companies and governmental agencies gather information on us more 
than ever, computer security becomes increasingly important for the society at large. Exam-
ples of data gathered at large information systems range from credit card numbers, biome-
tric data such as digital fingerprints and the history of patients’ illnesses. 
At the same time, the need to share this information between relevant actors is nowa-
days an everyday practice. Examples include, sharing data between the judiciary system and 
the courts, the insurance companies and the hospitals etc. 
Despite numerous benefits from this collaboration, this puts us at greater risk from suf-
fering severe consequences in case of information theft or misuse. To prevent this, special 
care needs to be dedicated into securing the applications that handle this information. 
For this purpose, during the design of applications, software industry employs security 
experts that formulate security requirements for applications in terms of security properties 
that those applications must have. Developers then implement these properties.  
In order to ensure high degree of security in the application, the software industry uses 
common techniques such as careful design and testing. 
Another way to ensure high quality of the source code is by using some tool that ensures 
certain properties of the code. These tools statically examine the structure of the code and its 
interdependencies (1).  
Many tools are available, where each has its own specifics and techniques that it uses. 
One of the tools (FindBugs (2)) enforces certain coding guidelines and uses techniques to 
detect errorness coding patterns. Another tool(ESC/Java (3)) statically verifies the code 
against the provided annotations which are inserted to capture the design decisions that the 
programmer had in mind during development (3).  
Another popular approach especially used for mission-critical applications is model 
checking. A tool like Bandera (4), exhaustively checks a finite state-model of the application 
for violations of the system requirements (or properties) formally specified in some tempor-
al logic (e.g. LTL1 (5)). The last technique involves full verification of the system by requiring 
                                                        
1 Linear temporal logic. 
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both additional annotations with detailed specifications and construction of a proof that the 
code matches the specifications. The latter task is the most time consuming. Example tools 
doing full verification are Jack (6), Loop (7) etc. 
The number of tools that uses the Java Modeling Language for static analysis and full 
program verification has been growing in the last decade. These tools rely on JML to specify 
the intended code behavior in the Design by Contract (DBC) fashion. DBC is based on “con-
tracts” — a formal agreement between a client and its suppliers. To call a method, a client 
class must satisfy the conditions imposed by a supplier class. If these conditions are satisﬁed, 
the supplier class must guarantee certain properties, which constitute the supplier class ob-
ligations. On the other hand, if conditions are not satisﬁed, that is, there is a contract viola-
tion, then a runtime error occurs. 
It is generally acknowledged that there is a considerable gap between properties ex-
pressed in this way, by method pre- and post- conditions and class constraints, and the prop-
erties and terms that system designers have in mind when they talk about properties in ap-
plications. 
Even though the JML constructs contribute to ensuring correctness that ultimately results 
in a more reliable software in the long run, they are far from being sufficient in capturing 
high-level properties of applications. 
1.1. Motivation 
When it comes to specification of security related properties with JML and their verification, 
the research community has been focusing mainly in Java Smart Card2 applets (8), (9), (10). 
Because of the specifics of the hosting environment that has very limited memory and 
processing capacity, applets are usually small programs and have less complexity. They can-
not be compared to a typical Java desktop or web application. The program behavior of these 
applications is characterized by a compact life cycle. Usually each stage of the life-cycle has 
precisely determined actions; allowed to be carried during the specific phase. 
The resource constraints in their hosting platform dictate specific characteristics and se-
curity requirements for these applications (11). The programming language used in Java 
Cards is a subset of Java with a number of Java constructs absent. It is ideal for application of 
formal methods, since the language is small enough to be actually feasible for study from a 
formal perspective, yet it is used in real world applications.  
As a result, the specification and verification of security properties with JML in these 
programs has been quite successful in the research community (12). 
In the recent years much research effort3 has been put in JML by research groups from 
around the world. Many new constructs were added to JML and different case studies done 
on how to use JML for different verification purposes including security features. 
                                                        
2 A typical example of Java Cards are SIMs in mobile phones. 
3 Papers regarding JML are available at http://www.eecs.ucf.edu/~leavens/JML/papers.shtml 
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Considering the success of JML in the Java Card world and the addition of many new se-
mantics to JML in the last years, we were motivated to see how far has this specification lan-
guage progressed and how useful it is in capturing high level security properties. 
In this thesis work our main concern is how JML can be used for security aspects in ap-
plications. We have been motivated mainly by the following questions: 
 How efficiently can JML be used for specification of larger Java programs that 
resemble those from real-life scenarios? 
 Is it possible to express security properties with JML in these aplications? 
 Can we capture high-level security properties in the application level by using 
JML? 
1.2. Objective 
Since JML includes constructs to capture additional aspects of the code behavior, we were 
interested in exploring how well these constructs are able to specify security related behavior 
of Java applications. Furthermore, we were interested in exploring if it is possible to “push 
the boundary” of property specification with JML, by aiming at specifying high-level security 
properties such as authentication, authorization etc. 
The objective of the work done during this thesis work is twofold. It consists of: 
 finding methods how JML can be used to specify high-level security properties 
in Java programs, and 
 applying the chosen method(s) to specify security properties on a prototype 
application developed for a case study regarding a medical clinic. 
After researching the JML capabilities, we apply our method for security property speci-
fication on a prototype application developed for a case study of our own. The problem defi-
nition of the case study that we will work on will be lightly simplified in comparison to possi-
ble requirements from real life medical clinics. 
During our work on the case study we do a threat analysis of the given scenario where 
we identify security properties required for this application. From the overall group of secu-
rity properties that we identify during the analysis, we choose a subset of them to implement 
in the application prototype. 
In this prototype, we specify the properties that we have implemented with Java Model-
ing Language and use a tool verify that there are no violations between the code and the in-
serted JML statements. 
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1.3. Outline 
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents related work showing 
how JML was used in the past to reason about security. In Chapter 3 we provide the back-
ground of the concepts that will be used during this thesis work. We give an overview of the 
main features and limitations of JML. We provide an insight on the RMI technology used dur-
ing development and the Java security mechanisms that we use during development.  In 
Chapter 4, we present the possible approaches for using JML to specify security properties 
that were used in the past. We present the approach that we intend to use, listing its similari-
ties and differences with others approaches. 
In Chapter 5 we present the scenario of our case study, the threat analysis and the de-
rived security properties from this process. In Chapter 6 we explain how we implement the 
properties in the prototype and apply our specification method. We present problems and 
observations during this process. In Chapter 7, we present additional details regarding the 
implementation and the tests done on the system. Finally, in Chapter 8, we present conclud-
ing remarks and point out future works. 
13 
 
Chapter II 
2. Related work 
In this chapter we present previous work where JML was used to specify properties related 
to security. The two areas where JML has been particularly successful in specifying security 
properties are Java Card applets and protocol verification and less frequently, simple applica-
tions implemented in Java.  
The software from both of first two categories is usually easy to express in a limited set 
of precisely defined states which makes them feasible for specification and verification.  
Because of the relatively limited size and complexity, JML has successfully been used to 
specify the behavior of these programs in the past. The provided specifications (which come 
in the form of annotations) can then be used to statically verify the programs with one of the 
many tools available that support JML (13). 
2.1. Specification of applications and applets 
Schubert and Chrzaszcz (14) annotate a simple desktop application for remote password 
storage. They do a security analysis from the source-code point of view therefore don’t take 
under consideration threats of data storage and threats related to social security attacks. 
Source-code point of view in this case uses JML to specify a certain behavior of code for 
which they claim that it meets a set of security properties. This code is then statically verified 
with the help of static analysis tool of ESC/Java2. 
 A set of security properties is chosen and features are implemented in the code to coun-
ter those threats. These features are then specified using JML4. 
They choose confidentiality, integrity and availability as security properties and list a set 
of threats against each of these properties. They implement solutions for a number of these 
threats in the program and specify the code formally using certain JML constructs to be able 
                                                        
4 Since their goal was to verify the application with ESC/Java2 static analysis tool, besides their own 
classes, they also had to annotate the behavior of the used Java libraries. 
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to statically verify that the solutions implemented for achieving those security properties ac-
tually work the way they were specified. 
A feature implemented in their programe is the analysis and verification of the control 
flow of the programe. They analyze and express the control flow of the application with the 
help of ghost fields. When a state of interest occurs in the program the set keyword is used to 
modify the ghost field to mark the occurrence of that state in the program. 
States expressed in ghost fields are then used in pre- and post- conditions of methods to 
ensure the general program flow. Object invariants are used to monitor the consistency of 
objects during the entire execution of the program.  
Pre- and post- conditions ensure context of the sequence of method calls. They ensure 
that certain conditions are met before a method is called. For example, when a method call 
occurs, pre- and post- conditions ensure that certain variables have been initialized. They can 
ensure that certain objects are created inside the execution of that method and not before it’s 
execution etc. 
In their work, they propose a solution to trace the information flow of the confidential 
data by inserting a ghost field to express the type of data. However they’re proposal has one 
deficiency - it is incapable of tracing the flow of primitive data types. 
Despite that they were able to statically verify their application with ESC/Java2 tool, they 
state that this kind of verification “does not guarantee full security, but provides a certain 
standardized level of assurance that the source code is well written with regard to the as-
sumed threat analysis”. 
Jacobs, Oostdijk & Warnier (15) do a case study in formal verification and development 
of secure Java smart card applications. They specify the control flow of an elementary Java 
Card applet for a rechargeable phone card. By verifying this flow they are able to prove the 
correctness of the applet in general. The card life cycle is modeled in finite state machines 
where program states are marked by ghost fields. 
They specify the behavior of cryptographic functions which they use for the challenge-
response mechanism in place to ensure secure transactions. 
They define high level functional and security requirements of the applet and capture 
them in the global class invariants and constraints. The functional behavior is captured in the 
pre- and post- conditions of methods. 
In (16) a method for automatically translating high level security properties for applets 
into JML annotations is shown. The annotations generated by this method are however main-
ly related to functional correctness of the applet. The first group of properties annotates the 
applet life cycle, describing the diﬀerent phases that an applet can be in and actions that can 
be performed in a certain phase. The second group of properties deals with the transaction 
mechanism ensuring its atomicity. The third group expresses the properties that restrict the 
exceptions allowed to be thrown and restricts access control of different applications inte-
racting with each other. 
Ostdijk and Warnier (17), present how to use JML to annotate applets that use Java Card 
RMI5. They use model variables to specify interfaces that remote objects implement and for-
mally verify the applet with the help of the LOOP (18) tool. 
 
                                                        
5 Java Card Remote Method Invocation. 
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2.2. Protocol specification 
Poll and Schubert (19) present a case study in the specification (and veriﬁcation) of an open 
source Java implementation of the SSH protocol. They propose a methodology to formalize 
this security protocol using ﬁnite state machines. JML is used to express the properties they 
wish to verify for in the source code. 
The protocol is represented as a finite state machine which describes how the state of 
the protocol changes in response to the diﬀerent messages it can receive. This is of course 
only a partial speciﬁcation, as it speciﬁes the order of messages but not their precise format. 
Nevertheless it is interesting enough because during specification of the implementing code 
they were able to find security flaws in the implementation. This occurs because specification 
contributes to a better understanding of the code. 
It appears that the specification of this kind is easy to read for non-experts as well. It is 
beneficial to include in the official protocol specification because it clarifies the specification 
and makes it easier for developers to implement. 
The formal specification of an abstract description for a security protocol for Java smart 
cards is given in (20). They refine an abstract description of the bilateral key exchange (BKE) 
protocol into finite state machines. This protocol is described in (21) and it allows two agents 
to agree on a session key. 
JML is used to specify the implementation code and static verification tools are used to 
verify if the code conforms to the behavior defined in the state machines. 
In both of these cases of protocol specification, state-transitions are expressed as a com-
bination of JML invariants, constraints, and method speciﬁcations. Static analysis tools are 
then used to verify if these specifications hold during program execution. If they hold then 
they assume that the implementation really behaves in the manner it was specified. 
2.3. Other related work 
(22) introduces a security automata as a convenient way to describe security policies. It pro-
poses a translation mechanism for security properties into program annotations. The securi-
ty properties are expressed as a finite state automaton and annotations are written in JML. 
The automaton contains a trap state to model the occurrence of an error. 
The authors define their own semantics of the annotated programs and a few additions 
to JML to accommodate their semantic constructs. 
They use the JML assert statement to evaluate a condition on the program state. 
The semantics of their language is restricted to a very limited subset of (sequential) Java, 
excluding typical object-oriented features. The method declarations are limited to containing 
only one parameter. 
(23) uses JML to specify non-interference properties such as confidentiality and integrity 
from a language-based perspective. They use a simple security lattice Σ, defined as {High, 
Low} with Low ⊆ High. A secure information flow policy maps variables to security levels 
and the sets of variables corresponding to those levels.  
16 
 
They’re work is based on previous work done by Josh and Leno (24). Confidentiality is 
guaranteed by restricting the dependency of the fields belonging to the Low confidentiality 
level from the ones belonging to the High confidentiality level. They use the \old keyword 
from JML to ensure this separation. 
Cheo and Perumandla (25) propose an extension to JML to specify the order of method 
calls. This approach is especially of use when specifying protocols. They propose to separate 
the protocol assertions from the functional assertions. The specification of the functional 
properties continues is written in the pre- and post- conditions of methods, but the protocol 
properties are written directly as separate annotation form proposed by them. For this, they 
introduce a new sequence clause called call_sequence.  
The call_sequence speciﬁcation constrains the order in which methods of a class 
should be called by clients. It speciﬁes the allowed sequences of method calls. 
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Chapter III 
3. Background concepts 
This chapter is meant to give a foundation of the concepts used later on during the thesis 
work. Before we look into how JML has been used in the past to specify security properties, 
and attempt to do the same in the program of our case study, we explain some of the tools, 
concepts and programming technologies that we will use during this process. 
In this chapter we present a more detailed picture of JML. We begin by presenting some 
of the most notable features of this specification language, to then continue listing some of 
it’s more advanced features. We list some of the JML limitations that we have identified, 
when JML is used to specify security properties in Java programs. 
We compare JML with another language of a similar purpose, namely with Object Con-
straint Language (OCL). We point out what are JML’s advantages in contrast to OCL, when the 
design features of the Java programs are specified. 
Since the foundation of our case study application is built using the Java Remote Method 
Invocation technology (RMI), in this chapter, we provide a short description of this pro-
gramming technology. We show the steps of how to program applications with distributed 
objects using RMI. 
Besides the RMI technology, in our case study we also use Java Authentication and Au-
thorization (JAAS) mechanism. This system authenticates the users based on a built-in au-
thentication mechanism and provides access control depending on their authentication sta-
tus. In the end of this chapter we explain the architectural components of this system and 
show how they work together to provide user authentication and authorization. 
3.1. An Overview of JML 
JML (26), which stands for “Java Modeling Language”, is a behavioral interface speciﬁcation 
language (BISL) tailored to Java. JML combines the practicalities of design by contract (DBC) 
principle to specify the behavior of Java classes and interfaces.  
During this specification, JML concentrates on two aspects of Java modules: 
18 
 
 syntactic interface – consists of names and static information (e.g., method 
names, arguments or return type) found in Java declarations; 
 functional behavior – describing how the module should behave when used. 
JML specifications are written in special annotation comments, which start with the @ 
sign. 
Specifications are written in two forms: //@ <JML specification> or  
/*@ <JML specification>  @*/ depending on if we are writing a one line (the first form) or 
multiple line (second form) specification. 
The specification comments are ignored by the Java compiler and interpreted by the JML 
compiler named JMLC (27). There are numerous languages for this purpose but JML is par-
ticularly popular firstly, because its syntax is heavily based on Java (thus easy to use and 
learn) and, it has a large tool support. 
These tools support DBC, runtime assertion checking, discovery of invariants, static 
checking, specification browsing and even formal verification using theorem provers (28)6. 
As in Eiffel, JML uses Java’s expression syntax to write the predicates used in assertions, 
such as pre- and post- conditions. As a consequence of heavy reliance on Java syntax, JML 
lacks some expressiveness that makes more specialized assertions difficult to express. To 
counter this, JML uses various constructs, such as quantifiers. 
3.1.1. Assertions and expressions 
Assertions and expressions in JML speciﬁcations are written using Java’s expression syntax. 
However, they must be pure. This means that side eﬀects cannot appear in JML assertions or 
expressions. 
To prevent side effects, the following Java operators are not allowed within JML speciﬁ-
cations: 
 assignment — assignment operators like =, += and -= are not allowed 
 increment and decrement operators — all forms of increment and decrement 
operators  like ++ and -- are not allowed 
 
In addition to this, only pure methods7 can be used in JML expressions. The purity in JML 
is expressed by using the assignable keyword. Only the ﬁelds listed in an assignable clause 
can be modified by a method. Two JML keywords can be used with the assignable clause: 
\nothing and \everything. We can indicate that a method does not have any side eﬀects by: 
writing assignable \nothing. 
  
                                                        
6 JML is a large and very active research project. More documentation, available tools that support JML and 
background papers are available at: http://www.jmlspecs.org 
7 A method is considered pure is it does not modify the state e.g. by assigning values to any fields or ob-
jects. 
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Below in the method example getName() we show two possibilities of declaring a me-
thod as pure – not being able to modify any fields outside their body. However, we should 
note that they can modify fields declared inside of their body. 
 
public /*@ pure @*/ int getName() { return name; } 
 
The same can be expressed also by using a one line annotation as listed in Figure 3.1: 
 
/@ assignable \nothing; 
public int getName( ) { 
   return Name; 
} 
Figure 3.1. JML speciﬁcation with an assignable clause. 
This method declaration denotes a method with no side-eﬀects; it is not allowed to modi-
fy the program state. The use of the JML modiﬁer pure is equivalent to the assignable 
\nothing clause. 
Besides assignable, JML provides a rich set of constructs, some of which make extensions 
to the Java’s expression syntax to provide more expressive power in JML speciﬁcation; they 
can be used in JML assertions and expressions. For example, \old(E) represents the pre-
state value of expression E. An expression with a pre-state value refers to the value before 
method execution. The \result construct speciﬁes the return value of a method. Note that in 
JML such constructs start with a backslash (\) in order to avoid interfering with identiﬁers 
present in a user program. 
JML also provides the use of logical connectives such as conjunction (&&), disjunction(||), 
negation (!), forward (==>) and reverse implications (<==), equivalence (<==>), and inequiva-
lence (<=!=>). Regarding quantiﬁers, JML supports several types such as universal quantiﬁer 
(\forall), existential quantiﬁer (\exists), and generalized quantiﬁers (\sum, \product, \min, 
and \max). The quantiﬁers \sum, \product, \min, and \max are generalized quantiﬁers that 
return respectively the sum, product, minimum, maximum of the values present in JML ex-
pressions. 
Note also that sometimes during development it is more convenient to insert an informal 
description when specifying a piece of code. Such descriptions are ignored by JML compiler 
but are there for clarity. They are inserted between (* and *) signs as below: 
 
(* some text describing a JML predicate *) 
 
As we can see, this description is informal and is entirely left to the reader to interpret it. 
 
 
 
In-line assertions 
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JML provides the use of a speciﬁc kind of assertion known as in-line assertions which are 
specified in the method body. They are bundled together with Java code as shown below in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
public class AssertionExample { 
  public void m() { 
      //@ assert y1 != 0 && y2 != 0 
   y1++; 
   y2++; 
  } 
} 
Figure 3.2. In-line assertions. 
In this example when the execution of method m() reaches line:  
//@ assert y1 != 0 && y2 != 0 the assertion must be satisfied or otherwise, an assertion 
violation is reported.   
JML provides several kinds of in-line assertions, such as assume statements, henceby 
statements, unreachable statements, set statements, and loopinvariant and variant 
statements. 
Default value of declarations 
Null pointer exceptions are among the most common faults raised by components writ-
ten in object-oriented languages such as Java. Because of this, in JML a declaration is by de-
fault non-null. So, unless it is explicitly declared by keyword nullable, it is required to have 
a non-null value assigned to it. 
Moreover, a class or interface that implicitly contains nullable declarations is speciﬁed 
by using the nullable_by_default class annotation. 
3.1.2. Method specification 
In JML, method specifications contain pre-, post- condition predicates. Methods can be speci-
fied by lightweight and heavyweight specifications, normal and exceptional postconditions, 
and frame conditions. All these features are briefly described. 
States of method speciﬁcations 
JML constructs used for method speciﬁcations are divided into three larger groups of 
states: 
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 pre-state speciﬁcations — these speciﬁcations must be evaluated in the pre-
state, immediately before the execution of the method body. Example of these 
speciﬁcations are: requires clauses, old variables and old expressions. It is 
important to note that expressions such as old appear in post-state 
speciﬁcations, but they must be evaluated in the pre-state (before method ex-
ecution); 
 post-state speciﬁcations — these speciﬁcations must be evaluated in post-
state, immediately after the execution of the method body. Clauses such a 
ensures, and signals are example of post-state speciﬁcations; 
 internal-state speciﬁcations — these speciﬁcations must be evaluated in inter-
nal states, during the evaluation of the method body. In-line assertions are ex-
amples of internal speciﬁcation state. 
Specification clauses 
JML provides a number of speciﬁcation clauses that can be used to specify the behavior 
of methods (see Table 3.1) the requires clauses speciﬁes preconditions; the assignable 
clauses speciﬁes frame conditions; the ensures clauses speciﬁes normal postconditions, whe-
reas signals clauses speciﬁes exceptional postconditions. 
 
requires preconditions 
ensures normal postconditions 
signals exceptional postconditions 
assignable frame conditions 
Table 3.1. JML clauses for method speciﬁcations. 
Preconditions are predicates that must hold before method execution. Figure 3.3 shows 
an example of a precondition of the method sum. According to this speciﬁcation, the argu-
ments a and b of the method sum must be non-negatives; otherwise an assertion violation is 
reported. 
 
//@ requires a >= 0 && b >= 0; 
public int sum(int a , int b) { 
   return a + b ; 
} 
Figure 3.3. Example of JML precondition specification. 
Normal postconditions are predicates that must hold after method execution without 
throwing any exception. Figure 3.4 shows an example of a normal postcondition of the me-
thod sum. According to this speciﬁcation, the result of the method (indicated by the \result 
22 
 
construct) must be equal to the sum of the arguments a and b; otherwise a assertion viola-
tion error is raised. 
 
//@ ensures \result == a + b; 
public int sum( int a , int b) { 
  return a + b ; 
} 
Figure 3.4. Example of JML normal postcondition speciﬁcation. 
 
//@ signals (Exception ) a >= 0 && b > = 0; 
public int sum( int a , int b) { 
// Throws a java.lang.Exception 
   return a + b ; 
} 
Figure 3.5. Example of JML exceptional_postcondition speciﬁcation. 
Exceptional postconditions are predicates that must hold when the method terminates 
by throwing an exception. Each exceptional postcondition can consist of several signals 
clauses. 
In this way, each signals clause must hold when the speciﬁed method terminates abnor-
mally by throwing an exception of a type speciﬁed in the signals clause. Figure 3.5 shows an 
example of an exceptional postcondition for the method sum. According to this speciﬁcation, 
when the method sum throws an exception, the arguments a and b must be non-negative; 
otherwise the original exception is intercepted signaling an assertion violation. 
Heavyweight and Lightweight speciﬁcations 
In JML, one can use two diﬀerent styles on method speciﬁcations: heavyweight 
speciﬁcations, and lightweight speciﬁcations (29). A heavyweight speciﬁcation can start with 
the keyword behavior, which indicates a “complete” speciﬁcation that includes both normal 
and abnormal situations. Figure 3.6 shows an example of a behavior speciﬁcation, including 
normal (lines 2 to 4), and abnormal situations (line 5).  
The normal_behavior keyword is used only to deﬁne speciﬁcations that include only 
normal situations, that is, no method can terminate abnormally by throwing an exception — 
the signals clause cannot appear in these speciﬁcations cases. Figure 3.6 (lines 1 to 3) 
shows an example of normal behavior speciﬁcation. Unlike the normal_behavior, the 
exceptional_behavior is employed to specify abnormal situations using the signals 
clause. Such speciﬁcations cannot terminate normally. We emulate this behavior by introduc-
ing an implicit ensures false.  
Figure 3.5 shows an example of an exceptional_behavior speciﬁcation. When an excep-
tion is thrown, both input parameters (a and b) must be greater than zero (lines 1 to 3). 
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/∗@ behaviour 
@ requires ( a >= 0 ) && ( b >= 0 ); 
@ assignable \nothing ; 
@ ensures \result == a + b; 
@ signals (Exception ) a > 200 && b > 100; 
@∗/ 
public int sum ( int a , int b ){ 
   return a + b ; 
} 
Figure 3.6. Example of behavior speciﬁcation. 
 
/∗@ normalbehaviour 
@ ensures \result == a + b; 
@∗/ 
public int soma ( int a , int b ){ 
  return a + b ; 
} 
Figure 3.7. Example of normal behavior speciﬁcation. 
A heavyweight speciﬁcation has a well-deﬁned interpretation for each clause in the 
speciﬁcation. When one omits a particular clause, JML assumes that it is interpreted as true. 
On the other hand, a lightweight s peciﬁcation does not start with a behavior keyword. Thus, 
only the clauses of interest are speciﬁed. In other words, it deﬁnes an “incomplete” 
speciﬁcation. For example, a method can specify its normal behavior (by deﬁning only pre-
condition or normal postcondition clauses), or its exceptional behavior (by deﬁning only ex-
ceptional postcondition clauses). In lightweight speciﬁcations, when a particular clause is 
omitted, the \not_specified interpretation is assumed. 
The JML semantics states that the keyword \not_specified is used to denote that a par-
ticular omitted clause has no condition. The JML compiler interprets omitted clauses in 
lightweight speciﬁcations similar to ones in heavyweight speciﬁcations which means true. 
Old expressions 
In JML, the keyword old is used to refer to pre-state expressions and variables in post-
state expressions (e.g., normal postconditions). An old expression, (\old(E)), and old varia-
ble, (\old(v)), denotes the value of the expression E and value of variable v respectively, in 
pre-state (i.e. before the method was called). 
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3.1.3. Type Speciﬁcations 
Invariants are predicates that must hold in all visible (reachable) states8. An invariant is an-
notated in a type declaration by using the keyword invariant, also known as type invariant. 
Figure 3.8 shows an example of invariant. In this example, the invariant  
(weight >= 0.0) must be preserved in all visible states. In this way, if a call to the me-
thods setWeight or getWeight violates the invariant, an error is raised. 
 
public clas s Person { 
  public double weight; 
  //@ invariant weight >= 0.0; 
 
  public void setWeight (double weight) { 
    this.weight = weight; 
  } 
  public double getWeight ( ) { 
    return this.weight; 
  } 
} 
Figure 3.8. JML invariant speciﬁcation. 
JML uses the keyword helper to provide more ﬂexibility for invariants. The helper 
modiﬁer (4, Section 7.1.1.14) can only be used on a private method or private constructor. By 
using this modiﬁer, such methods and constructors are also called helper methods and helper 
constructors. In this way, helper methods and constructors are “free” from the obligation of 
preserving type assertions (e.g., invariants). Suppose that the help method m is part of the 
class Person (see Figure 3.8). 
 
private /*@ helper @*/ void m (){ this.weight = -10; } 
 
Since it is declared of type helper, it does not need to satisfying the invariant  
(weight >= 0.0). The example presented in Figure 3.8 refers only to instance invariants. 
In JML, the invariants are distinguished into static and instance invariants. The former refers 
only to static ﬁelds and methods. On the other hand, the latter can refer to both static and in-
stance ﬁelds and methods. 
The following states of the program execution must be preserved by an object in order to 
keep an instance invariant integrity: 
 after execution of all non-helper constructors; 
 before execution of a non-helper ﬁnalizer method; 
 before and after execution of all non-helper non-static non-ﬁnalizer methods. 
                                                        
8 Visible states are all the possible states in the program execution. 
25 
 
On the other hand, instance invariants need not be preserved in the following states: 
 after execution of constructors declared with the helper modiﬁer;  
 before and after execution of methods declared with the helper modiﬁer 
 
public clas s TemporaryInvariantBreak { 
  public int f; 
  //@ invariant f >= 0; 
  public void m() { 
    this.f = −10; // temporary invariant break! 
    System.out.println("internal -state"); 
    System.out.println("f:" + f) ; 
    this.f = 0; //re−establishment of the invariant 
  } 
} 
Figure 3.9. Example of temporary invariant violation in a JML speciﬁcation. 
An invariant may be explicitly declared to be a static or an instance by using the 
modiﬁers static or instance during the declaration of the invariant. If an invariant is de-
clared in a class without the modiﬁer, it is an instance invariant by default, whereas if an in-
variant is declared in an interface without the modiﬁer, it is an static invariant by default. 
Regarding invariant violations in JML, there is only one way to temporarily break an in-
variant that consequently throws no assertion violation error. This temporarily invariant 
break is established in an internal-state during evaluation of a method’s body. However, be-
fore the method returns to the caller, the invariant must be reestablished, that is, a method 
during the execution of its body can break an invariant many times, but before the end of its 
execution all invariants must be reestablished, otherwise an error is raised indicating the in-
variant assertion violation. The example in Figure 3.9 demonstrates the temporarily violation 
of an invariant assertion even in presence of callbacks (recursive assertion checking). In this 
example the class TemporaryInvariantBreak has an invariant condition (line 3) that refers 
to the ﬁeld f (line 2). For the invariant break purpose, the class TemporaryInvariantBreak 
has a method m (lines 5 to 10) that temporarily breaks the invariant declared in line 3. The 
invariant break occurs in line 6 of the method m. Once broken, one can use the values of the 
internal-state (line 8 is printed the value of ﬁeld f). However, before the method terminates 
its execution, the invariant is established again (line 9) in order to prevent invariant asser-
tion violation. Regarding invariants and method termination, methods and constructors must 
preserve invariants in the case of normal and abnormal terminations. For example, even if a 
method terminates abnormally by throwing an exception, the invariant check must be per-
formed. 
Methods and constructors must preserve invariants in the case of normal and abnormal 
terminations. For example, even if a method terminates abnormally by throwing an excep-
tion, the invariant check must be performed. 
An invariant can be declared with any Java’s access modiﬁers (private, protected, and 
public). As in class members, if an invariant is declared in a class with no one of the Java 
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access modiﬁers, this means that it has a package visibility (default access). An invariant de-
clared in an interface with no modiﬁers has public visibility.  
History constraints 
History constraints, known as constraints for short, are used to specify the way that ob-
jects can change their values from one state to another (i.e., pre-state to a post-state) during 
the program execution.  
In JML, a constraint is written in a constraint clause with the keyword constraint. 
Moreover, constraint clauses are usually written using old expressions to relate the previous 
state (pre-state) with the resultant state (post-state), because they are two-state predicate. 
On the other hand, invariants (discussed in a previous section) cannot use old expressions, 
because they are one-state predicates. The constraints are applied to methods, and they must 
hold in the post-state of every (non-helper) method execution. 
 
public class ConstraintExample { 
  public int index ; 
  //@ constraint index == \old (index + 1); 
  public void incIndex () { 
     index++; 
  } 
 
  // . . . other methods 
} 
Figure 3.10. Example of constraint in JML speciﬁcation. 
Class ConstraintExample in Figure 3.10 includes an example of constraint in JML. The 
example deﬁnes the public ﬁeld index and the method intcIndex. The constraint  
index == \old(index + 1) states that after execution of the method incIndex (in a post-
state), the speciﬁed constraint must be checked. If the constraint does not hold, an error is 
raised indicating the constraint assertion violation. A scope problem is observed in the con-
straint deﬁned in Figure 2.15. Here, the constraint is applied to all methods in class 
ConstraintExample. In this way, we can have calls to other methods in class  
ConstraintExample which do not modify the ﬁeld index, thus leading to a constraint asser-
tion violation. To deal with such a scope problem, JML also allows one to specify constraints 
that are applicable only to a speciﬁc set of methods. 
 
//@ constraint index == \old(index + 1) for incIndex(); 
 
Below we show how to rewrite the constraint in order for it to be obligatory only for me-
thod incIndex(). If the for clause is omitted, it becomes an universal constraint that con-
strains all methods. The constraint speciﬁcation in Figure 3.10 is an example of universal 
constraint. 
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As with invariants, JML makes a distinction between instance constraints and static con-
straints. An instance constraint must hold only for instance methods, whereas a static con-
straint must hold both for instance and static methods. It is important to note that: (1) in-
stance constraints do not apply to constructors and ﬁnalizers because there is no well-
deﬁned pre-state for constructors and no post-state for ﬁnalizers. Moreover, helper methods, 
like invariants, do not have to preserve history constraints; and (2) unlike instance con-
straints, static constraints must be satisﬁed by all constructors (after constructor execution). 
Concerning constraints and method termination, just like invariants, constrained me-
thods must preserve constraints in the case of normal and abnormal terminations. In relation 
to access modiﬁers, like invariants, constraints can also be declared with any Java’s access 
modiﬁers (private, protected, and public). The rules of visibility for invariants are the 
same on constraints. 
Speciﬁcation for interfaces and inheritance 
As we previously mentioned, JML is used to specify Java’s modules such as classes and 
interfaces. Thus, interfaces may have speciﬁcations as well. The JML speciﬁcations that are 
present into interfaces provide two semantics diﬀerences between JML and Java: 
 stateful interfaces — in Java, interfaces are stateless in the sense that there are 
no time-varying ﬁelds in interfaces. In JML, however, interfaces become state-
ful as one can declare instance ﬁelds into interfaces by using model ﬁelds (this 
is one feature of the model programs). Accordingly to JML, locations should be 
allocated somewhere for storing state information attributed to the interfaces; 
 multiple inheritance — Java allows only single inheritance of code whereas 
JML supports multiple inheritance of speciﬁcations. That is, an interface in JML 
can have its own (model) ﬁelds and (model) methods.  
 
In JML, a subclass inherits speciﬁcations such as preconditions, postconditions, and inva-
riants from its superclasses and interfaces that it implements. An interface also inherits 
speciﬁcations of the interfaces that it extends. The semantics of speciﬁcation inheritance re-
sembles that of code inheritance in Java; e.g., a program variable appearing in assertions is 
statically resolved, and an instance method call is dynamically dispatched (30). 
There are several ways to inherit speciﬁcations: subclassing, interface extension and im-
plementation, and reﬁnement. A subtype inherits not only ﬁelds and methods from its super-
types, but also speciﬁcations such as pre- and postconditions, and invariants. To provide the 
eﬀect of speciﬁcation inheritance, JML employs the keyword also, which denotes a combina-
tion (join) of speciﬁcation cases, which consist of clauses including pre-, postconditions and 
so forth. 
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3.1.4. Visibility of Speciﬁcations 
As in Java, JML provides rules of visibility for JML annotations. It imposes extra rules to the 
usual Java visibility rules. One rule states that an annotation cannot refer to names (e.g., 
ﬁelds) that are more hidden than the annotation visibility. Suppose x is a name declared in 
package P with type T (P.T), by applying this JML visibility rule, we have the following restric-
tions: 
 An expression in a public method speciﬁcation can refer to x only if x is de-
clared as public; 
 An expression in a protected method speciﬁcation can refer to x only if x is de-
clared with public or protected visibility, and x must also respect Java’s visibili-
ty rules — if x has protected visibility, then the reference must occur from 
within P or outside P only if the reference occurs in a subclass of T; 
 An expression in a method with default (package) visibility can refer to x only 
if x is declared with public, protected or default visibility, and x must also re-
spect Java’s visibility rules — if x has default visibility, then the reference must 
occur from within P; 
Note that the visibility access modiﬁers used in JML only occur in heavyweight method 
speciﬁcations. In a lightweight method speciﬁcation, the privacy level is the same of the me-
thod. For example, a public method with a lightweight method speciﬁcation is considered to 
have a public visibility annotation.  
Still regarding privacy of speciﬁcations, JML also oﬀers the keywords spec_public and 
spec_protected. Both are used to provide means to make a declaration that has a nar-
rower visibility become wider (public or protected), and thus, respecting the rules of JML vi-
sibility. For instance, the declaration: 
 
private /*@ spec_public@ */String name; 
 
introduces a ﬁeld name of type string that Java considers private but JML considers pub-
lic. In this way, this declaration can be referred to, for example, in a public method 
speciﬁcation. 
3.1.5. Advanced JML features 
When JML is used to specify high level properties and then to verify formally modules of pro-
grams written in modern object-oriented languages like Java, features listed in the previous 
section are unfortunately not sufficient. In this section we will present the necessary extra 
constructs for specifying object-oriented modules: datagroups, ghost fields, model fields etc. 
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Datagroups 
It was previously mentioned that frame properties specify which parts of the system may 
change as a result of a method execution. So, any location left outside the frame property 
(expressed by the assignable keyword) is guaranteed to have the same value as in the pre-
state. 
Consider the following example from Figure 3.11. 
 
 
public class Time { 
  // some invariant 
  protected int hour, min; 
   
  . . . 
 
  /*@ requires ...; // some pre-condition 
    @ assignable hour, min; 
    @ ensures ...; // some post-condition  
    @*/ 
  public void setTime(int hr, int m) { 
    this.hour = hr; this.min = m; 
  } 
} 
Figure 3.11. Frame properties. 
In the Figure 3.11 we have the class Time with two variables hour and min. Their values 
get updated by the setTime method.  Note that the assignable clause of this form is highly 
problematic because it contradicts good object-oriented practices for two reasons: 1) it ex-
poses implementation details by mentioning names of the protected fields and 2) the specifi-
cation is restrictive for any future subclasses. 
Thus, if in the future we are required to express time more precisely (e.g by adding a 
field for seconds and milliseconds respectively) then the newly added fields in the extended 
class would not be explicitly mentioned in the assignable clause. 
Datagroups (31) provide a solution to this problem. The idea is that that a datagroup is 
an abstract piece of an object’s state that may still be extended by future subclasses. 
The specification in Figure 3.12 declares a (public) datagroup _time and declares that 
the three (private) ﬁelds belong to this datagroup. This avoids exposing any private imple-
mentation details, and it’s subclasses may extend the datagroup with additional ﬁelds. 
Using the datagroup principle the example from Figure 3.11 is modified as presented in 
Figure 3.12. 
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public class Time { 
  //@ public model JMLDataGroup _time; 
 
  protected int hour;     //@ in _time; 
  protected int min;      //@ in _time; 
  protected int sec;      //@ in _time; 
  protected int milisec;  //@ in _time; 
 
  . . . 
 
  // the rest of the class 
  } 
} 
Figure 3.12. Datagroup with three fields. 
Model ﬁelds  
Model ﬁelds serve for the purpose of data abstraction. A model ﬁeld is used for 
speciﬁcation-only purposes that provide an abstraction of (part of) the concrete state of an 
object. The speciﬁcation in Figure 3.13 illustrates the use of a model ﬁeld. 
Note that the _currentDay model ﬁeld in class Month is public, and hence visible to 
clients, though its representation is not. The represents clause must be declared private, be-
cause it refers to private ﬁelds. For every model ﬁeld there is an associated datagroup, so 
that the model ﬁeld can also be used in assignable clauses. An object can have several mod-
el ﬁelds, providing abstractions of diﬀerent aspects of the object (31). 
 
 
public class Month { 
   //@ public model long _currentDay; 
   //@ private represents _currentDay = month + date + day; 
 
   private int month;   //@ in _currentDay; 
   private int date;    //@ in _currentDay; 
   private int day;     //@ in _currentDay; 
 
    . . .  // the rest of the class 
 
} 
Figure 3.13. Model field with its associate datagroup. 
Model ﬁelds are especially useful in the speciﬁcation of Java interfaces, as interfaces do 
not contain any concrete representation we can refer to in speciﬁcations. We can declare 
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model ﬁelds in a Java interface, and then every class that implements the interface can deﬁne 
its own represents clause relating this abstract ﬁeld to its concrete representation. 
Ghost fields 
Ghost fields are also specification-only fields, which means that they cannot be referred 
to by Java code. They’re difference with model fields is that while model ﬁelds are there to 
provide data-abstraction, a ghost ﬁeld can provide an additional state of the object. 
The change of the state of the ghost fields is done by the set keyword. The setting of the 
ghost fields can be (and usually is) done not in the specification, but rather during the pro-
gram control. In this way the objects state can be monitored during different program execu-
tion paths. 
 
public class Person { 
   private String name; 
   private int age; 
   //@ public ghost boolean _invalidAge = false; 
 
   //@ requires age >= 0; 
   //@ assignable age; 
   //@ ensures age >= 0; 
   public void setAge(int age) { 
      
     if (age < 0)  { 
   age = 0;  // set age to zero, since invalid value  
     // was provided 
   //@ set _invalidAge = true; 
     }  
   else { 
         this.age = age; 
      //@ set _invalidAge = false; 
           } 
} 
Figure 3.14. Setting the value of the ghost field based on program execution. 
In Figure 3.14. we provide an example of using ghost fields to monitor the state of object 
based on input provided from the user. Namely, in the method setAge of class Person, if a 
negative parameter is provided as input, than the value of the ghost field is set to true indi-
cating that the age is invalid. Note that since the ghost field was declared public it can be 
seen, and thus this objects state verified, from outside the Person object itself. 
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3.1.6. Some additional JML operators 
Java Modeling Language has some operators which are useful for the definition of the me-
thod API’s. The operators mentioned here can be used in both normal and exceptional pre-
conditions (i.e. in ensures and signals clauses) and in history constraints. 
The first mentioned, is the \not_assigned operator which specifies the data groups that 
were not assigned during the execution of the method being specified (29). The example be-
low specifies that the datagroups _gr1 and _gr2 defined in the class Person, are not assigned 
during the execution of the method increaseWeight.  
 
public class Person { 
 . . .  
  int weight; 
 
  //@ public model JMLDataGroup _age, _stamina; 
 
  /∗@ requires  true; 
    @ 
    @ ensures   (\result = \old(weight) + a) && 
    @       \not_assigned(_age, _stamina); 
    @∗/ 
public int increaseWeight(int a) { 
     weight =  weight + a; 
return weight ; 
} 
 
} 
Figure 3.15. Restricting field modification with the \not_assigned operator. 
The next operator is the \not_modified operator used to assert fields whose values are 
the same in the post-state as in the pre-state. For example, the \not_modified(xval, yval) 
says that xval and yval have the same value in the pre and post state (their values are equal) 
of the method execution (see Section 11.4.4 in (29)). 
The operator \only_accessed specifies that the method’s execution only reads from a 
subset of data groups named by the given fields. For example, \only_accessed(xval, yval) 
says that no fields of the data groups named xval and yval were read by the method. This 
includes both direct reads in the body of the method, and reads during calls that were made 
by the method (and methods that this method might have called, etc.) (see Section 11.4.5 in 
(29) for more). 
The operator \only_assigned specifies that the method’s execution only assigns new 
values to a subset of the data groups named by the given fields. For example, 
\only_assigned(xval,yval) says that no fields, outside of the data groups of xval and yval 
were assigned by the method (see Section 11.4.6 in (29)). 
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Keyword Description return type  
\not_assigned specifies the data groups that are not as-
signed during method execution 
boolean 
\not_modified specifies fields whose values should remain 
the same in the post-state as in the pre-state. 
boolean 
\only_accessed specifies that only a subset of data groups 
named in the given fields should be read during 
the method execution 
boolean 
\only_assigned during the method execution only a subset 
of the data groups  are assigned new values 
boolean 
\only_called method’s execution only called from a sub-
set of methods given in the method-name-list 
boolean 
\only_captured method’s execution only captured refer-
ences from a subset of the data groups named 
by the given fields 
boolean 
\fresh objects were freshly allocatedbound as a 
result of this method execution. They did not 
have values assigned in the pre-state. 
boolean 
assert check that the specified predicate is true at 
the given point in the program 
 
assume assume that the given predicate is true  
Table 3.2. The description of some of the JML predicates and specification expressions. 
The \only_called operator specifies that the method’s execution is only allowed to call 
from a subset of methods given in the method-name-list. For example, \only_called(p,q) 
says that no methods, apart from p and q, were called during this method’s execution. 
Similarly, the operator \only_captured specifies that only the method’s execution only 
captured references from a subset of the data groups named by the given fields. 
Another handy operator is the \fresh operator which specifies that the objects created 
in this method are freshlly allocated; for example, \fresh(x,y) asserts that x and y are not 
null and that the objects bound to these identifiers were not allocated in the pre-state. 
Two other keywords of interest are defined here. Namely, the assert and assume state-
ments. An assert statements tells JML to check that the specified predicate is true at the given 
point in the program (29). The runtime assertion checker checks such assertions during ex-
ecution of the program, when control reaches the assert statement. The assume statement is 
used when we to tell the analysis tool that the given predicate is assumed to be true (29). 
The difference between the assert and the assume statement is that that the static check-
er just uses the assumption without checking if it is correct, while with an assert statement, it 
checks if a condition can be deduced. 
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3.1.7. Limitations of JML 
Despite that JML is able to specify quite rigorous specification it has limitations which have a 
particularly impact when it comes to specifying properties related to security. 
JML specifications are restricted to a single class. This makes it especially hard to reason 
about security related behavior because some of the design decisions determining this beha-
vior are made in different classes. Furthermore, at least in larger (Java) desktop applications, 
this behavior is usually spread in many classes located in different packages. 
It is difficult to specify the allowed sequences of method calls with JML. Such sequences 
are essential properties of reusable object-oriented classes and application frameworks.  
Another key limitation is related to one of the design goals of JML. JML was designed for 
specifications exclusively restricted to the functional behavior of programs. For this reason 
most of the up to date security related research involving JML tends to reason about security 
from a functional point of view as well. This means that reasoning about security properties 
with JML depends from the implementation of solutions for those security properties. JML as 
a design by contract language, in this context is used to reason about the correctness of im-
plementation of these solutions.  
The third limitation of JML is that it has not much support for refinement. The only re-
finement support that JML has is the possibility to express the data abstraction of fields of 
objects by the JML construct of model fields [For more on model fields go to page 28]. No re-
finement is possible for any JML clauses representing behavior. As a result of this, it is not 
possible to define any sort of dynamic annotations, that would for example reflect on beha-
vior based on a given pre condition. 
The motivation  for JML  is  to provide support  for ensuring  that  the program works  
under  the  assumptions  the  programmer  had  in mind during development (32).  That is, 
improve program development so that assumptions of specific actions are recorded and en-
forced.  The specific actions ensure that method implementations behave as expected.  
3.1.8. A comparison of JML and OCL 
JML does have some things in common with the Object Constraint Language (OCL), which is 
part of the UML standard. Like JML, OCL can be used to specify invariants and pre- and post-
conditions. An important difference is that JML explicitly targets Java, whereas OCL is not 
speciﬁc to any one programming language.  
JML clearly has the disadvantage that it can not be used for, say, C++ programs, whereas 
OCL can. But it also has obvious advantages when it comes to syntax, semantics, and expres-
sivity. Because JML sticks to the Java syntax and typing rules, a typical Java programmer will 
prefer JML notation (33) over OCL notation. 
JML supports all the Java modiﬁers such as static, private, public, etc., and these can 
be used to record detailed design decisions. Furthermore, there are legal Java expressions 
that can be used in JML speciﬁcations but that cannot be expressed in OCL. 
More significant than these limitations, or differences in syntax, are differences in se-
mantics (26). JML builds on the (well defined) semantics of Java. So, for instance, the equals 
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keyword has the same meaning in JML and Java, as does ==, and the same rules for overrid-
ing, overloading, and hiding apply. This is not the case for OCL. 
3.2. Java RMI 
In this section we present Java Remote method Invocation mechanism that we used during 
the implementation of the prototype in our case study. Namely, first we give a short overview 
of the Java RMI technology (that has been in existence for more than twenty years) and se-
condly, we give an outline of necessary steps to create distributed objects with this technolo-
gy. 
3.2.1. Remote Method Invocation (RMI) 
The primary goal of Remote Method Invocation (RMI) is to make it possible to develop dis-
tributed Java applications with same syntax and semantics as if they were used in non-
distributed applications. RMI allows developers to create programs that share objects (usual-
ly located on the server side) and make them remotely accessible for other programs (usual-
ly on client side), allowing them to invoke methods and access attributes in the same way as 
it is done in local objects. RMI requires only a TCP/IP based network infrastructure for com-
munication between Java virtual machines, but all network related communication is hidden 
from the developer. 
The core of the RMI lays in the deﬁnition of objects and the implementation of objects 
(34). In RMI, the deﬁnition of a remote object is coded using an interface. The implementa-
tion of the remote object is coded using a class. Clients that invoke methods on the remote 
object use the interface (deﬁnition) of the remote object and do not know the implementa-
tion. 
Figure 3.16 shows an example of remote method invocation. Both the client and server 
know the Example interface. The server has the implementation of this object and has made 
it available to the client to contact it remotely. The client only knows the deﬁnition of the 
class; methods of this class that are invoked on the client side will function as a proxy. 
The way the server shares the objects is by placing them on the RMI registry using a 
string as a name to identify them (34). When clients want to access the objects that the serv-
er advertises, they request the name together with a hostname (Internet address) to identify 
the virtual machine that serves the object. 
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Figure 3.16. The conceptual overview of distributed objects with RMI. 
 
Steps for creating distributed objects with RMI 
Below we show steps in a typical usage of RMI technology. The steps are organized as 
follows: 
1. Creating an interface 
import java.rmi.*; 
public interface ServerObj extends Remote  
{ 
    public void methodA() throws RemoteExcetption; 
} 
 
This is the interface of the ServerObj. By extending the java.rmi.Remote class, the ob-
jects that implement this interface can be available remotely. The method signatures need to 
throw RemoteExcetption exception because they are not executed locally. 
2. Creating the implementation 
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public class ServerObjImpl extends java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject 
{ 
   public void methodA()throws java.rmi.RemoteExcetption 
   { 
     // … implementation code 
   } 
} 
 
 
The ServerObjImpl is the implementation of the ServerObj class. It extends the 
UnicastRemoteObject to have it registered into the RMI registry and thus make it avail-
able to get called remotely. 
3. Serializing objects 
In order to be able to pass objects as arguments to remote methods, object serialization 
must take place. Therefore each objects that will be passed through the network has to im-
plement the Serializable interface. 
This way, these objects can be ﬂattened and streamed over the network. 
4. Creation of Stubs and Skeletons 
In Java, manual creation of the stubs was necessary until the version 1.4.2 which coinci-
dently, is the version that we will be using. 
To create the stub and skeleton ﬁles, the RMI compiler is used. It is a command line tool 
that is shipped with the Java SDK and is named rmic. After running it on 
ServerObjImpl.class a ServerObjImpl_Stub.class and ServerObjImpl_Skel.class are 
created. 
In these two files resides all the network communication details. So when the client calls 
a remote method he is actually calling the stub will contain the code to connect to the remote 
skeleton, to send details about the function to be invoked, to send the parameters, and to get 
the results back.  
5. The server side 
ServerObj s = new ServerObjImpl(); 
Naming.rebind("rmi://localhost:1099/Service”, s); 
 
Naming.rebind() is a static method that is used to bind a remote object to an URL. The 
number 1099 is the default port that is used with RMI registry. 
6. Client Side 
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ServerObj so = (ServerObj); 
Naming.lookup(“rmi:// localhost:1099/Service”); 
 
Naming.lookup() returns a java.rmi.Remote object (proxy stub), that can be 
used like a normal, local object. 
7. Running the Applications 
 
First, the RMI registry server has to be started where we register the remote object 
ServerObj. Next, the client can be started. It will connect to the registry and obtain a refer-
ence to the ServerObj by specifying the name that was used by the server to register it. 
3.3. Authentication and Access Control in Java  
In this section we present Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS). We use this 
mechanism to implement security properties in our prototype application.  
JAAS was introduced in the Java 2 SDK. It represents a framework that authenticates us-
ers and allows them (or not) to run certain code, based on the privileges that were assigned 
previously for each user individually (35). 
3.3.1. Java Authentication and Authorization Service 
JAAS is mainly formed of two components, authentication and authorization. The authentica-
tion part is used to determine the identity of the user, while the authorization component is 
there to restrict the execution of the sensitive tasks that users can perform. The latter com-
ponent does this by checking if the (authenticated) user has privileges to run that particular 
source code. 
JAAS is a pluggable interface that can be developed independent of the application and 
irrespective if it’s an applet, servlet or an ordinary desktop application. (35) 
Subjects and Principals 
Users or processes in JAAS are represented as Subjects which represent single identities 
and are implemented by the Subject class (36). A single subject class can have numerous as-
sociated identities, each of which is represented by a Principal object.  
For e.g., a single Subject represents a medical employee which requires access to both, 
email system and the patient database. This Subject will have two Principals, one asso-
ciated with the employee's user ID for e-mail access and the other associated with his user ID 
for patient database. Each time this user logs in successfully, both of these principals are (dy-
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namically) associated to him gaining him execution privileges for both of these functions. 
When the user logs out, all his associated principals are removed from the subject. 
Policy files 
Policy files are the main mechanism to control access to system resources and sensitive 
code execution. They can be used for three main purposes, to specify the login configuration 
type, to assign system resources and to assign execution privileges to authenticated users. 
 
grant signedBy “Erik”, codebase “file:Querry.jar”  
{ 
    permission java.io.FilePermission “/DB/Access”, “read”; 
} 
Figure 3.17. The policy file my.policy for access control. 
Access control to system resources is specified in a separate file and loaded at start-up as 
an argument. This file contains statements as shown in the Figure 3.17. This policy file serves 
to create the java.security.policy object. 
Statements in Figure 3.17 allow code signed by “Erik” located in the file Querry.jar file 
read access privileged to the files in /DB/Access directory. 
In this way, Subjects discussed previously, are assigned specific system resource per-
missions through the policy file. 
To authorize code execution-privileges to certain Principal of a Subject, we can give a 
policy as an argument to the java.security.auth.policy object with grant entries that 
look as in the Figure 3.18. 
 
grant Principal MyPrincipalIml “user1”  
{ 
     permission PersonnelPermission “*”; 
}; 
 
grant Principal MyPrincipalIml “user2”  
{ 
     permission PersonnelPermission “doOperationA”; 
}; 
Figure 3.18. Assigning different privileges to different users. 
In Figure 3.18 user1 is permitted to execute all methods, while user2 is permitted to ex-
ecute only the method named doOperationA. 
Every time we try to execute code whose access is monitored by JAAS in that access con-
trol context, a facility called AccessController, iterates through the permission objects 
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created by the grant statements that were listed in the policy file for that particular Subject 
(35). 
Login Context 
To set up a login module for an application we need to implement the LoginContext 
class. 
The LoginContext class authenticates Subjects by using built-in methods. This class can 
take two parameters, the Configuration object that associates the login module to be used 
in the application and a CallbackHandler class. The CallbackHandler reads the username 
and password9 from the user. 
3.3.2. Flow of operation in JAAS 
As we mentioned previously, in JAAS operations are split in two phases. First, a Subject has to 
be authenticated and then various JAAS authorization features can be used to restrict access 
to the system resources. Both phases of authentication and authorization are explained be-
low. 
User authentication in JAAS 
JAAS establishes the identity of the user based on the credentials the user provides. Fig-
ure 3.19 presents the sequence diagram of processes when JAAS establishes the identity of 
the user.  
To authenticate a Subject instance, an application instantiates a LoginContext object. 
This is done so the credential information of the Principals are presented to JAAS. The 
LoginContext instance loads the login module(s) that was configured for that application. 
Then, the application invokes the login method of the LoginContext class. The login me-
thod, in turn, invokes all the login modules, which call the CallbackHandler to read the user-
name and password from the user represented by a Subject. If these modules successfully 
authenticate the Subject, they (according the authorization policy grant entries supplied) 
associate his corresponding Principals with that Subject. The LoginContext class returns 
the (authentication) status to the application. If the authentication is successful, the user’s 
identity has been verified and this Subject instance is retrieved from the LoginContext in-
stance. 
Now that the Subject has been authenticated, a fine-grained access control can be en-
forced to verify his permissions before the JAAS systems allows him to perform actions that 
he requests. 
                                                        
9 Note that different features, such as voice recognition, can be used to determine the identity of the user. 
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Verifying the authorizations of users with JAAS 
After the identity has been established and the Subject class created for that identity, a 
fine-grained access control can be enforced by invoking the built-in doAs and doPrivileged 
methods of this class. Using JAAS access control can be enforced every time when user 
acesses/creates different system resources such as files on the disk, different system options 
etc. 
 
 
Figure 3.19. A typical JAAS Authentication sequence. 
 
Related to authorization control, in our application we mainly use JAAS to ensure that 
only users who have permissions for the methods that they attempt to call are actually al-
lowed to do call them. To provide access control of methods we use the built-in methods of 
Subject10 and AccessController11 class of Java API.  
By invoking the internal doAs method the Subject class, verifies if it a permission object 
named like the method he is trying to call. To verify that the call done by the Subject is in 
compliance with the current security policy the checkPermission method of AccessControl 
                                                        
10 javax.security.auth.Subject 
11 java.security.AccessController 
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is called. If this call is allowed, then checkPermission returns quietly. If the call is not permit-
ted, an AccessControlException is thrown. 
This concludes the control of authorization for that Subject making the method call. 
After discussing the background concepts and programming technologies that will be 
used during this thesis work, we continue in the next chapter, by looking at the possible ap-
proaches where JML was used to specify programs.   
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Chapter IV 
4. Approaches of using JML to specify security properties 
In this chapter we discuss the approaches that we have identified on how JML was used be-
fore to reason about security properties. Some approaches attempt to formally verify the 
properties or while others just to prove that their program is correct in relation to their in-
tent. We present examples of these approaches and explain the approach that we plan to use 
when specifying security properties. 
One approach views security properties as a problem of correct implementation of the 
intended behavior. The problem here is how to ensure that the functional part of the pro-
gram which implements the security properties is implemented correctly. Correctly in this 
context means that the implemented functionalities match the behavior that the developer 
had in mind. The goal of this approach is to verify that the behavior which was specified with 
JML (as the intended behavior), really matches the actual implementation. And if so, it is 
claimed that because the implementation is correctly implemented, the specified properties 
also hold for that implementation. 
Another approach identifies states in the program and models the program, based on the 
states, as a finite state automaton. The security related behavior of the program is also mod-
eled in the state automata. The problem here is how to capture the behavior and state transi-
tions of the program with JML constraints. The goal is to verify that transitions of states in 
the program match the transitions in the state automata. If this is verified then the program 
meets the security properties modeled in the automata. 
In the field of language based security, the security properties of confidentiality and in-
tegrity are defined in terms of non-interference in the data flow. The fields involved in the 
data flow are assigned different security levels. The problem here is how to ensure that con-
fidential data from fields belonging to the higher security levels don’t leak to the lower fields 
intended for public data. The goal is by using JML, how to specify that no data flow should oc-
cur from high (secret) fields to low (public) fields. 
We will explain these approaches in more detail below. During our explanations, on oc-
casion, we use the following abbreviations:  
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Abbreviation Represents 
P The program that implements the intended be-
havior (where the  JML specifications will be 
inserted)  
S The down finite state automata modeling the 
states of the program P 
SJ All the JML statements used to represent S 
Φ The property that we are specifying 
Table 4.1. Explanation of used abbreviations. 
Each of the following three sections address one the afore mentioned approaches. Each 
section illustrates the approach with example(s). At the end of each section we identify is-
sues related to that particular approach. 
4.1. Correctness of implementation 
This approach of specifying security properties views security from the correctness point of 
view. Some of the examples of this approach are (14), (37) and partly (38).The foundation of 
this approach lays on the principle that even though a correct implementation does not nec-
essarily represent a secure application, the opposite of this claim certainly implies (among 
others) an erroneous and possibly insecure application. Thus, it is considered important to 
have a correct implementation of the intended behavior. In this sense JML is used as a second 
assurance for the correctness of implementation. Thus, we have the code behavior establish-
ing the given property, and we have JML statements which should capture the requirements 
of the method implementor and responsibilities of the method caller. 
This approach starts by claiming that the program P meets certain security properties 
because of its specific implementation details. It informally argues that because P has certain 
features it meets the claimed properties. An example claim can be, since P implements a 
cryptographic protocol when party A communicates with party B, this program meets the 
property of confidentiality of communication between these parties. 
However, to be sure that the implementation of P really implements the argued behavior 
correctly it uses different JML constructs to capture the behavior of P in annotations. In other 
words, in order to be sure that confidentiality is achieved we specify the behavior of the code 
implementing the cryptographic protocol used in communication between party A and party 
B. Inserted JML annotations are to be understood as predicates for the code (17). 
We denote the total of JML statements required to annotate P as SJ. Thus, SJ would for 
example specify the behavior of code in terms of when a nonce is generated, how public and 
private keys are being administered, how the program encrypts and decrypts the provided 
messages etc.  
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Further on, static analysis tools (such as ESC/Java2) 12 are used to verify that P reports 
no violations in relation to the SJ. If no violations are reported then by inference it claims 
that P has been implemented correctly in relation to SJ and thus it meets the claimed proper-
ty. 
In essence JML here is used to specify the behavior of the code that has been imple-
mented. The motivation for this is twofold, first; some of the basic errors can be reported by 
static analysis tools such as lack of null checks, unnecessary leakage of object references etc. 
and secondly, by reasoning about the code in the contractual manner between the caller and 
the implementor, it should contribute to a better understanding of the code and point out 
possible mistakes or design errors made during the implementation phase (26). 
In the following, we provide a simple example to show how JML is used to verify proper-
ties with this approach. Note that this program is a simple “toy” example and is showed he-
reby to only illustrate the principle of how JML can be used to claim that an implementation 
of a program is correct and thus that program meets the given property. 
An example 
Our simple example is presented to only show is this principle used to claim correctness 
of the application. The program in question P presented in Figure 4.1 is very simple and has 
one policy defining confidentiality. The policy specifies that the program only prints to the 
screen objects of type UserData that are not confidential and ignores the received confiden-
tial objects of the same type. In this example we show how this behavior respecting the given 
policy can be modeled by JML. The purpose of the modeling is that, if the annotated P is stati-
cally verified then we can claim that the policy is correctly implemented and thus P is confi-
dential in respect to the definition of confidentiality in our policy. Note that usually security 
properties are more complex and programs larger, thus the JML constructs used to specify 
those properties are more advanced than the ones used in this example. However this exam-
ple should suffice to illustrate the principle. 
The method starts by claiming that the java program P presented in Figure 4.1 has the 
property Φ. P contains a class UserData with two fields to hold a username and password as 
well as a boolean field named isConfidential to keep track of state of that object during 
program execution. The isConfidential field is updated during the program flow at differ-
ent points according the program logic that we are implementing.  
Below we show only the relevant parts of P and hide the rest for clarity. The other ele-
ments such as the definition of PrintException and toString method are omitted in the 
Figure 4.1 as they do not contribute the purpose of our explanation. 
The definition of property Φ which should hold in P, states that the method  
printToScreen prints only objects of type UserData which are not marked as confidential and 
ignores the rest. 
 
  
                                                        
12 Available at: http://secure.ucd.ie/products/opensource/ESCJava2/ 
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class P { 
 
class UserData { 
 private String username; 
 private String password; 
 private boolean isConfidential; 
   
 public UserData(String usr, String pwd) { 
  username = usr; 
  password = pwd; 
 } 
 . . . 
} 
  
. . . 
  
public boolean printToScreen (UserData ud)  
      throws PrintException { 
 
 if (ud.isConfidential==true) { 
  throw pe; 
 } 
  else { 
   ud.toString(); 
   return true; 
  } 
} 
 
. . . 
 
} 
Figure 4.1. Program P.  
Our claim that property Φ holds in program P is based on the particular behavior that we 
have implemented in P. This behavior is defined as follows: “the method printToScreen in 
program P checks if the parameter object received has the field isConfidential set to false. 
If so, it prints his string representation to screen and if not, it throws a PrintException 
without printing the object”.  Based on this behavior we claim that P fulfils property Φ. The 
behavior explained in the statement below is implemented in the if statement of the 
printToScreen method of program P. 
However, in order for us to be sure that P really implements Φ we use JML to express the 
intended behavior with annotations. After annotating the program with JML it now becomes: 
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class P { 
  
 . . . 
 class UserData { 
  private /*@ spec_public @*/ String username; 
  private /*@ spec_public @*/ String password; 
  private /*@ spec_public @*/ boolean isConfidential; 
 } 
 
 . . . 
  /*@ requires usr!=null && pwd!=null; 
    @ ensures  username==usr && password==pwd; 
    @*/ 
  public UserData(String usr, String pwd) { 
   username = usr; 
   password = pwd; 
  } 
  . . . 
 } 
  
 . . . 
  
 /*@ requires ud!=null; 
   @ ensures  \result==true; 
   @ 
   @ signals_only (PrintException pe)  
       ud.isConfidential==true; 
   @*/ 
 public boolean printToScreen (UserData ud)  
       throws PrintException { 
 
  if (ud.isConfidential==true) { 
   throw pe; 
  } 
   else { 
    ud.toString(); 
    return true; 
   } 
 }  
. . . 
 
} 
Figure 4.2. Annotated version of program P. 
By inserting the JML annotation we capture the previously defined behavior of P with 
JML. Note that we have additionally required a check of the isConfidential field by JML be-
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fore we print the object. This should make it clearer that such check is necessary in the pro-
gram code as well. By doing the annotations of our program the requirements should become 
clearer leading to a better understanding of the code. 
This annotation ensures that when the printToScreen method is called, the object re-
ceived as parameter should not be null and is required to have the isConfidential field set 
to false. Only if this holds, the object will be printed, on the contrary a PrintException is 
raised. 
So, when a static analysis tool is used to verify P against the provided JML annotations 
and if no violations are reported during verification, then our claim is considered to have 
been verified. In that case, program P does indeed meet property Φ because the behavior in P 
is implemented correctly in relation to the annotations which specify the claimed behavior 
for establishing property Φ - as it has been defined in the policy. Note that because the pro-
gram we have shown is very simple, the JML used here is straight forward. When the pro-
gram is more complex and when policies deal with more advanced security properties, then 
these JML constructs do not suffice any longer, new and more advanced ones have to be used.  
Despite that the JML features used with this approach depend on the specific program 
behavior being implemented and the properties that are being specified, there is a group of 
constructs from JML that are often used when specifying properties with emphasis to securi-
ty. Next we present the most important constructs of this group. 
4.1.1. Employed JML constructs 
The JML constructs used most often for preventing coding errors that might lead to a com-
promised security in the application are listed below. They include a special specification-
only field marking the state, object invariants keeping track of consistency through the object 
life cycle, pre- and post- conditions expressing context of method calls and exception control. 
Ghost fields 
Ghost fields are used to mark the states when analyzing the information flow property 
(39) of data. Variables of this kind are auxiliary ﬁelds which are not used by the implementa-
tion, but occur in speciﬁcations only. For example if we have an object that is being received 
by another object and if we mark the state of the first object with a ghost variable like below: 
 
//@ public ghost boolean isConfidential = false; 
 
In the precondition of the method that receives this object we can ensure that only the 
objects with the appropriate state are received. Furthermore, we can specify this as an inva-
riant in the receiving object, at which case we ensure that the received object maintains one 
of the states from a fixed set of previously defined states. This enables us to specify the state 
of that object during its flow through the program.  
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Information flow is just one example where ghost fields can be used. Besides using them 
for information flow monitoring they can be used to mark any state in the code by only set-
ting their value appropriately at that point in the code. 
Object Invariants 
Object Invariants express properties which should hold at the entry and exit to each me-
thod. The invariants describe the meaning of the consistency of the object data. 
An object invariant that verifies if the state of the receiving object is true looks as in the 
following example: 
 
//@ invariant obj.isConfidential == false; 
 
Here obj is the reference of the object being received. In this way, when objects are re-
ceived we can check if they are in the appropriate state. In the information flow control do-
main, this allows us to monitor the flow of data in the program based on their current state. 
Note that is possible only for immutable types as ghost fields can only be assigned to them. 
Pre- and Post- Conditions 
Each method in Java code is supposed to be called in certain context i.e. it assumes that 
certain ﬁelds of its object are appropriately set, that the parameters come from speciﬁc 
ranges (e.g. between 0 and 10), that a particular parameter has a particular type, and in gen-
eral that certain relations hold between the input data and/or the ﬁelds of the object. Here is 
an example of such a precondition: 
 
/*@ requires obj.isConfidential!=true && param1!=null 
  @*/ 
private String m(Password obj) { 
  . . .  
} 
Figure 4.3. A precondition for method m. 
The above invariant states that when method m is called it should only accept Password 
objects of type confidential, that is, where the state variable named isConfidential is set 
to true. 
Similarly, it is often needed for a method to guarantee that certain ﬁelds are set, certain 
relations between the object states hold or, a relation between the result and the input data 
of the method hold. This is done by means of pre- and post- conditions.  
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/*@ … ensures \result.isConfidential && \fresh(\result) … 
  @*/ 
private … String m(Password obj) { 
 . . .  
} 
Figure 4.4. A postcondition for method m. 
For example if we want to specify that the result of m is confidential and should be pro-
tected from exposure in the code of the application we annotate as in Figure 4.5. 
Additionally we have required that the result generated after the method m is executed 
needs to be generated inside this method. This solution is one way how to prevent an uncon-
trolled aliasing of data considered to be confidential. 
Exception control 
The specification of exceptions can be used to clearly mark the conditions guaranteed to 
hold after an exception has been raised. This leads to a clearer understanding the code. It can 
also mark types of exceptions that are possible to be thrown and the pre- and post- condi-
tions separately for each exception. 
 
/*@ … signals_only (NullpointerException e) param1==null  && 
  @ …  signals_only (SecurityException se) 
  @*/ obj.isConfidential==false 
private … String m(String param1, Password obj) { 
 . . .  
} 
Figure 4.5. Catching the behavior of exceptions in JML. 
In this invariant we have specified that when method m is called, if the provided param1 is 
null or if the object obj of type Password is not confidential then the corresponding exception 
will be raised. 
4.1.2. Issues 
We have stated previously that this method of specifying security properties enables us to 
capture the intended program behavior by JML annotations and then verify that the code cor-
rectly implements that behavior. And since this is the case then we claim that security prop-
erties claimed in the implementation are also met. 
However, in principle there is no guarantee that the annotations are really correct, or 
that they really capture the intended behavior accurately. As (14) claims; the annotations do 
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not provide full proof security but only an additional standardized level of assurance that the 
source code is well written with regard to the intended behavior. 
This approach brings to a better clarification of the requirements of the software, be-
cause reading of the speciﬁcations is easier than reading the actual source code as the anno-
tations provide a certain abstraction of the functionality (14). They also give a stable repre-
sentation of the expected functionality during development which can be a huge asset in 
areas of development where cost of implementing flaws is way too high. This cost can be 
matched with the higher cost during development process, because adding these annotations 
is a costly and labor intensive process which contributes to the rise of the total cost of devel-
opment. 
 The cost of development rises because (a) the code needs to be specified in detail with 
annotations and (b) the behavior of Java API’s need to be specified as well in order for the 
verification to be possible. There have been projects like Daikon (40) to automatically detect 
annotations. However these annotations do not represent the intended behavior but the ob-
served properties of the program. Therefore if the behavior of the code is not the intended 
one then the generated annotations are not correct either. 
The explained method has been used in somewhat larger Java (desktop) applications and 
applets to ensure that functional and security requirements are properly implemented. 
Another approach aiming towards narrowing the gap between the actual code behavior and 
the JML annotations is the approach presented below. Namely, capturing the behavior of the 
program by representing it as a state machine. 
4.2. State machine representation 
This approach is widely used in the Java smart Card applications (9) and will be explained 
below in more detail. A similar approach is used in (16) with a slight difference that no state 
automata is created but the state of the program is still established and maintained by JML 
constraints, the same as in (9).  Java applets running on browsers can also use a similar ap-
proach (41). The common ground of all these examples is that they precisely define the 
states occurring during program execution, express them in JML and then verify if the transi-
tions of the states in the program match the states transitions defined in annotations. 
Based on their architecture these Java Smart Card applications can easily be modeled as 
state machines. These applications are also called applets and usually have their Installation, 
Personalization, Processing and Locked states as their main life-cycle stages (42).  
Each phase corresponds to a diﬀerent moment in the applet’s life-cycle. First, the applet 
is loaded on the card, and then it is properly installed and registered with the Java Card Run-
time Environment. Next, the card is personalized, i.e. all information about the card owner, 
permissions, keys etc. are stored in the device running the programe. After this, the applet is 
selectable, which means that it can be repeatedly selected, executed, and deselected. Howev-
er, if a serious error occurs, for example, if there have been too many attempts to verify a pin 
code, the card can get blocked or even become dead. From the latter state, no recovery is 
possible. 
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Figure 4.6. Default life cycle model for a Smart Card application. 
The default stages of a smart card applet are presented in Figure 4.6. In most of the 
smart card applications additional stages can be derived based on the particular functionality 
that the smart card application implements.  
This approach models all the stages of the applet in a finite state machine, which we de-
note as S. The transitions between the identified states represent the methods which trans-
form the state of the program from one state into the other, as defined in the automaton. This 
change of state in P comes as a result of the code being executed in these methods. The me-
thods that take the program from one state to another are specified with annotations, pre-
cisely defining their behavior. This behavior is among others, defined with pre and post con-
ditions. 
If states of S are modeled from states of the program P then we say that S mirrors the 
program P. 
The part of the program behavior which ensures that security properties are met is also 
modeled in the finite state machine. For example, in Java Smart Card applications, modeling 
the following set of security properties is of particular interest: Atomicity, Applet life cycle, 
Exception handling and Access Control (16).  
Atomicity in this context refers to the requirement that all the transactions should not be 
nested but atomic and, there should be no uncaught exceptions in transactions. When the 
applet gets into operation for the first time, this initialization should be carried out by an au-
thenticated authority, usually by a PIN number or alike. Once it is in operation, if it gets into 
the blocking state, it should be able to be unblocked only by an authenticated authority, 
usually accomplished by a PIN number. This personalization can be carried out only once. 
The program P closely mirrors the automata S because S was modeled based on P. To en-
sure that state transitions occurring in P indeed mirror the transitions occurring in S, JML 
annotations are added to P. The role of the annotations is to define constraints that specify 
legal transitions of states in the program P. These transitions are initiated by methods and 
INIT 
PERS 
PROCESS 
LOCKED 
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expressed in class constraints. The class constraints reflect the set of legal states for each ob-
ject created from that class at any point in time during the program execution. 
Static analysis tools can be used to verify that the order of state-changes during execu-
tion of program P indeed matches the one of S. If no violations are reported, it is claimed that 
P really matches the behavior of S and since S models the security behavior as well, it is in-
ferred that P also meets the security properties of S. 
An example 
To provide an example about how JML is used to specify security properties of Java Card 
applets we will show the specification of atomicity as one of the security properties of ap-
plets. Note that in this example we will not model the whole life cycle of the applet, nor we 
will model the state changes in the applet execution. Our intention is to show only the speci-
fication of the property of atomicity. Atomicity ensures that no nested transactions are al-
lowed to be carried out during the applet operation. 
This is important in smart cards because they do not have a power supply, thus a brutal 
retrieval from the terminal could interrupt a computation and bring the system in an incohe-
rent state. To avoid this, the Java Card speciﬁcation recommends the use of a transaction me-
chanism which controls the synchronised updates of sensitive data.  
A statement block surrounded by the methods beginTransaction() and 
commitTransaction() can be considered atomic. If something happens while executing the 
transaction (or if abortTransaction() is called), the card will roll back its internal state to 
the state before the transaction was started.  
This transaction mechanism should ensure that (a) only one transaction happens at a 
time, (b) if a variable maintaining the number of transactions in place is one when the applet 
initializes, that means that it was previously shut down abruptly (without committing the 
transaction) and thus us it should revert the state back to it’s previous, and (c), when the 
transaction is completed the variable keeping track of the numbers of transaction should go 
to zero enabling the applet to process the next transaction. 
 
To enforce the proper implementation of this behavior we model it with JML by a static 
ghost variable named TRANSAC. This variable keeps track of the number of transactions in 
progress at any time: 
 
/*@ static ghost int TRANSAC == 0; @*/ 
 
Each time a transaction is initiated this variable is set to one and when the transaction is 
finished it is set back to zero again. Thus the method beginTransaction is annotated as fol-
lows:  
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/*@ requires  TRANSAC == 0; 
  @ assignable  TRANSAC; 
  @ ensures  TRANSAC == 1;  
  @ signals_only  (TransactionException te)  
  @   requires  TRANSAC == 1 
  @   ensures  te.getMessage()!=null; 
  @*/ 
public static void beginTransaction() throws TransactionException { 
   . . . 
} 
 
This annotation requires that there are no transactions in progress when this method is 
called. After it is called the value of TRANSAC should be set to one, indicating that there is a 
transaction in progress. And if there is a transaction already being completed when this me-
thod is called then a TransactionException is thrown. This specification also states that 
during the implementation of this method the value of the ghost field monitoring the number 
of the transactions needs to be set to one. 
The method commitTransaction() has the following annotation: 
 
/*@ requires  TRANSAC == 1; 
  @ assignable  TRANSAC; 
  @ ensures  TRANSAC == 0;  
  @ signals_only  (TransactionException te)  
  @   requires  TRANSAC == 1 
  @   ensures  te.getMessage()!=null; 
  @*/ 
public static void commitTransaction() throws TransactionException { 
   . . . 
} 
 
The annotation of this method on the other hand, states that a transaction must have 
been started before commitTransaction() method can be called. Which makes sense, be-
cause there needs to be a transaction in place prior to it being committed and recorded into 
the smart card memory. After it is finished the state variable should be set to zero. 
Note that in the annotations of this example the implementation of methods is not pro-
vided because it is straight forward. 
4.2.1. Issues 
This approach has mostly been applied to programs for Java smart cards13. There has been a 
considerable success in preventing errors that might lead to security flaws in these applica-
tions. Since they run on devices with very limited memory and processing capacity, the de-
sired security properties are mostly related with this limitation of resources. For this reason 
these applications are small, so the state transitions in these programs can be modeled accu-
                                                        
13 http://java.sun.com/javacard/ 
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rately and verified easily. This approach contributes to an increase of dependability of soft-
ware from smart card application providers (38).  
Note that applying the same approach of modeling all the program states in regular 
large-scale application, in comparison to applications of smart cards, can be tedious and even 
impossible because of one fundamental problem. Namely, the state explosion problem. The 
number of states of almost any system of interest is huge even when using different tech-
niques of reducing this state (43). 
It should be noted that this approach does also not provide full proof security for high 
level properties such as confidentiality, authentication or integrity. The constructed automa-
ton which the program mirrors, is in no way verified for all possible threats against the antic-
ipated security properties. It is there to just model the security related behavior in more de-
tail and express it in JML so it is clearer during implementation. However after such behavior 
is implemented and verified we still have no guarantee that both the model and the annota-
tions are not faulty. This is simply left on our sound judgment to decide. 
Considering that smart card applications have limited complexity compared to, for ex-
ample Java desktop applications, detailing their behavior in a state machine, specifying their 
code with JML and formally verifying it in this manner, is a strong guarantee for their securi-
ty. 
However, expressing program-wide high level security properties such as authentica-
tion, confidentiality or integrity is far harder to express in JML (42). This is because of the 
overall limitations of JML (See Section 3.1.73.1.7). 
4.3. Language Based perspective 
Another approach where JML was used to specify security properties is in the Language-
Based information ﬂow security. This branch within computer security tries to enforce end-
to-end secure information flow for programs (44). In modern programming languages in-
formation flow is tackled by access control modifiers. However, this can not guarantee an 
end to end secure information flow. The basic question raised here is how one can ensure 
that public information is completely independent from sensitive (secret) information.  
In (42) specification of confidentiality with JML is presented from a language based secu-
rity point of view expressed from an information flow perspective. Here confidentiality is 
formalized using the notion of non-interference. i.e. it deals with all possible runs of the pro-
gram that terminate normally, without for example exceptions being thrown. 
The notion of non-interference was ﬁrst introduced by Goguen and Meseguer (45). They 
define non-interference in an automata. This automata has input and output channels. The 
input and output channels are labeled with security levels, typically using levels High for se-
cret and Low for public information. By ﬁxing the low input channels and varying (all) the 
high input channels, one can check if high input channels are indeed independent of low out-
puts. In this way, we can guarantee that data flowing from the high input remains indepen-
dent from the data in the low output and thus, non-interference is preserved. This work was 
later picked up by Volpano and Smith (46) showing that type systems are especially well 
suited for (automatically) enforcing non-interference properties. 
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In order to be able to verify that a program is non-interfering, all output and input chan-
nels need to be labeled with appropriate security levels. This labeling defines a secure infor-
mation ﬂow policy. Instead of just labeling the inputs and outputs of a program, typically all 
global variables (ﬁelds) are labeled and those that are only used locally are discarded. 
To monitor non-interference, security levels need to be ordered in some way. We use a 
security lattice for this ordering and denote the ordering with the ⊆ symbol. This (basic) lat-
tice will suﬃce to explain the main ideas in most cases, but if a more complicated policy is 
used than a more complicated lattice is required. Building such a lattice is just a matter of 
doing more ‘book-keeping’ (42). This simple Security Lattice Σ is deﬁned below: 
 
Σ = {High, Low}   with Low ⊆ High 
 
A secure information flow is then given by the function Sif : Var → Σ which maps va-
riables to security levels in the simple security lattice. Sif denotes a secure information flow 
policy represented by a function. Security levels can now be identified as sets of variables 
corresponding to those levels, i.e. High = {v ∈ Var | Sif(v) = High} and  
Low = Var \ High. 
As stated before, this approach formalizes confidentiality as a notion of non-interference. 
The definition of this term is taken from (45) and defined as: 
 Noninterference of programs essentially means that a variation of conﬁdential 
(high) input data does not cause a variation of public (low) output data. 
From this definition we can see that confidentiality involves a relation between the pre- 
and post- state. In other words defining confidentiality means ensuring that we don’t have a 
flow of data from high fields to the low fields. The reasoning behind is that data from the high 
fields should be kept secret from data flowing in the low fields because low fields are of low-
er security level than the high ones.  
Integrity on the other hand involves the definition of data that keeps secret data of the 
high fields safe from modification coming from the low fields. It ensures that secret data 
flows only in high fields and there is no ‘leakage’ of data from high fields to the low ones. 
In JML it is possible to express such relations using the keyword \old. If used in a post-
condition, variables encapsulated by \old are evaluated in the precondition. This feature 
makes it possible to build a formulation of conﬁdentiality in JML. Note that formalization of 
confidentiality is guaranteed only for executions that terminate normally (where no excep-
tions are raised). This non-interference is referred to as termination-insensitive non-
interference. 
With the help of non-interference this approach defines security properties of confiden-
tiality and integrity by establishing corresponding specification patterns (42). The first pat-
tern defines confidentiality as:  
 
ensures low == \old(χLow); 
 
For each low ∈ Low the expression χLow should not contain any ﬁelds high ∈ High. 
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A specification like this for a Java method enforces that all ﬁelds low ∈ Low in the post-
state are independent of the values of ﬁelds high ∈ High in the pre-state. This proves 
conﬁdentiality for that Java method. 
The JML pattern for specification of integrity is: 
 
ensures high == \old(χHigh); 
 
For each high ∈ High the expression χHigh should not contain any ﬁelds low ∈ Low. 
The second pattern expresses that all high ﬁelds are independent of low ﬁelds. Thus low 
ﬁelds cannot alter high ﬁelds, thereby ensuring integrity for all high ﬁelds belonging to the 
High set. 
Examples 
We illustrate specification of confidentiality with JML in the first example. The example 
has two methods m1 and m2 with two fields declared. The high field belongs to security level 
High and low to security level Low. According to the pattern definition m1 and m2 maintains 
confidentiality but m2 does not maintain integrity. 
 
 
int high, low;  // high:H, low:L 
 
/*@ normal_behavior 
  @    requires true; 
  @ assignable low; 
  @        ensures low == \old(0); 
  @*/ 
public int m1() { 
 low = 5; 
 low = low*low; 
return low; 
} 
 
/*@ normal_behavior 
  @    requires true; 
  @  assignable high; 
  @        ensures high == \old(low); 
  @*/ 
void m2() { 
 high = m1(); 
} 
 
Figure 4.7. Example with both methods maintaining confidentiality. 
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Confidentiality is maintained because in both methods the flow in high fields is indepen-
dent from the low fields. In the m2 method we have a flow from a low to a high field, which is 
not a breach of confidentiality because public data can be read by a higher security level. This 
however, is a violation of integrity, because the high fields are updated by low ones which 
have lower security level and this is a violation. Thus, method m2 does not respect the defini-
tion of the second pattern. 
In the second example we have an interdependency between methods. We have method 
m3 and m4, where m4 internally calls m3. There are only two ﬁelds, high and low which have 
security level High and Low respectively.  
Whether method m3 is confidential depends on the parameter i. In case i is a low ﬁeld 
the method does not leak information, otherwise, it leaks information of a high ﬁeld via its 
return value.  
In m4 we see that there is a dependency between the low field and the value of high in the 
pre state. This represents a violation of the second pattern in the ensures clause. So, we con-
clude that the method m4 leaks information. 
 
int high, low;  // high:H, low:L 
 
/*@ normal_behavior 
  @      requires true; 
  @    assignable high; 
  @      ensures \result == \old(high) &&  
  @      high == \old(high + 1); 
  @*/ 
int m3(int i){ 
high = high + 1; 
return i; 
} 
 
/*@ normal_behavior 
  @      requires true; 
  @    assignable low,high; 
  @       ensures low == \old(high) &&  
  @       ensures high == \old(high + 1); 
  @*/ 
void m4(){ 
low = m3(high); 
} 
 
Figure 4.8. Dependencies appearing when we have method calls. 
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4.3.1. Issues 
The main limitation of this approach is that it does not scale well on an application with ‘real 
life’ requirements. To apply this on an application it would require a very large number of 
security levels making the security lattice complex. Defining and maintaining the flow be-
tween a large number of security levels would be cumbersome. 
It is very hard to develop an application where the flow of data occurs within static secu-
rity levels as is suggested in this approach. Another problem here is that no (controlled) re-
lease of confidential data is possible. We know that this is often a crucial functional require-
ment of applications. Very often, (secret) data that is declassified needs to be released. This 
represents a problem for this approach because such a declassification represents a violation 
of the main principle on which this approach defines confidentiality.  
After presenting the approaches that have been taken in the past for specifying security 
properties with JML in Java programs, we now explain the approach that we will use to speci-
fy security properties in the application of the case study examined in the next chapter. Our 
approach is more similar to the second approach where the Java Card applets are presented 
with finite state automata’s. 
4.4. Our approach 
The method that we will use to specify security properties in our application models the pro-
gram behavior implementing those properties in a finite state automaton. The states and 
transitions of this automaton are expressed in JML annotations. We do implementation of 
our programe mirroring this automaton. All the states and transitions defined in the automa-
ton are also defined in the programe. We show that the states and their transitions defined in 
the automaton also occur in the implementation of the programe. 
We start by choosing the security property Φ that we want to implement in our pro-
grame P. We informally explain how the security property Φ should be implemented in the 
programe P. Since we will use this approach in the case study that we develop in the next 
chapter, we explain the architecture and the solutions employed in the implementation that 
should establish Φ in the given architecture. Solutions in this case represent the features and 
mechanisms of our programe that should establish the required properties. 
Speaking in general terms, depending on the property that is chosen, different solutions 
are necessary to establish different properties. For example, in the event of establishing con-
fidentiality to ensure a secure communication between two communicating parties, for ex-
ample, an encryption algorithm would be implemented. In this case, the behavior of the en-
tire programe flow, and not just the implemented protocol that ensures this property would 
be explained. 
 After explaining the behavior of the programe that should establish the property Φ in 
terms of the program flow, we model this behavior in a finite state automaton, denoted by S. 
The modeled behavior will actually be an abstraction of the programe P, capturing its overall 
flow that establishes that property but at the same time, abstracts away from the low-level 
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implementation details of the implemented mechanisms that serve to establish that proper-
ty. 
We implement the program flow of P based on the behavior modeled in S. To ensure that 
this behavior is implemented correctly in the programe P, we translate the transitions be-
tween states in S, into methods which implement the behavior of P. These methods are then 
specified with ordinary design by contract pre and post conditions.  
The states defined in the automaton are expressed in the programe P by a ghost variable. 
To ensure that the method execution in P follows the same order as the transitions of states 
in S, class constraints and invariants expressed in JML are inserted in P. These are predicates 
which have to be maintained by all methods. JML statements are to be understood as predi-
cates which should hold for the associated Java code (17).  
We show how the states and their transitions defined in S, closely follow the execution 
flow of the programe P. 
Since we previously argued that the behavior modeled in S meets the property Φ, then 
we can claim that the programe P also meets that property, since all the states and transi-
tions in P are identical as in S. 
Discussion 
Note that during this thesis work, we show that the program flow in P is actually identic-
al as the state transitions in S, but we do not use any static analysis tool to verify that the an-
notations hold for every execution path of the programe P. This is the case because this of 
thesis work concentrates on methods (principles) of how to specify high-level security prop-
erties with JML, but does not include work on verification of those properties. The focus of 
our work has been to find ways to express these high-level security properties with JML. 
Even though, we are aware of the importance of the two going together, the verification 
part is left out for future work. 
During our work we use the open source plugin named JML214 for Eclipse IDE that does 
runtime assertion checking. Details on downloading and configuring Eclipse to run this plugin 
are included in the Appendix XX1.2. 
This tool checks JML specifications such as preconditions, normal and exceptional post-
conditions, invariants, and history constraints during runtime (13). 
4.4.1. Comparison to other approaches 
The closest to our approach, perhaps is the work done in (42). Here they specify security 
related properties of a Java Card applet. They design a simplified version of a client side part 
of the applet, and specify some of the security properties which are related to the specific ar-
chitecture of Java Card applets. 
They’re applet is implemented in one class. Because of this, most of the JML limitations 
do not pose a problem for them (see Section 3.1.7 for more details on JML limitations). As a 
                                                        
14 The plugin is developed and maintained at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland. 
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result, they were able to clearly define the states of the object created from that class in one 
state automaton and implement the program based on that automaton. 
One difference is that they’re implementation maintains the state with an ordinary vari-
able. This variable is updated as the state of the object changes during the execution of the 
program. Their application is designed very closely to the automaton. It contains the state 
and the state-transitions implemented as methods. 
In our program, we use a ghost field to ensure the state of the application. No hard-coded 
state is implemented in the programe itself. Instead, this ghost field is used to maintain state. 
This field is also used to ensure the flow of method execution.  
Note that in our case study, the application will require multiple classes. This gives a sig-
nificant impact of the JML limitations in the specification process in our application. This im-
pact will come with the price of the assumptions that we will be forced to make, in order to 
model the behavior of our application comprised of multiple classes in a state automaton.  
Because of the limitation that JML annotations were designed to capture behavior of 
code in one class, when we have design decisions spreading in multiple classes, as is often the 
case with the implementation of security features, this makes it harder to capture and ex-
press these features with JML. 
In the next chapter we proceed by analyzing the case study of a medical clinic and deriv-
ing the security properties required to secure this application. 
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Chapter V 
5. Case Study analysis 
This chapter presents a case study for a small medical clinic where we develop a prototype 
application in Java. This application will be used in the next chapter to specify its security 
properties with the approach just defined in the previous chapter.  
The work on this case study starts by first doing a threat analysis for the application, 
where we look into what are the assets that are important to protect. After defining the as-
sets, we turn to identifying the possible threats against those assets.  
We establish the attacker model which looks into how these threats can be turned into 
valid attacks for our application. The attacker model helps us see how these attacks can be 
carried out in our application, therefore giving us a view of the protection measures re-
quired. Based on the threats and the possible attacks that we listed, we look into the security 
goals that we need to pursue in our application.  
These goals come in the form of high-level security properties that our application should 
have in order to achieve the level of security that we want it to have.  
From the overall properties that we identify, we choose a set of them to implement in the 
application. At the end of this chapter we explain the design decisions and implementation 
technologies used to achieve those properties in our application. 
We use the architecture set-up of the prototype developed for this case study as an ex-
ample application, to explore how well can high-level properties be specified with Java Mod-
eling Language, using our approach from the previous Chapter. 
5.1. A general overview 
In this section we present the problem statement of the case study which gives us a short de-
scription of the problem. We then list the functional requirements of the application describ-
ing what our application should do and afterwards, we present the basic design decisions of 
our architecture and a discussion on features of the architecture layout that we have chosen. 
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Problem statement 
A small to mid size medical clinic requires an information system for their everyday 
work. The number of employees using the system is estimated at 20-30 with the prospect of 
growth of up to 20% in the upcoming 10 years. The users of the application are classified in 
two categories: the medical and administration personnel. 
Each category of employees has separate duties with no overlap between them. The new 
(digital) system is intended to replace their manual paper-based system of data administra-
tion that the clinic currently has in place. The new information system should have the func-
tionalities of the old paper based system. This information system should have limited access 
to registered users only. Registered users should only be able to access functionalities which 
fall under their authorization. 
The medical clinic operates in at most seven locations inter-connected via ordinary 
TCP/IP connection. Thus the system needs to be a distributed application operating from 
these locations and enabling its users a centralized access to data.  
5.1.1. Functional requirements 
The required functionalities for this information system are the following. The users need to 
be able to: 
a. add new patients 
b. find a patient 
c. edit personal data of the patient  
d. add new medical records to patients history, and 
e. list all medical history records of a patient 
There’s a clear separation between what the admin staff can access and what the medical 
staff can access. The admin staff can work on patient’s personal data, while the medical staff 
can only work on the patient’s medical records. 
Personal data include personal information belonging to the patients identity. They in-
clude the CPR ID of the patient, name, date of birth and address. The medical records on the 
other hand include data related to the medical history of the patient. They include: test name, 
remarks/comments related to that test, date when the tests were done and costs of the tests. 
More on this will be discussed in the implementation section 7.1. 
In respect to the functionalities listed below the system should also: 
a. grant access to authenticated users only 
b. the registered users are assigned privileges to perform corresponding opera-
tions/tasks. Only if they have required permissions assigned to them, they are 
allowed to perform the requested task. 
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The distribution of authorization privileges is done for each user separately in accor-
dance with company policy. The company policy separates users in two categories: adminis-
tration and medical staff. As we have stated previously, the administration staff is granted 
privileges to perform of a), b) and c), while the medical staff is granted permission for d) and 
e).  
5.1.2. Design choices of the architecture  
This application will be built on the principles of the client/server architecture with client 
software installed in the workstations in the branches of the clinic. The clients should have 
minimum load and complexity while the server implements the core functionalities.  
 
  
Figure 5.1: The system architecture.  
 
The clients are connected to the server who in turn is connected to the database server 
that provides the centralized data storage. This connection is shown in Figure 5.1.  
The database server resides on a separate machine located on a controlled network such 
as a Local Area Network. This machine has no public access to the internet. The clients are 
connected to the server through the Internet. The server is connected to the database on a 
dedicated LAN connection.  
After initially giving the functional requirements of the application and afterwards a 
high-level overview of this application, we proceed by discussing the choices we have made 
for the architecture. 
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5.1.3. Discussion 
The client/server architecture is chosen particularly because it is feasible to handle potential 
changes of the functional requirements that might come in the future. In case this is required, 
since all the functionality is implemented in the server, we only need to update the server in 
accordance with the new given requirements. A downside of this layout is that if we concen-
trate all the functionality on a single server station, this introduces the concern of a single 
point-of-failure in our architecture. If the server is down the whole system cannot offer ser-
vices. 
Another approach to this would be a distributed approach where parts of the functional-
ities are spread in multiple nodes offering services that are independent but complimentary 
to each other. This type of architecture would require multiple stations to communicate and 
coordinate in order for the system to service its users. In case any of these stations are out of 
service then only its residing functionality will be unavailable and the rest will function nor-
mally. 
The database facility is placed in a local area network without access to the internet thus 
the database cannot be accessed by the outside world. Only the server machine can access it. 
This restriction will most likely be enforced by an implemented firewall and is intended to 
limit the penetration attempts from the outside adversaries. 
5.2. Use cases 
In this section we present the identified used cases including the actors involved in the use 
case diagram. Use cases are derived from functional requirements listed in section 5.1.1. The 
diagram is presented in Figure 5.2.  
After initially giving the functional requirements and a high-level overview of the appli-
cation we proceed to the next section where we analyze the threats of the system. 
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Figure 5.2. The diagram representing use cases and actors involved. 
5.3. Threat analysis 
In this section we identify assets which are important for the security of our application and 
list possible threats against the security of those assets. Threats serve as a basis for establish-
ing security goals of our application.  
5.3.1. Assets 
The integrity of data is the main asset to be protected in information systems. A crucial con-
cern for us is maintaining the integrity of data while it is being processed in any of the nodes 
of our architecture and during the exchange of data between those nodes. The workstations 
of our system which are considered as untrusted because of the amount of malware in circu-
lation today. The data exchange that needs to be protected in our architecture occurs when 
client machines send requests and receive responses from the server, and when the server 
accesses the database.  
In light to this, we identified two assets that require scrutiny in our threat analysis: 
a. data flow 
b. integrity of the data in the database server 
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5.3.2. Threat model 
The threats that we have identified in regard to our assets will be presented in several cate-
gories. They are listed in categories based on what asset they target. We have grouped them 
into three categories based on what they target. The listed threats can target the flow of data 
in the application itself, the integrity of the data at the storage site or the functional require-
ments our application. 
Category one 
The first categories lists threats that are predominantly common for most of the distri-
buted applications and in regard to asset a of section 5.3.1. These threats appear mostly due 
to the nature of distributed applications where components are spread in different remote 
locations connected via internet connection. 
In this category we identified the following threats regarding the asset a: 
 communication between parties occurs in an open network exposing our asset 
to the possibility of different vulnerabilities such as: 
- sniffing - reading the data by an unauthorized party 
- tampering - changing the contents by an unauthorized party  
- message removal - In this context message removal refers to reading the data, 
identifying a particular message of interest and removing that from the rest of 
the traffic 
 identity of the parties involved in the communication process can be spoofed 
 resource exhaustion can be achieved by sending a large number of fake con-
nection requests from multiple locations to the server 
 different malware programs can be running in the nodes that host our applica-
tion and compromise it 
Category two 
Category two present threats related to asset b. Threats related to database protection 
usually come from two areas. They are connected to: how well has the system where the data-
base resides been hardened and how well is the access controlled to the database.  
The main threats coming from these areas are listed below: 
 database server penetration 
 excessive privilege abuse 
 theft and fraud of data 
 the inference problem 
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The main threats (47) coming from these areas can cause: 
 The loss of the integrity of data through unauthorized modification. For exam-
ple an unauthorized modification of the medical records of patients 
 The loss of availability of the data because the database in no more operational 
thus the server has no access to the data and the entire system is out of opera-
tion.  
 The loss of confidentiality of data(also referred to as the privacy of data), for 
example by an unauthorized access of patients personal data 
Category three 
In the third category we present threats that are more specific for our case study. These 
threats are directed towards compromising the functional requirements of our application. 
They explain threats of the application being used inappropriately. 
These threats include: 
 attackers can attempt to gain access to the system without authenticating 
 legitimate users can attempt to perform functions which are outside of their 
domain 
5.4. Attacker model 
In this section we determine the possible attacks to the system based on the previously iden-
tified threats. We research how the previously named threats can be turned into actual at-
tacks that would compromise our application. Our analysis classifies the potential attackers 
in three groups based on which asset they target. 
The first group includes the Dolev-Yao (48) model of attackers which have full control of 
the network traffic. This type of attacker is able to eavesdrop on the entire network traffic, 
modify, replay or fabricate messages, as well as analyze the network traffic. Among the most 
known attacks is the man-in-the-middle attack where the attacker impersonates the identity 
of the other party involved in communication and tricks him into receiving all his traffic. 
Another attack is the Denial of Service attack when the server receives a large number con-
nection requests from multiple locations. All its resources are used to deny these invalid 
connection requests and no resources are left to establish communication with valid re-
quests. The only limitation of the Dolev-Yao attacker is that it is unable to break existing 
cryptographic protocols.  
The attackers of the second group exploit weaknesses coming from the threats of catego-
ry two in section 5.3.2 related to the integrity of the data in database server. If the current 
patches are not installed on the database server it is relatively easy for attackers to learn the 
weaknesses of the software that has not been updated to the latest patches. This offers them 
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an opportunity to exploit the weaknesses and perform attacks that the newest patches would 
prevent. 
If access control privileges are not regulated properly and users have unnecessary privi-
leges exceeding their requirements then they can abuse them and cause unauthorized mod-
ification of data or even destruction. For example if ordinary users are given administrator 
privileges in accessing the database then they have permission to do much more than they 
usually need and in this way they can seriously compromise it. For example they can manipu-
late the access control lists of the database. 
Even though communicating between the server and the database is done on a dedicated 
connection the database connection strings need to be encrypted during transmission as 
these strings can be abused by attackers. With connection strings at hand attackers that have 
access to the local area network can attempt to connect to the database as regular legitimate 
users.  
SQL injection can be attempted by attackers thus data should only be accessible through 
stored procedures as they provide another layer of data access control. This attack is per-
formed when user input is either incorrectly filtered for string literal escape characters em-
bedded in SQL statements or user input is not strongly typed and thereby unexpectedly ex-
ecuted. It is an instance of a more general class of vulnerabilities that can occur whenever 
one programming or scripting language is embeded inside another (49). 
With the emerging of more sophisticated data mining tools in the recent years the infe-
rence problem (50) has gained increasing attention. As a result of this problem the interfe-
rence of data in the database occurs. Interference is the process of users posing queries and 
deducing unauthorized information from the legitimate responses that they receive (51). 
For the third group of attacks we assume that they have physical access to the work sta-
tions running the application. Attackers belonging to this group are clinic employees who are 
not listed as registered users of the clinic information system and yet, they attempt to gain 
access to the system. An example attack for this model could be performing a dictionary at-
tack trying to guess the password of any of the user names that they have previously ac-
quired for example by social engineering. 
Another case of attacks of this group can be the attackers that are legitimate users of the 
system in the clinic but attempt to gain access to functionalities which fall outside of their 
domain of authorization. For ex. an administration employee attempting to edit medical 
records of a patient – a functionality exclusively reserved for the medical staff. 
5.5. Security goals 
Based on our threat analysis and the possible attacks that we have listed we set the security 
goals for our solution. Every goal represents a security property that we want to achieve in 
our application. Security properties tell about the security-related features of our applica-
tion. In other words, security goals are the standards that we impose on the behavior of our 
application in order to ensure that our application is secured. 
We will divide the security goals of our application in two groups. The first group con-
cerns the goals for ensuring security of the application running in the clients and server ma-
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chines and the second group of goals concerns ensuring security in the database storage. In 
our case the application authenticates and authorizes users, but the application itself has to 
be identified to the database (for ex. by a database password). 
5.5.1. Application security goals 
In order to achieve security in our system we extract several goals that need to be imple-
mented in the architecture of our application. Goals relevant to the security of the application 
and its hosting platforms are listed here. The goals are extracted from the identified threats 
in section 5.3 and presented in the following. 
a. Confidentiality: Data exchange between parties involved in the communica-
tion process has to be kept secret from intruders that are able to read and ana-
lyze traffic in an (open) network. Data can be read during transmission by au-
thorized parties only.  
b. This goal counters the threat defined in category one resulting from the com-
munication occurring in an open network. 
c. Integrity: Data integrity in general is deﬁned as safeguarding the accuracy and 
completeness of information15. In this case if data is altered during transport in 
an unauthorized way, this change has to be detected.  
d. This goal counters the threat data communication occurs in an open network, 
and as such is vulnerable to sniffing, tampering and other forms of unautho-
rized message alterations. 
e. Mutual site authentication: If party A is communicating with party B, a me-
chanism to verify the identity of the two communicating parties has to be in 
place. In other words, if party A is communicating with party B, they have to 
mutually be sure that they are actually communicating with each other and not 
with a third party.  
f. This goal secures the system from the threats of identity spoofing between two 
communicating parties. 
g. Availability: The system should be up-and-running for users who require its 
services.  
h. This goal protects the system from the threat of resource exhaustion identified 
in the group of threats in category one. 
i. Authentication: Access to the application is permitted only if the user pro-
vides proof of a legitimate identity. 
j. Authorization: Authenticated users are allowed to perform certain actions on-
ly if they are previously assigned corresponding rights from the security policy 
of the company. 
                                                        
15 A definition given by International Standard Organization in the ISO-17799 standard: www.iso.org 
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5.5.2. Database security goals 
To ensure security of the data in the database facility we establish several goals that we re-
quire to be implemented in the architecture of the data storage system. Notice that these 
goals tremendously resemble the security goals which deal with the security of the applica-
tion because they both have to do with data protection. The only major difference is the con-
text and the environment of where this data protection occurs. 
a. Access control: Only properly authenticated requests to the server can add, 
edit or delete the data from the database 
b. Confidentiality: The data in the database can only be accessed by the autho-
rized server requests.  
c. Reliability: Database has to be up and running providing data to the applica-
tion upon its request. The copy of data that the application works with as pro-
duction data when it accesses the database has to be current (the latest up-
date). 
d. Integrity: Refers to the requirement that information needs to be protected 
from improper modification. Modification of data includes creation, insertion, 
modification, changing the status of data, and deletion. Integrity is lost if unau-
thorized changes are made to the data by either intentional or accidental acts. 
e. Recovery: The database server is protected by a firewall and should be mir-
rored into a separate server. The application forwards queries to the mirror 
who hosts production data. The data from the mirroring server is periodically 
copied back to the ‘real’ database server (behind firewall). In case of corrup-
tion, this enables us full recovery of the data as it was in the latest state before 
it was last saved.  
f. The data in the databases server should be mirrored into separate server(s). 
The application server interacts with the mirror(s) to answer queries from his 
clients. The actual databases server is periodically synchronized with the mir-
ror(s). It should be protected by a firewall (or, if possible stored on a different 
perimeter – different LAN). This enables us to be safe in case the application 
server and the mirrors are corrupted. We can still do full recovery of the data 
in the state from when it was last synchronized. 
g. The database server should not offer ‘live’ data. The data in the database 
should be mirrored to separate servers that are connected to the application 
server. The database server where data is stored is synchronized with the mir-
rors every fixed period of time. The application works with the mirrors of the 
‘real’ data. This enables us in case of corruption full recovery of the data in the 
latest state before it was last saved.  
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5.6. Scope of implementation 
The system is a three-tier client/server application16 presented in Figure 5.3. It is composed 
of the presentation tier, the middle tier and the data tier. The presentation tier presents data 
to the user and permits data entry though the user interface. The middle tier or commonly 
referred to as the application server, implements the application logic and interacts with data 
tier. The data tier, or data storage, represents the database management system for storing 
data. 
  
 
Figure 5.3. A three tier application. 
Our scope of our work will include implementing the application logic in the application 
server. Developing the data and the presentation tier is not in the scope of this thesis work. 
In the middle tier we also leave out of the scope the implementation of the module that con-
nects the application server to the database management system. This module allows the ap-
plication server to query and update the database.  
On Chapter 7 acceptance tests of our application are provide.  For the purpose of (tem-
porary) storing data, we use a simple data structure presented in Section 7.1.  
We implement the application logic in the application server were the identified use cas-
es are implemented.  
Regarding the implementation of security properties in the application, the scope of this 
work includes implementing solutions for establishing the properties of Authentication and 
Authorization listed in section 5.5.1 under i) and j). Ultimately, since the data layer is out of 
                                                        
16 One of the primary advantages of a three-tier architecture is that, as the data storage needs grow, we can 
change the way data is stored without affecting the clients. The middle layer usually serves to centralize the 
processing of business rules for the application.  
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scope, establishing security properties in the database server is also not included in the 
scope of work. 
In the next section, we list the design architecture of the application and the technologies 
we intend to use during the implementation of the application for this case study. 
5.7. The application 
In this section we explain the design decisions during the implementation of the prototype 
application. We shortly discuss how the security properties included in the scope of work 
will be established in this application. 
It was already mentioned that this application will be built on the principles of the 
client/server architecture with all the functionality implemented on the server. The client 
software (even though it is not included in the scope of work) would be a simple graphical 
user interface (GUI) application which would validate data entries by the user, send that data 
to the server and present results back.  
Since the full implementation of the presentation tier is not in the scope of work, and we 
need to provide the interaction between the user and the application (which would be made 
possible though the presentation tier), we provide only one simple class to compensate for 
this. This class fills the gap for the presentation tier and enables the interaction between the 
user (running the client software) and the sever. This class statically connects to the server, 
calls methods on the server, forwards data there and receives the results back. Statically re-
fers to the fact that this is done only once and then the program exits. Thus, in this prototype 
application we do not implement a ‘real’ interaction that one would find in an ordinary appli-
cation where the user is able to repeatedly interact with the application.  
To gain access to the system the user will need to be assigned a username and a pass-
word from the administration. The administration also assigns permissions for each user 
about the tasks they are allowed to perform. The tasks are defined based on the identified 
use cases defined in Section 5.2 of this chapter. Each use case is implemented in the applica-
tion server within one method and that use case can be completed by the user calling the 
corresponding method for that use case. So the administration basically gives permissions 
separately for each user, about what methods he is permitted to call. 
The user first submits his login credentials in the form of a username and password from 
the client to the server to prove his identity. If credentials are valid he is allowed access to 
the system and allowed to call methods on the server. Each method that the user calls on the 
server is subject to verification of his authorizations. 
Since we don’t implement the presentation tier to do this interactively, we do this stati-
cally in the class provided to compensate the interaction between the user and the applica-
tion. 
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5.7.1. Technologies used 
The implementation technology used to connect the clients and the server is Java Remote Me-
thod Invocation. It is a relatively old technology, it has been around for almost fifteen years17, 
and it simplifies remote communication by not having to deal with sockets during program-
ming (see Section 3.2, on how Java-RMI works). This technology provides us with a high-level 
interface of interacting with the remotely located services as if they were local. 
Since we use JML compilers to parse annotations that specify the security properties, we 
are forced to use Java version 1.4. At the time when we started working on our application, 
on May-June 2010, this was the latest version of Java that current stable JML compilers could 
work with. 
To achieve properties of authentication and authorization we implement the Java Autho-
rization and Authentication (JAAS) mechanism on the server (see Section 3.3 for more details 
on JAAS). So, clients now connect to the RMI server where JAAS restricts user access by 
checking their login credentials callers and enforces authorization control to the (authenti-
cated) users when they attempt to execute methods on the RMI server. The concept on how 
this is achieved is explained below. 
5.7.2. The concept behind restricting public access to the RMI server 
We have stated earlier that once a RMI service is made available in the registry anyone can 
access it. Any client knowing its address can bind to the registry, obtain a reference to the 
object, and call its methods (52). This poses a problem for us if we want to restrict its use to 
only a limited number of users. 
Here, we briefly introduce the concept of how we intend to use JAAS to deal with re-
stricting access to publicly available RMI methods18. Namely, how we intend to restrict 
access to the RMI server to only the authenticated users calling methods from the client pro-
grams installed in the workstations of the clinics. 
Note that the user and the server in this case are operating on two different, remotely lo-
cated Java Virtual Machines. In order to control access and to allow only authorized calls to 
the server, we implement JAAS in the server and use it to control access to (the part of) our 
program which implements the functionalities required by use cases.  
So, the user first connects to the server who has been configured to use JAAS, authenti-
cates and then is able to call methods on the server based on the privileges that he has. These 
privileges are assigned to users individually in the JAAS policy file by the administration. In-
itially, when the user log’s in, his (previously) assigned permissions are dynamically attached 
to his identity. So, when an (authenticated) user calls methods on the server, JAAS verifies if 
his identity has necessary permissions for that call. If the identity of the calling user pos-
sesses the necessary permissions, it allows the call (see Section 3.3 for more details on JAAS). 
If it doesn’t, an exception is raised. The basic concept of this architecture is pres- 
                                                        
17 It was first added to Java version 1.1 in the year of 1997. 
18 We are aware that the idea of exposing functionalities that we want to limit access to only a number of 
users, is not a smart idea, but we wanted to explore how this can be achieved when using RMI. 
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Figure 5.4. A sketch of the logic of the RMI server with access control by JAAS. 
 
ented in the figure above. A security manager is installed in the RMI server, who verifies if 
the calling authority has been previously assigned permission for that call.  
In the next chapter we explain some of the features of JAAS when used in this layout, we 
explain this concept in more detail and argue how these features will meet the properties of 
authentication and authorization control in our prototype application. We show the proper-
ties are specified with JML. 
In the next chapter we proceed by explaining in more detail how do we intend to imple-
ment the properties included in the scope of work and apply our method defined in Section 
4.4 to specify those properties with JML. 
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Chapter VI 
6. Implementation of properties 
In this chapter we explain how we intend to implement the properties of authentication and 
authorization in our application. We explain how these properties are achieved functionally 
in the architecture of our application. We show how our application establishes these prop-
erties by implementing the features of Java Authentication and Authorization mechanism in 
the architecture of our case study.  
For better clarity, we present sequence diagrams of the processes that interact in the ap-
plication that achieves the given properties. After explaining the intended behavior for estab-
lishing the above mentioned properties we model this behavior as a finite state automaton 
with defined states and transitions between those states. We do this because we want to ex-
press this automaton with JML. 
This automaton is used as a model for the implementation of this case study application. 
The goal for modeling the behavior of the program is that the states and transitions defined 
are translated into invariants and class constraints expressed by JML annotations in the ap-
plication. The annotations can be used to verify that the implementation of the program in-
deed mirrors the behavior defined in the automaton in terms of states and state transitions.  
Since these states and state transitions establish the properties of authentication and au-
thorization and; if the implementation of our program holds for the provided annotations, 
then we can claim that the program also establishes the properties defined in the automaton. 
This approach of specifying security properties enables us to ensure that the behavior 
the programmer had in mind to implement security properties in the application, indeed cor-
responds the behavior represented in the JML annotations. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section gives a high level 
description of how the properties are established in the implementation. Section 6.2 de-
scribes this behavior with sequence diagrams. Section 6.3 models this behavior on a state au-
tomaton listing the assumptions made. Section 6.4 shows how we have specified the imple-
mentation of our program with JML annotations that that express the intended behavior and 
Section 6.5 discusses problems and benefits of taking this approach.  
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6.1. Architecture of the application 
In this section I explain in more detail the architecture of our application and how we intend 
to achieve properties of Authentication and Authorization using JAAS19. We give some more 
details and background on how JAAS functions in general and how its implementation in our 
architecture will establish the two properties.  
We have stated earlier that JAAS is implemented on the server. At the server the JAAS 
mechanism first verifies the identity of the caller and then checks if he has the necessary 
permissions to call that method. Only if the (authenticated) user has the corresponding per-
missions to call that method, the call is allowed and otherwise an exception is raised. 
To verify the identity of the user we implement a login module which is a built-in feature 
of JAAS. The login module creates a login context for each (successfully authenticated) user 
individually. As part of this login context, a proxy is created also and its reference is returned 
to the caller. When the proxy is created it contains the identity of the user. The user uses this 
reference to call the methods on the server.  
So, when the user calls the methods on the server, the proxy checks his permissions. If 
the caller has the necessary permission then the proxy calls the method on his behalf. If it 
doesn’t, an exception is raised. The authorizations are checked at runtime to verify if the call-
er has execution privileges for the requested method. Each of the methods that the proxy can 
call completes a corresponding use case of our application. 
A more detailed concept behind this approach is presented in Figure 6.1. The steps oc-
curring when the identity of the user is authenticated and his execution privileges checked 
are presented in the Figure 6.1. They are ordered numerically.  
Initially, the server advertises the JAAS login module object to the RMI registry system so 
that clients can connect to it. In step 1, users of the client software attempt to authenticate 
themselves to the server. In step 2, when correct credentials are presented by the user a new 
login context is created for the identity of that user in the server. The login context is a built-
in mechanism of JAAS. In JAAS the identity of the user is represented by a Subject class. All 
permissions that have been assigned to the user in the policy file by the administration are 
attached to the subject representing his identity in the application. In this way after each suc-
cessful user authentication, JAAS creates a login context for that user and attaches his 
Permission objects to his Subject class. 
Next, a proxy object for that particular user (containing his identity) is created in step 3 
by the login object. In step 4, the reference of this proxy is returned to that particular user, 
for which the proxy was created initially. So now, only he can reference the methods of the 
proxy because he is the only one that has the reference to it. And on the other side, the proxy 
knows the identity of the user as well, so it only accepts calls from the user that it was 
created for.  
The role of the proxy is to only check if the user has necessary permissions to call that me-
thod while the functionality of the method itself is implemented in another object; in Figure 
6.1 denoted as Server Impl. So, when the user actually calls the methods on the RMI server, 
he is actually referencing the proxy first, who verifies his authorizations and then calls that 
method for him. 
                                                        
19 Java Authentication and Authorization Service 
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Figure 6.1. The simplified concept of restricting access on the RMI server with a proxy. 
In step 5 the user requests a method by using the proxy reference which he got in step 4. 
When the user references a method on the proxy, the proxy first checks if that user has per-
mission to call that method by using the built-in feature of the JAAS system. This step is de-
noted as step 6. Only if the user has been assigned the required permission to execute that 
method, the proxy calls the method on the server object where the real method functionality 
is implemented. This step is denoted as step number 7.  After method execution, the result is 
returned to the client in step 8.  
Note that this architecture creates a corresponding login context and proxy object for 
each (authenticated) user but the actual use cases are implemented is a single object listed in 
the figure as ServerImpl. So, all the created proxies verify the authorizations of their corres-
ponding user and call methods in this object for him. 
Figure 6.2 shows this scenario with two users authenticated at the same time. After their 
successful authentication a login context and a dedicated proxy is created for each of them. 
The reference to the proxy objects is returned to the corresponding clients who can after 
wards use it to call the methods on the server. And since only the authenticated users have 
references to their corresponding proxies then only they can call methods on the server by 
having the proxy call them on their behalf. This limits the completion of use cases on the 
server to only the users that have logged-in successfully, which is goal that we wanted to im-
plement in our application. 
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Figure 6.2. Dedicated proxies and login contexts created for each authenticated user. 
We wanted to allow only authenticated users to be able to have access to the methods on the 
server, subject to verification of access control rights (permissions) required by the adminis-
tration for that particular method call on the server. 
6.1.1. JAAS features in our application 
Verification of access control rights of users in our application is done by the policy system of 
JAAS. The policies defined are enforced by installing a security manager. Starting from ver-
sion 1.4, Java implements a code-centric security mechanism (35). This means that permis-
sions can be granted based on code characteristics: where the code is coming from, whether 
it is digitally signed and if so by whom. (for more details on how permissions are expressed 
in the policy file go to Section 3.3.1). By using the JAAS authorization mechanism we are able 
extend the existing code-centric access controls of Java with new user-centric access controls.  
Now we can restrict execution by not just where the code is coming from and who signed 
it but also by identity of the user who is trying to execute that code. This is done by creating 
policies that list which user is allowed to execute which classes and what system resources 
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are these classes allowed to access. In other words, permissions can be granted based, not 
just on what code is running but also on who is running it. 
How is the JAAS policy enforced? 
When a Java application starts by default, it has no security manager installed. At its op-
tion, the application can install one. If it does not install a security manager, no restrictions 
are placed on any activities requested of the Java API; the Java API will do whatever it is 
asked. If the application does install a security manager, then that security manager will be in 
charge for the entire lifetime of that application. It cannot be replaced, extended, or changed. 
From that point on, the Java API will fulfill only those requests that are sanctioned by the se-
curity manager (35). 
We require that application install a security manager20. The security manager controls 
the permitted operations based on security policies that we create. These policies are placed 
on separate files that security manager reads when it is invoked at the start of the applica-
tion.  
We will use three policies defined for our application. Each of them deals with a particu-
lar aspect of our application. 
The first policy defined in the codePermissions.policy file is the most important for 
our application. It specifies which .class files on the server are allowed to use and create 
what resources. We split the files on server into two JAR archives, putting all the files that 
need to use security sensitive resources in the server.jar archive, and the other ones (that 
don’t need such resources) in the actions.jar. The policy that we have just mentioned as-
signs permissions for each of the archives separately on the resources they can use. This lim-
its the harm that the files can do to our application if they’re compromised.  
In the event that they become compromised by malware and tricked into doing harm to 
our application, their access to the system resources is restricted. For example, if the 
server.jar file is compromised by malware and tries to establish a TCP/IP connection with 
a remote host to copy all the data there, this is not possible, because the archive file is not 
permitted to make new TCP/IP connections to hosts. The security manager will not allow 
such actions because in our policy we have instructed him that this archive is to accept only 
connection requests not initiate new ones. The requests that are accepted can also only come 
from a fixed IP address and port number.  
This policy is listed in Appendix C. Basically, here we list which sensitive resources can 
be created and used by the JAR archives in the server. 
The second security policy in our application, enables the administration to assign per-
missions for users individually. The permissions are given in the form of method-names (of 
use cases) that each user is allowed to execute.  
When permissions are assigned to the users, they map the names of the methods imple-
menting use cases to the usernames of the staff in the clinic. (The methods that implement 
use cases are covered in Section 7.2.1). This policy is presented in the file named 
                                                        
20 We invoke it by adding it as an argument to JVM when we first start the application. The argument re-
quired is: -Djava.security.manager 
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Authorizations.policy. It needs to be associated with the environment variable 
java.security.auth.policy so that the Login Context can create permission objects for us-
ers that it authenticates. 
The third policy defines which login module to implement for authentication and is given 
in the file called LoginModule.config It specifies the name, options and the package location 
of the login module to be implemented. This naming of the modules is necessary because it is 
possible to have more than one login module implemented per application. In this case each 
module would impose different levels of restrictions. All the policy files are listed in Appen-
dix C. 
Our application implements only one login module. We invoke it with the option 
required so that the authentication needs to be successful in order for the overall login of 
the user to succeed. The login module is used to establish the property of authentication in 
our application. 
This way of controlling which users are allowed to execute which use cases is convenient 
for us because it is not defined internally in the code but in a ordinary textual file that is 
loaded when the application starts up. Thus if changes are needed, no interventions in the 
code are necessary. All we need to do is edit the grant statements in this textual file. 
The mechanisms and their features explained here will establish the properties of au-
thentication and authorization included in the scope of work. They enable us to control 
access to the application and to verify if the (authenticated) users are allowed to execute the 
requested methods which in turn, implement the use cases of the application. 
In the next section we explain how this intended behavior would look in an actual imple-
mentation. The term intended behavior refers to the functional behavior of our program with 
mechanisms of JAAS and its features that will establish the security properties in the imple-
mentation of our program. 
 We present the numbered steps of this behavior from Figure 6.1 through sequence dia-
grams. The sequence diagrams capture the order of processes and show how they work 
when these steps are actually implemented in the classes of an application. 
6.2. Sequence of operations 
In this section we explain the interactions of processes in the program behavior that should 
establish authentication and authorization in our case study. 
Since the application is built on RMI technology first the remote object needs to be ad-
vertised in the RMI-Registry. The application starts by the client software looking up into the 
registry to obtain the reference of the (remote) object. The client must provide the address of 
the remote object he is looking for. If this remote object has been advertised previously, its 
reference is found and returned to the caller. This is presented in the Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3. Obtaining the reference to the remote object. 
The client software using this reference requests methods on the remote object of the 
server. The object declared as remote by the RMI system in the server implements the login 
module which creates a login context for the calling user. The remote object is denoted in the 
figure as Login Impl and the login context created as Login Context. The caller calls the 
built in method login() of the module which creates a login context and authenticates the 
caller. If the caller has provided correct username and password the user is authenticated 
successfully, a proxy is created and the reference of this proxy is returned to the caller. The 
proxy has now established the identity of the user. 
Note that when the login() method is called in the Login Context it creates the identity of 
the user and it dynamically binds his permissions to his identity. So based on the grant 
statements that the administration has listed for that user in the policy file the object from 
the Subject class gets the corresponding Permission objects binded to him. This part of how 
JAAS functions internally is not presented in the figure. For more details on this, read Section 
3.3.2. This completes the authentication phase. 
The authorization phase starts by the caller requesting to execute a method on the serv-
er. Using his reference the client can now call methods on the server object which implement 
the use cases of our application.  
Both the proxy and the other server class implement the same interface, which means 
that both of them implement the same methods. The difference is that the proxy object (de-
noted here as Server Proxy) only checks if the caller possesses the necessary authorizations 
and the implementation class (in the figure denoted as Server Impl) implements their ac-
tual functionality.  The verification of authorization of the caller is done by executing the 
built-in method doAs of the Subject class. This class represents the identity of the user. This 
class stores all the permission objects that the user has been binded to when his identity was 
created. The doAs method looks through all these objects to find the necessary permission. If 
it is found then no exception is raised and the proxy calls the method on user’s behalf in the 
Server Impl objects where the use case functionality is completed. 
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Figure 6.4. A proxy is created when the user is successfully authenticated. 
An architecture that implements the sequence of steps shown in this section establishes 
the anticipated properties in the application.  
In the next section we model the flow of these steps in a finite state automaton that cap-
tures the behavior of the application in terms of states and state-transitions. The implemen-
tation of our case study is done based on this modeling. In fact our program mirrors the au-
tomaton. Mirrors in this context means that states and state transitions appearing in the au-
tomata will identically appear in the program as well. To ensure that they indeed do appear 
identically as in the automaton, we express the states and their transitions with JML annota-
tions.  
The goal of this modeling is to show that since the application actually mirrors the auto-
maton, and since we have showed how this behavior defined in the automaton meets proper-
ties of authentication and authorization then the implementation of our program also meets 
these properties. 
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Figure 6.5. The proxy verifies the permissions of the caller. 
6.3. Modeling the behavior of the application 
In this section we model the flow of the program as a finite state automaton. This type of an 
automaton is a mathematical abstraction used to model computer programs. It is a behavior 
model composed of a finite number of states, transitions between those states, and actions, 
similarly to a flow graph in which one can inspect the way logic runs when certain conditions 
are met (53). The start of the finite state automaton begins in the start state and goes 
through the other states depending on the input that it gets from the states it has previously 
been in. 
This automaton will capture the intended behavior of the program explained in the previous 
section with states and actions defined for each state. Actions here represent the methods al-
lowed to be called in the corresponding states that lead to state transitions and the (possible) 
exceptions that can be raised as a result of method execution.  
One of the intentions of this modeling is to abstract away from the actual implementa-
tion details which establish these properties but still be able to capture the intended (high-
level) behavior of the program. Since this model is based on the abstraction of the actual ap-
plication some assumptions are necessary for this model to hold. These assumptions are pre-
sented in the following section. 
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6.3.1. Assumptions 
In the model of our application we include the JAAS mechanism but abstract away from how 
this system works internally. In the automaton we only model the requirements that a Login 
Context and a Subject representing the identity of the user is created by JAAS and assume 
that JAAS works correctly. 
We assume that no unauthorized tampering of messages during communication between 
the client and the server takes place. 
Recall that one of the limitations of JML in regard to security is that specifications are de-
fined for each class separately (see Section 3.1.7 for more details). As of result of this design 
of JML, the static checking tools, also verify the annotations for each class separately. This 
poses a great problem for us since, the overall flow of the program that we want to model 
happens in more than one classes. More specifically, it begins in the Client class, which inte-
racts with the LoginImpl and ServerProxy classes. 
 To model the continuity of state transitions between these classes into one state ma-
chine which represents the entire program behavior, when the predecessor state of the pro-
grame occurs in another class we assume the value of the previous state. To model this, we 
use the assume keyword of JML. By using this assumption, when the flow control of the pro-
grame goes from a state in one class into a new state in another class, we instruct the static 
checker to assume that the program flow came from a particular state. This assumption 
enables us to capture the continuity of the state transitions in the overall program. 
Thus, in the case when we need to express the two consecutive transitions occurring in 
two different states with JML annotations, we manually check the predecessor state from our 
automaton and insert it in the programe as an assumption statement expressed in JML. 
This is done so we could model the overall flow of the application in one state automa-
ton. We require this because the properties that we are specifying depend on the behavior 
implemented in multiple classes.  
The transition of states occurring in two different classes happens for example, when we 
go from the state when the client class calls a remote method, to the state when the server 
verifies the authorizations of that user (more on this will be explained when we do the actual 
specification in Section 6.4. 
6.3.2. The  state automata 
We present the automaton modeling the life-cycle of the application in the Figure 6.6. The 
states are represented by ovals; transitions are represented by arrows and exceptions by 
broken line arrows of grey color. The automaton depicts the behavior of program occurring 
in the client side (marked with C) and the server side (marked with S). The dotted gray line 
represents the separation of the states occurring in the client side of the program shown on 
the left side of the automata, from the states occurring on the server side shown on the right  
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Figure 6.6. The program behavior modeled as a state automaton. 
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side of the figure. Since we are modeling the behavior of a prototype application, the client 
behavior that we model here calls statically one method on the server21 and exits. 
The automaton has ten states. It begins in the INITIAL state when the application starts. 
From this state the program calls the method lookupRemoteObj() for searching the refer-
ence of the remote object in the server which is advertised in the (global) RMI registry. If the 
(remote) object is found, the program goes into the state of FOUND and the reference of this 
object is returned to the caller. 
From the FOUND state the requestLogin() method reads the credentials from the user 
and forwards them to the remote object in order to prove the identity of the calling authority 
to the server.  
When the remote object receives credentials, it creates a new login context for the (au-
thenticated) user; the program goes in the CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT state. JAAS verifies the 
credentials when the built-in method of login() is called. If the provided credentials are 
invalid then a Login Exception is thrown, the program gets in the TERMINATE state and exits. 
If the credentials are valid the getSubject() method is executed to get the Subject 
(with its permission objects binded) for that user from the login module of JAAS. This gets 
the program in the state of NEW_SUBJECT. Then a new proxy is created for that user by the 
createNewProxy() method which puts the system in the NEW_PROXY state. The reference of 
the newly created proxy is returned back to the caller. 
After receiving this reference at the client, the program goes into the AUTHENTICATED 
state. From this state, the client program calls the performTask() method which calls a re-
mote method on the proxy. This brings the application in the state of REQUEST_METHOD. The 
requested (remote) method is denoted here with m(). m() in this case is just an example 
name for a remote method that implements the functionality of a used case in the server. For 
example m() can be a method that adds patients, lists the records of the patients or com-
pletes any other use case defined in Section 5.2.  
When the proxy receives the request it enters the state of VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION. In this 
state, checkPermission method is called to verify if the caller is permitted to execute m(). If 
the user making the call is permitted to execute that method, then the proxy enters the state 
of CALL_METHOD and calls m() on the object where it is actually implemented. In this object 
the actual work of the used case is completed. After it is completed m() returns the result to 
the caller and enters the TERMINATE state and exits.  
On the other hand, if the user does not have the required permissions for method m a Se-
curity Exception is raised and the program again gets in the TERMINATE state and exits with-
out the user completing that use case. 
This marks a complete lifecycle of the application starting from first verifying the identi-
ty of the user, checking if that user has corresponding permissions to execute the requested 
method and at last, executing the method. 
The lifecycle defined in the automata is implemented on the program of our case study. 
The implementation is listed in the Appendix B. In the next section we show how we specify 
the defined states of the automata and the transitions between the states in the program. The 
states and transitions are specified with JML annotations. 
                                                        
21 This modeling simplifies from a typical application behavior where the user interacts with the applica-
tion by calling different methods that complete different tasks for him. 
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6.4. Specification of the program 
In this section we show how we specify the properties of authentication and authorization in 
our program. By explicitly modeling the behavior of the programe that implements these 
(high-level) properties, it becomes easier to formulate the JML statements when specifying 
the program. 
Note that we do not specify all the classes of the programe with annotations that would 
enable us to verify the correctness of the entire programe. Instead, we are only concerned in 
verifying the correctness of the security properties that we have implemented.  
We will show that all the states and the transitions between the states defined in the automa-
ton will also occur in the classes of our program.  JML ghost fields are used to mark the states, 
while the order of transitions between them is translated into constraints and invariants 
placed in the corresponding classes where they are implemented.  
Remember that when invariants are defined for the class then they must hold for any ex-
ecution of the program statements. On the other hand constraints must hold at every entry 
point and exit point of each method (26). They may however, become broken temporarily in-
side the method but are established again when the method returns [see Section 3.1 for 
more]. 
Ghost fields are used to mark the state because, in comparison to other JML annotations 
which are defined before the method and can’t be updated later, the value of this type of 
fields can be updated inside the method itself. In this way, when we want to mark a change in 
the state of the object (that has occurred as a result of some program flow) we update the 
value of this field correspondingly at that point in the code (see Section 3.1.5 for more de-
tails). The ghost field used in our implementation for this purpose is called state. 
The complete program is listed in the Appendix B. The actual implementation of the 
functionalities required by the used cases is discussed in the next chapter. Here we discuss 
only the classes that define the behavior presented in the automata. By behavior we mean 
the defined states and the state transitions in our program. We show how we have modeled 
states and expressed transitions between these states in terms of constraints to ensure that 
the defined behavior is implemented correctly in the application. Correctly in this context 
means that the implementation actually behaves as specified in the JML annotations. 
The complete life-cycle defined in the automaton occurs in three classes of our program. 
The behavior defined for the client is implemented in the Client class listed in the Appendix 
B page on page 111. This class finds the reference of the server, sends credentials of the user 
to there and calls methods on the server which complete the use cases for the user. 
The behavior of the server occurs in the LoginImpl and ServerProxy class. The first 
class is listed in Appendix B on page 115 and implements the behavior of user authentication 
and creation of the proxy. The second class is shown in the Appendix B page 118 and imple-
ments the verification of authorizations of the user when he invokes methods. 
Specification of the Client class 
In the Client class we define the possible states for this class in the invariant below.  
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/*@ invariant  
  @  ( state==INITIAL || state==CONNECTED ||  
  @    state==AUTHENTICATED || state==REQUEST_METHOD ||  
  @    state== CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT || state==TERMINATE );  
  @*/ 
Figure 6.7. States of the Client object. 
To specify the transitions between these states during the object life cycle we use the con-
straint listed in the Figure 6.8. With this constraint we specify the order of occurrence of 
transitions between the states of this class. For each state we specify what are the pre states 
that can lead to that state and post states that can follow from it. For example in line four we 
specify that prior to state AUTHENTICATED, the FOUND state must have been in place.  
 
 
/*@ constraint 
  @  (state==INITIAL ==> \old(state==null ) && 
  @  (state==FOUND ==> \old(state)==INITIAL ) && 
  @  (state==AUTHENTICATED ==> \old(state)==FOUND ) && 
  @  (state==REQUEST_METHOD==>\old(state)==AUTHENTICATED)&& 
  @  (state==TERMINATE ==> \old(state)==INITIAL 
  @    || \old(state)==FOUND 
  @    || \old(state)==AUTHENTICATED 
  @    || \old(state)==CREAT_LOGIN_CONTEXT 
  @    || \old(state)==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION 
  @    || \old(state)==REQUEST_METHOD); 
  @*/ 
Figure 6.8. Constraint specifying state transitions. 
Note that there are many states listed in this constraint that can lead to the TERMINATE state. 
This is because we build an RMI application where communication between the client and 
the server is done though the web and anything can go wrong with the connection at any of 
these states. These interruptions will raise a RemoteException, the program goes into the 
TERMINATE state and exits. These transitions are implemented and specified in our program 
but not visible in the Figure 6.6 for two reasons. Since they are part of the RMI functionality 
and not directly linked to the establishing of our properties and to simplify the representa-
tion of the automaton in the figure. 
Note one important detail in Figure 6.8 which comes as a result of one of the assump-
tions we have made for the purpose of modeling the consecutive state transitions in the pro-
grame, when they occur in two different classes. 
We have the transition of states from CREAT_LOGIN_CONTEXT and TERMINATE on one side, 
and the transition of REQUEST_METHOD to TERMINATE state on the other side. The two transi-
tions occur if an exception is thrown in another class and returned at the Client class where 
it is caught. This happens in two situations: (a) when the user is not authenticated successful-
ly or, (b) when he does not have necessary authorizations to make that method call. 
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Note that the state CREAT_LOGIN_CONTEXT is not defined as an admissible state in the in-
variant of this class in the Figure 6.7. The reason is that this state actually occurs in another 
class – in the LoginImpl class, when the user attempts to authenticate.  
When the user makes this attempt to authenticate, the state of the program goes into the 
state of CREAT_LOGIN_CONTEXT but, if the authentication is not successful, an exception is re-
turned to the Client. In this case, the application goes into the TERMINATE state and exits. To 
model this exception being thrown; in the code where we catch it, we instruct the static 
checker that the predecessor state was VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION. So this transition is covered 
by the assumption. 
Please consult the actual code listings of these classes listed in Appendix B to see the 
code and the annotations provided to support the modeling of these inter-class transitions. 
The application starts by calling the start() method in the constructor which sets the 
state of the program to INITIAL. This method implements the following behavior: it first 
looks for the reference of the remote object; if found than forwards the credentials that the 
user has provided to the server in an attempt to authenticate him, and if authentication is 
successful then it calls a (remote) method. If any of the two conditions is not met the applica-
tion exits. The following annotation presented in the Figure 6.9 models this. 
 
 /*@ requires state==null; 
   @ 
   @ ensures (lookupRemoteObj() && requestLogin() ==> 
   @     \only_called(performTask) ) && 
   @  
   @   (!lookupRemoteObj() || !requestLogin()) 
   @         ==> \only_called(exit)) 
   @*/   
private void start() { 
  //@ set state = INITIAL; 
  if (lookupRemoteObj()) { 
   if (requestLogin()) { 
    performTask(); 
   } 
  } else { 
   exit(); 
  } 
 } 
Figure 6.9. Specification of the behavior in the start method. 
The first method called by the remote lookupRemoteObj() method gets the reference to 
the remote object from the RMI registry.  
The annotation for this method states that when this method is called the state must be 
INITIAL and the reference of the remote object must be null. There must not be a (old) refer-
ence to the remote object. By using the assignable clause we restrict that the only variable 
allowed to be modified in this method is the loginServer reference. It also states that during 
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the method execution only the lookup method called. By using the \fresh keyword we speci-
fy that that when the method terminates the result stored in the reference of loginServer 
must have been generated “freshly”; as a result of this particular method execution and not 
some other (prior) method.  
In the postconditions we specify what conditions need to be met in order for the result to 
be true, and what conditions are required for it to be false. Note that in annotation for this 
method (and for the other methods as well), we don’t need to catch the value of the state 
after the method returns, because this is defined in the general class constraint from Figure 
6.8. 
 
/*@ requires state == INITIAL && loginServer == null; 
  @ 
  @ assignable loginServer; 
  @ 
  @ ensures    \only_called(lookup) &&  
  @     ( (loginServer==null ==> result==false) && 
  @ 
  @ ensures    (loginServer!=null ==> result==true && 
  @      \fresh(loginServer) ); 
  @*/ 
 
private boolean lookupRemoteObj() { 
 . . .  
 
 loginServer=(LoginInterface) Naming.lookup(serverObject); 
    
 //@ set state = FOUND; 
 
 . . . 
 } 
Figure 6.10. Specification of the lookupRemoteObj. 
After the method lookupRemoteObj() executes, it brings the object in the FOUND state. In 
this state the requestLogin() method is called. 
This method forwards the credentials read from the user to the server. Note that in the 
lack a presentation layer component for this application, we enter the user credentials stati-
cally (by hardcoding they’re values inside this method). 
In the specification we use the assignable clause again to limit that only user, pass and 
theServer variables can be modified during this method. During the method execution only 
the forwardCrds method can be referenced and the reference to the remote object should 
not be null and must have been updated during this method execution. 
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 /*@ requires state == FOUND && loginServer != null; 
   @ 
   @ assignable user, pass, theServer; 
   @ 
  @ ensures    \only_called(forwardCrds) &&  
  @     ( (theServer==null ==> result==false) && 
  @ 
  @        (loginServer!=null ==> result==true && 
  @        \fresh(loginServer) ); 
  @*/ 
 private boolean requestLogin() { 
  user="admin1"; pass="admin1";  
//USERNAME AND PASSWORD OF THE user 
 
  try { 
    theServer = (ServerInterface) 
 loginServer.forwardCrds(user,pass); 
 
    //@ set state = AUTHENTICATED; 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   //@ assume state == CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT; 
   return false; 
  } 
  return true; 
 } 
Figure 6.11. Specification of the method that requests to authenticate the user to the server. 
In this method we face the problem mentioned earlier when the state transition occurs 
between two different classes. This has been covered in the assumptions, where we decided 
that every time a state transitions occurring between two classes, we assume the value of the 
predecessor state.  
So, in the specification of this (remote) method, if an exception is thrown in the server 
during the attempt to authenticate the user, at which point the state of the programe enters 
the CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT state, then the (remote) method forwarding the login cre-
dentials also throws an exception. After this exception, the program should go into 
TERMINATE state and exit because incorrect credentials were provided and the user must not 
be allowed access of the application. 
To model this continuity of state transitions, going from state 
CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT (that occurred in the LoginImpl class) into the TERMINATE state 
(that occurs in the Client class) we assume the value of the first state in the catch clause af-
ter which the program goes into the second state.  
On the other hand, if the authentication succeeds, the program enters the state of 
AUTHENTICATED allowing the user access to the application. Note that prior to entering the 
state of AUTHENTICATED, the state of the program was transformed through all the states de-
fined for the LoginImpl class. Namely the programe has gone through 
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 CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT, NEW_SUBJECT and NEW_PROXY states as defined in the automa-
ton in Figure 6.6. 
Now that the user has authenticated and the server has established his identity, he can 
begin calling methods that complete use cases. 
The performTask() method requests to complete one of the use cases by calling the cor-
responding (remote) method in the proxy object in the server. The choice of which use case 
to request, is again done statically in this class.  
The specification of the predecessor state occurring in another class (in this case the 
ServerProxy class) is also specified here. This inter-class transition occurs when the user 
does not have required permission to make method call that he requested; at which case an 
exception is thrown. 
The specification of the method performTask is straight forward, not listed here. 
Specification of the LoginImpl class 
In the LoginImpl class the possible states are also defined in an invariant. The invariant is 
straight forward and is not listed here. The constraint specifying the state transitions of this 
class is presented below in Figure 6.12. 
 
 /*@ constraint 
   @  (state==NEW_SUBJECT ==>  
    @   \old(state)==CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT) && 
   @ (state==NEW_PROXY ==> \old(state)==NEW_SUBJECT) && 
   @  (state==CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT ==> \old(lc)!=lc); 
   @*/ 
Figure 6.12. State transitions in the LoginImpl class. 
In the last line of this constraint we specify that if the state of the program is in 
CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT then a new login contest must have been created. 
The implementation of the (remote) method that handles credentials from the user call-
ing the JAAS login module to verify the credentials of the user has the following annotation. 
Since exceptions can be thrown their behavior is also specified. 
We define precisely the behavior of the method when it returns normally and when ex-
ceptions are thrown. When this method is called we require that the values of its parameters 
be non null, we define which variables it can modify and ensure that a login context and 
the Subject is created during this method execution (see Section 3.3 for more details about 
Subjects). It also specifies that when a LoginException is thrown no login context is 
created. The reason for this is that the user did not authenticate successfully.  
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/*@ normal_behavior 
 @ requires username != null && password != null; 
 @ assignable lc, user; 
 @ ensures  \fresh(lc, subject); 
 @ also 
 @  exceptional_behavior 
 @ requires lc==null; 
 @ signals (LoginException le) 
  @   le.getMessage()!=null&&\fresh(le); 
 @ also 
 @   exceptional_behavior 
 @    requires lc!=null || lc==null; 
 @  signals  RemoteException; 
 @     
 @*/ 
 
public ServerInterface forwardCrds(String username,  
String password) throws RemoteException, LoginException { 
 
 //@ assert state==FOUND; 
      lc = new LoginContext("JAASLogin", new  
                  RemoteCallbackHandler(username, password)); 
 
    //@ set state=CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT;   
    lc.login(); 
   
    Subject subject = lc.getSubject(); 
    //@ set state=NEW_SUBJECT;   
 // Return the reference of a proxy to the calling client.
    
return createNewProxy(subject); 
} 
Figure 6.13. Specification of user authentication. 
Note that even though the state changes twice inside this method and the sequence of 
this transition is not captured in the annotation, it is captured in the global class constraint 
from Figure 6.12. 
In the second exceptional_behavior specification we list the RemoteException, to tell 
that it can be throw. This clause is not really useful during verification, but is given for better 
clarity of the method behavior. 
 The specification of the next method createNewProxy is similar and straight forward 
and thus not listed here. The function of this method is to create a new proxy for the (authen-
ticated) user and return its reference to the caller. 
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Specification of the ServerProxy class 
Since in our program a proxy is created everytime a user is authenticated, in the proxy class 
invariant we specify that during the life-cycle of the proxy there needs to be a Subject; its 
value must be non null. This basically means that when a proxy is created there needs to be a 
Subject class also in place. We also require that the reference to the object where the use 
case functionality is implemented is non null. This invariant also lists the possible states that 
can occur in this class. These elements constitute the invariant for this class and are pre-
sented in Figure 6.14. 
 
/*@ invariant  
  @ (subject!=null && theServer!=null) && 
  @ (state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION || state==CALL_METHOD); 
  @*/ 
Figure 6.14. Defined states for the proxy. 
We add a global constraint to specify the state transitions occurring in this class. Note that if 
the program is in the VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION state we assume (in accordance with our 
model) that prior to this state the program was in the REQUEST_METHOD state. Since this state 
occurred in the previous Client class in order to model the continuity of the program flow 
we assume that the predecessor state in that class was VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION. Thus, is the 
assert statement in the definition of this constraint. 
So, this assumption is made to model the continuation of the program flow from the pre-
decessor class Client where the request for calling the (remote) method came from.   
 
/*@ constraint 
  @ (state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION ==>  
  @  assert \old(state)==REQUEST_METHOD) && 
  @ (state==CALL_METHOD ==>  
  @  \old(state)==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION); 
  @*/ 
Figure 6.15. Class constraint for the ServerProxy class. 
In this class all the (remote) methods exercise the same behavior. Namely, they first 
check for the permissions of the user and then call the requested method under the condi-
tions that the user making the call has sufficient permissions. We show the specification of 
the insert method. The other methods are similarly specified. The only difference between 
them is the number of parameters that they take. Thus, the specification that we did for them 
will not be listed here.  
For this method we specify that its parameters are non null, and only the insert and 
checkPermission methods can be called. The reference of the class where the method func-
tionality takes place is denoted as theServer.  
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The method functionality is implemented in the ServerImpl class listed in Appendix B 
page 121. The insert method and its specification are listed in Figure 6.16. 
 
/*@ normal_behavior 
  @ requires cpr!=null && fName!=null && 
  @              lName!=null && adress!=null && DOB!=null;  
  @  ensures \only_called(checkPermission, insert); 
  @               
  @ also 
  @   exceptional_behavior 
  @ signals_only  RemoteException, SecurityException; 
  @*/ 
 
public boolean insert(String cpr, String fName,  
   String lName, String adress, String DOB)  
    throws RemoteException, SecurityException { 
 
 //@ set state=VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION;  
 checkPermission("insert"); 
 
 //@ set state=CALL_METHOD; 
return theServer.insert(cpr, fName, lName, adress, DOB); 
} 
Figure 6.16. The specification for the insert method in the proxy class.  
Everytime a (remote) method is called from the Client class in the ServerProxy class, 
the proxy checks if the user has the necessary authorizations to run that method. To do this, 
inside of every (remote) method defined in the proxy we call the checkPermission method 
which in turn, uses the JAAS features to verify permissions of the user. 
The specification for the checkPermission method specified the behavior similarly and de-
fines the possible exception being thrown if the user does not have the required permission 
for that method. Here we specify that the doAs (built-in) method of the Subject class is 
called. The annotation for this method is shown below in Figure 6.17. 
 
/*@ normal_behavior 
  @   requires methodName!=null; 
  @  assignable \nothing; 
  @     ensures \only_called(doAs); 
  @ also 
  @ exceptional_behavior  
  @  signals  (SecurityException se) 
  @     se.getMessage()!=null && fresh(se); 
  @*/ 
private void checkPermission(String methodName)  
                            throws SecurityException{ 
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 Subject.doAs(theUser,new MethodcallValidate(methodName)); 
} 
Figure 6.17. Specification of the method that verifies permissions of the user. 
Since our application uses RMI technology to implement the communication between the 
remote parties, an interface of all the remotely accessible methods has to be defined. This is a 
requirement of the RMI technology (see Section 3.3 for more details on RMI implementa-
tion). The interface class is then implemented by all the classes where the remote methods 
are implemented. In our case, this interface is defined in class ServerInterface listed on 
page 124 and implemented by the ServerProxy and ServerImpl class. 
In the event that we were to specify all the classes of our application with JML, including 
these three classes, we could use model fields (54) (55). With these fields we define one (or 
more) model fields in the interface marked with keyword instance. This keyword indicates 
that the actual fields on the implementation class have to be linked to this variable.  
All the classes implementing this interface can then relate the model fields defined in the 
interface with the fields that they implement (see section 3.1 for more on model fields). Oth-
er advantages of specifying interfaces with these fields can be found in (31). For a more ex-
tensive discussion of model fields regard (56). 
We did not use this method, since we do not specify all the classes of our program, but 
only the classes that establish the security properties thus the aforementioned benefits 
would not help us. 
6.5. Discussion 
In this section we discuss problems encountered and our experience during specifying prop-
erties with this method. We point out the reasons behind these problems and discuss the 
benefits and outcome of doing property specification with this method. 
6.5.1. Problems 
The specification of properties with this method brings additional assurance that the beha-
vior the programmer had in mind is correctly implemented in relation to the JML annotations 
provided. However, the fundamental problem remains; there is no formal proof of the auto-
maton modeling this behavior.  
A problem that we encountered during specification of our application was related to 
specifying the remote exceptions that the RMI methods throw when the connection is inter-
rupted. It is not possible to express in pre and post conditions when this type of exception is 
thrown because it does not depend internally from our application but from an external fac-
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tors (the interruption of the TCP/IP connection). Based on our experience, we are convinced 
that specifying exceptions is not useful for verification.  
We have experienced that getting the specifications right is a labor intensive work. The 
JML2 Eclipse plugin that we used for doing run-time assertion checking does not report the 
possible logical errors in the specifications. Thus it is very easy to include annotations in the 
programe that are syntactically correct, but do not express any valuable pre- or post- condi-
tion that could be used during verification because their logic is erroneous. 
Furthermore, sometimes the JML2 compiler did not report even the syntactical errors.  
On occasion when we compiled the annotations with the JML2 plugin, it did not show us 
warnings of syntactical errors even though we were sure about them. On these cases, it 
helped restarting the Eclipse IDE and recompiling the annotations back again. This time, the 
warnings were shown.  
In the past, correctness has been formally proofed on small and relatively simple Java 
Card applets (41) (16). Since their behavior is considerably simpler it is possible to model 
their security related behavior as a protocol and verify this protocol for the given properties. 
Despite this being possible, the properties specified do not constitute high-level properties 
such as authentication, authorization or alike. The properties specified there are usually low 
level properties which are specific to the architecture of the processing device (the chip) 
where these applications run. An example of a property specified here is atomicity of trans-
action. 
It is generally acknowledged that there is a substantial gap between modeling the high 
level properties such as authenticity, confidentiality and similar with specifications done on 
the implementation level, usually consisting of pre- and post- conditions for methods and 
invariants or class-wise history constraints (42).  
Modeling Java desktop applications with real-life requirements as protocols is however 
considerably more challenging because of the complexity involved in them.  
When modeling the behavior of the application for our case study, a number of abstrac-
tions from the actual implementation details are done. It is generally known that, it is at the 
implementation level that often errors compromising security of the application appear. For 
example, our model of the application uses the JAAS features of login context and the Subject 
representation of the user identity but it abstracts away from the implementation of JAAS 
that creates these features. So if verification of the program is done, we are only assured that 
that these features are created but no assurance on their actual implementation of JAAS. 
Some of the major problems when doing the specifications of (high-level) properties 
modeled in this fashion comes as a result of the limitations of JML [see section 3.3]. Usually 
design decisions related to security are (most often) implemented in multiple classes which 
affect other sections of the program. On the other hand, JML is meant for specifications of 
single classes thus, specifying design decisions that spread over multiple classes is proble-
matic in JML. We face this problem in our implementation when modeling the flow of states 
between two classes. We go around this issue in our implementation by assuming when 
states change between two classes; we use the assume keyword of JML which basically as-
sumes the predecessor state in the previous class. 
Our experience during implementing this prototype application with states and state 
transitions defined in a state automaton has shown that additional complexity is added to the 
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application when the program statements have to be encapsulated in the methods which 
represent the transitions of the automaton. 
6.5.2. Observations 
The research efforts in the JML community were mostly concerned in developing features of 
JML that deal with sequential22 programming in Java. As a result, JML lacks proper constructs 
to support the specification of Object Oriented programming in Java.  
Based on the experience that we had during the specification of our programe, we as-
sume that the costs of writing a fairly complete functional speciﬁcation for program behavior 
is usually about the same as that of writing the code to implement it. 
We think that capturing the behavior of code in the application level can be done easier if 
the programe is developed in a modular fashion. In this case annotations for modules can be 
written in separate files and static checking tools such as ESC/Java2 can interpret them. 
Even though we don’t use concurrency in our application, we notice that the specifica-
tion of the ordering of events would be highly problematical in such programs. Simply be-
cause, specifying contracts between the caller and implementor using only the Hoare style 
logic (57) does not suffice to specify sequences of operations in concurrency. 
6.5.3. Benefits 
Modeling the program behavior as a state automaton enables us to easier write JML specifi-
cations for high-level security properties intended to be implemented in the application.  
Writing the JML annotations contributes to a better understanding of the code in general. 
Because the programmer is thinking twice about the implementation details in the code, so 
the chances for discovering inconsistencies are greater. 
Static analysis tools (such as ESC/Java2) can be used to discover programming errors 
occurring during implementation by using the JML annotations. This tool checks for common 
run-time errors for each class separately and issues warnings if violations of annotations are 
encountered. For example it checks if invariants, constraints, pre- and post- conditions are 
broken. 
By specifying security properties of authentication and authorization in our case study, 
we give an example of how it is possible to actually narrow the gap when specifying high-
level security properties on one side, and the low-level implementation details on the other 
side. 
 
                                                        
22 Also referred to as procedural programming. 
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Chapter VII 
7. Testing and other implementation details 
In this chapter we explain how our application implements the functionalities defined in the 
case study. We show how the use cases are implemented and we do acceptance tests for 
them. Tables of acceptance tests are provided in Section 7.3 showing the relation between 
the test input data and the generated output.  
Our functional testing involves identifying and testing all the functions of the system as 
defined within the requirements. This form of testing is an example of black-box testing since 
it involves no knowledge of the implementation of the system. 
We test if the users are authenticated properly when they provide appropriate creden-
tials to the system. We also test the system if it controls the authorizations of users properly 
when they initiate remote method calls to the server. 
Our test cases serve to assure that the policy of separating the duties in the clinic is 
properly implemented in the application. Namely, we test to ensure that only users that were 
assigned privileges belonging to the administration staff can work with patients’ personal 
data and, only users assigned privileges of the medical staff can work with patients’ medical 
records. 
In Section 7.3.3 we do test cases to see if the application implements the use cases with 
the requirements that we have defined them.  
In this prototype application we use a data structure to store data in the memory. The 
details of the design choices for this data structure are explained in Section 0. 
In the previous chapters when discussing the architecture of the application, we have 
stated that the proxy object created for the (authenticated) user calls methods for him in the 
ServerImpl class (listed in Appendix B pg. 121). In Section 7.2 we explain both the class that 
implements the use cases and the class of the proxy object. This section includes their class 
diagrams. 
In the end of the chapter we analyse of the results that we got from testing.  
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7.1. Data structure 
The data structure used in this application is comprised of three Java collections for storing 
data of the application. They hold the list of users that are allowed to access the system and 
the data related to the registered patients of the clinic. The patient data is held in two sepa-
rate collections, each recording the personal data of the patient and the medical records.  
The following data collections are used in the application: 
 a HashTable is used in the LoginModule class to hold the username and pass-
word of the users that are allowed access to the application in the clinic. The 
login credentials provided by the user are searched for in this table. If they are 
found then that caller is a registered user and he is allowed to access the appli-
cation. 
 the list of patients is stored in a HashTable. It maps the unique CPR number’s 
(of type String) with the patient objects from the Patient class. This collection 
is presented in Figure 7.1. 
 the list of the medical records for patients is stored in a HashMap. Since the CPR 
number is used to uniquely identity the patient, we map this ID to an 
ArrayList. This ArrayList holds all the medical records for that patient and 
every time we insert a new medical record for the patient we just append it to 
this list. This collection is presented in Figure 7.2. 
The patient class has fields for storing first name, last name, address and the date of birth 
of the patient.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. The HashTable for holding the list of patients. 
The objects of this ArrayList holding medical records for patients are from the class of 
MedRecords presented in Appendix B pg. 133. 
The fields of the MedRecords class hold the date when the tests were conducted, a field 
for additional comments, the total cost of the tests that were performed during that visit to 
the clinic and a list of tests done during the visit.  
The list of tests for each medical record is again, stored in a new ArrayList. This 
ArrayList contains objects from the Test class. The test class is listed in Appendix B page 
135 and holds the name of the test that was done and the result of that test. 
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Figure 7.2. The HashMap for medical records of patients maps CPR to array list holding all the 
medical records of that patient. 
The symbol  used to express the relationships between entities in the two previous 
figures represents a one to one relationship. s 
Note that this data structure satisfies only the very basic data storage needs which are 
not complete for an actual real-world medical clinic. The simplification was done because the 
data layer for the application is not implemented in our application. Thus we chose a limited 
data structure with basic needs for the application.  
However, in case the application is extended with an actual database, this data structure 
can serve as a good layout model for designing a more extensive relational data base. 
In the next section we proceed by explaining some of the other design elements concern-
ing our application. They are related to the implementation of use cases and the internal 
structure of class files in the application. 
7.2. Design of the application 
In this section we explain how the use cases are implemented. We explain the methods that 
implement their functionality and show the class diagram of the class where these methods 
are implemented. We list the internal structure of the class files of the application grouped in 
packages and JAR archives. 
7.2.1. The implementation of use cases 
Here we explain classes of the program in the server side of the application, where the re-
quired functionality for the use cases is implemented. The class diagram of the ServerImpl 
class that implements these methods is listed below in Figure 7.3. 
In the previous chapters we have stated that the functionality of each use case from Sec-
tion 5.1 is implemented in one atomic method. In Table 7.1 we list the names of the methods 
and the corresponding use cases that they complete. But first we show the class diagram of 
the class where these methods are implemented. 
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Figure 7.3. The class diagram of ServerImpl. 
 
Method name Use case 
insertP add new patients  
findP find a patient 
editP edit personal data of the patient 
addMedicalRecords add new medical data to a patient 
listRecords list all medical history records of a patient 
Table 7.1. The method names that complete the use case functionalities. 
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The insertP method, first checks if the received CPR ID for the new patient to be in-
serted exists, and if it doesn’t it inserts it. If the patient is inserted true is returned, and if not, 
false is returned to the caller. 
The findP method returns the string representation of the patient object to the caller. 
The editP method edits only the fields of the patient object for which the received para-
meters are an empty string. The caller of this method gives only values to the fields that he 
wishes to update. The parameters that he leaves as empty strings are neglected in the up-
date. 
The addMedicalRecords method first checks if that patient exists, if he exists then it 
checks if he has any previous records listed. If not it creates an ArrayList and places the 
(newly created first) medical record in this list. If there are records listed, it just appends to 
them by inserting the object in the (existing) ArrayList. 
The listRecords returns the string representation of the medical records from the pa-
tient identified by the CPR id that it received as a parameter. 
The Proxy class 
The class creating proxies for users that are authenticated successfully is named 
ServerProxy and listed on page 118. This class implements the same interface as 
ServerImpl class. Remember that the role of the proxy is to check if the caller has the per-
missions for the method call he is making. This verification is done in the checkPermission 
method. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. The ServerProxy class. 
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7.2.2. How is access control enforced in the server 
We have discussed earlier that JAAS performs authorization control of users based on 
principles which in our application are defined in the MyPrincipal class. They are basically 
objects that get inserted in the Subject class which is created after the user is authenticated 
and signify all the permissions that the user has.  
The principal objects are added to the subject class at the start-up of the application ac-
cording to the policy file defined earlier and loaded then. 
The principle authorization is enforced through the use of  
javax.security.auth.Subject.doAs method, which allows a piece of code to be executed 
with the privileges of a specific principal. The Subject.doAs method is called in the proxy 
class which requires the code to be executed as an object. For this purpose the 
MethodcallValidate class serves, where the java.security.AccessController calls it’s 
checkPermission method to see if the Subject class (representing the user making that is 
making the call) has the required permission object. If the Subject has the required permis-
sion object, the code is executed and if not, a security exception is raised and the actual privi-
leged code is never reached.  
After a security manager is installed in the application, all the method calls are for-
warded to the java.security.AccessController class who makes the final decision. This 
class decides, based on the principals that the user making the call has, if the code is allowed 
to execute or not. 
7.3. Acceptance tests 
In this section we present tests done on the system. We have chosen to test our application 
with acceptance tests. These tests ensure that the used cases of the system are implemented 
as required in the functional specification of the system. Using this method of testing, the ap-
plication is tested from the user’s point of view. We run a suite of tests providing the user-
input and we verify if the outcome is as expected. 
We use acceptance testing with column fixture. This form of acceptance testing 
represents input data entered in the system and the output data generated during testing in 
the form of rows of tables (58). Each test case is presented in a separate table. It is best used 
for testing functional behavior, i.e. the relation between inputs and outputs.  
It is possible to use frameworks for integrated testings, such as Fitnesse23 that does tests 
automatically by using software tools available online. In this case the coding of fixtures is 
necessary to connect the tables with the tool that executes the tests on the program being 
tested and reports back the results. Fixtures are the coding done by the programmer to ex-
press the HTML tables in the format that the online tool can process.  
However, we did not use this framework. Instead we choose to do the tests manually, by 
entering the test data in the application and using print statements to read the generated 
                                                        
23 www.fitnesse.org 
107 
 
outcome. After placing the outcome in the corresponding columns we examined it if it was 
correct. 
The first test that we have done was to test if the authentication and authorization is 
functioning properly. 
7.3.1. Authentication 
After registering the credentials of two users in the LoginModule class where the authentica-
tion takes place we test if the clients providing correct credentials are allowed to login. 
 
user password  requestLogin 
admin1 admin1pass true 
med1 med1pass true 
admin1 A false 
med1 MED false 
admin admin1pass false 
Med med1pass false 
 Table 7.2. Acceptance test for user authentication. 
From this table we see that when users enter valid credentials to the system, they are au-
thenticated successfully (the first two cases). In the four last cases where the incorrect user-
name or password is given, the authentication of the subject fails. 
7.3.2. Authorization control for method execution 
In this test case we test if the application correctly implements the of separation of duties be-
tween the administration staff and the medical staff in the clinic. The company policy states 
that only the administration staff of the clinic can work with the personal data of the patients, 
while the medical staff can operate with the data related to the medical history.  
As a result of this policy the administration staff is only allowed to call methods insert, 
findP and editP, while the medical staff is allowed to call methods of addMedicalRecords 
and listRecords.  
In our system, we register two users (one admin and one medical user) in the system 
and assign them corresponding permissions in the policy file. Namely, the user admin1 is as-
signed permission to execute methods insert, findP and editP while the med1 user is as-
signed permission to execute methods addMedicalRecords and listRecords. 
To verify that the application allows only method calls from authorized users we do the 
following test. First we login with the admin user and call all the methods and then we do the 
same with the med user.  
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user performTask  throws Security Exception 
admin1 insert no 
admin1 findP no 
admin1 editP no 
admin1 addMedicalRecords yes 
admin1 listRecords yes 
med1 insert yes 
med1 findP yes 
med1 editP yes 
med1 addMedicalRecords no 
med1 listRecords no 
Table 7.3. Test results for the authorization control during method calls. 
We see that in accordance with the policy, exceptions are thrown only when users call 
methods that they do not have permission to call. 
Note that since this is a prototype application the implementation of the client software 
statically calls only one method and exists. So, to do this test we manually changed the refer-
ence to the (remote) method call for each test. 
After testing the authentication and authorization control in the application, we proceed 
by testing if the application meets the functional requirements defined. 
7.3.3. Implementation of use cases 
Next, we test if the use cases defined are correctly implemented in the application. Note that 
during these test the user went through the same authentication and authorization proce-
dure as in the previous tests, but is not shown here for simplicity. Instead, here we focus only 
on how methods function. 
We start with testing the insertion of new patients when the insert method is called by the 
user. 
Insert a new patient 
In this test case we check the implementation of the insert24 method. We test if we can 
insert more patients with the same CPR ID. 
 
CPR ID first name lastname adress DOB insert 
0101903989 John Doe Street 1, Copenhagen 01-01-90 true 
0101903989 John Doe Street 1, Copenhagen 01-01-90 false 
                                                        
24 This method first checks if the patient exists and only if he doesn’t it inserts it. Patients are uniquely 
identified by their CPR ID 
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0101903989 John Hanssen Street 1, Copenhagen 01-01-90 false 
Table 7.4. Acceptance tests for inserting new patients. 
From the test results we see that when we try to insert patients with the same CPR ID, 
those attempts fail. 
Find patient 
In this test case we test if the application, when provided a CPR number of the patient, 
can find the personal records of that patient25.  
 
CPR ID findP  
0101903989 John Doe  
Street 1, Copenhagen 
01-01-90 
0503979895  
0101903988   
Table 7.5. Acceptance tests for finding an existing patient. 
Only when we provide a CPR ID of an existing patient, the method returns the string re-
presentation of the patient. Otherwise it returns an empty string. 
Edit patient 
In this test case we test the application to edit any of the personal data of the patient 
such as update his first name, last name or address. This method takes three parameters, and 
depending on which parameter is given a value (not equal to an empty string), that field of  
 
CPR ID first name lastname adress editP 
0093930900 Leila Knudsen  false 
0101903989  Stenssen  true 
0101903989 Johan   true 
0101903989   Elektrovej 10, Lyngby true 
Table 7.6. Acceptance tests for editing data of an existing patient. 
the object should be replaced. The parameters whose value is an empty string are just 
skipped during the update. 
                                                        
25 An existing patient refers to the patient that has previously been inserted in our data structure. 
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In the first case when we try to edit a patient that doesn’t exist, false is returned, but in 
the last three tests when attempting to update a field of a patient that exists, they all return 
true. 
We use the findP method to see if the patient object has been updated correctly. 
 
CPR ID findP  
0101903989 Johan Stenssen  
Elektrovej 10, Lyngby 
01-01-90 
Table 7.7. The result after the update. 
We see that the fields of the object have correctly changed with the values that were 
provided during the previous update of the patients personal data. 
Adding a medical record to the patient’s medical history 
In this test case we test the application when the patient visits the clinic and a medical 
record needs to be added to his history to record this visit. The medical record that is added 
during each visit contains the date when the patient visited the clinic, a list of tests that were 
done during that visit - with each test containing the name and the result of the test, any ad-
ditional comment for that visit and, the total cost of that treatment in the clinic. 
 
CPR ID date tests comment totalCost addMedicalRecords 
0101903000 01-06-10 T1name: testA, 
result: 23.34 
visit scheduled 
for next Friday 
2500.99 false 
0101903989 01-06-10 T1name: testA, 
result: 23.34, 
T2name:testB, 
result: 99.67 
visit scheduled 
for next Friday 
900.00 true 
0101903989 02-06-10 T3name: testC, 
result: 77.0 
patient is re-
leased on home 
care 
1100.00 true 
Table 7.8. Acceptance tests for adding medical records to the patients. 
Our second test, tests the application for an insertion of a record for a client that is com-
ing to the clinic for his first time visit (and does not have a previous history in the system). In 
the following we test the application when the patient comes back and has already a medical 
history created in the system from his previous visits. 
When the client software initiates this activity, the tests are sent as (Serializable) objects 
placed on an array list. In the table above we denote them in short as T1, T2 and T3. They are 
created on the client side, placed on the array list and sent over the network as a parameter 
to the receiving method on the server. 
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We see that we get true when we try inserting records for patients that exist and false 
when we attempt to enter records for patients that don’t exist. The first successful insertion 
is during the first visit, and the second one is on the returning visit to the clinic of the same 
patient. 
List the records of a patient 
In this test case we test the listing of the medical history for the patients. First, we at-
tempt to list the medical history of a patient that doesn’t exist in our system and then we list 
the history of an existing patient. 
 
CPR ID listRecords  medicalRecords.toString() 
0101903000   
0101903989 medicalRecords 01-06-10 testA 23.34 testB 99.67 visit scheduled for 
next Friday 900.00 
02-06-10 testC 77.0 1100.00 patient is released on 
home care 1100.00 
Table 7.9. Acceptance test for listing of the patient records. 
We see that after listing records of the patient that was added in the previous testing 
suite, both of the objects from two visits to the clinic were inserted. The first object having 
two tests, and the second object having one test. To see their content we show their string 
representation on the objects that were received in the arraylist. 
As expected, when trying to list the history of a patient that is not registered in the sys-
tem, we get the null value returned. 
7.4. Analysis of the test results 
Based on the test cases we have done, we conclude that the application correctly implements 
the use cases as defined in Section 5.2 (for the given test data). The application enforces 
access control permitting access only to the registered users.  
It also restricts which methods the (authenticated) users can call, based on the execution 
privileges they are assigned by the administration. 
Discussion on the complexity of the prototype implementation 
During the development of this prototype application we developed only one class for 
the client side of the software. Furthermore, this class is very simple because all the actions 
and methods that the user initiates are coded statically. For example, if we want the user to 
authenticate with different credentials, or execute a different use case we have to manually 
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alter the code to do this. This class connects to the server, sends the credentials of the user, 
executes one use case for him and then exits. 
We are aware that perhaps this is an oversimplification. However, our intention during 
the development of this prototype was to include only those programming constructs that 
directly implement the anticipated security features. We tried to avoid, as much as possible, 
implementing other commonly found constructs that do not deliberately contribute in the 
establishment of the given security properties.  
This simplification was applied because we wanted to avoid adding code complexity that 
does not deliberately contribute to the establishing of the security properties that we model 
in the state automaton. With a more simple code, the automaton that models the program 
behavior is also less complex. And if the model is less complex, it is easier to see the draw-
backs and advantages of the applied method for property specification, which was our goal in 
the first place. 
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Chapter VIII 
8. Conclusion 
During this work we did a comprehensive threat analysis from the system designers point-
of-view on the case study. During the threat analysis we derive all the identified security 
properties necessary to secure the system. We built a prototype application implementing 
Authentication and Authorization properties. By abstracting the program behavior that im-
plements these properties we were able to model the relevant behavior in a finite state au-
tomaton. States and state transitions of the automaton are expressed with JML annotations. 
We use a run-time assertion checking tool to verify the program for violations against the be-
havior captured in the JML annotations.  
The design purpose of JML is to record the intentions of the programmer with annota-
tions that can be used to verify the programe with the help of tools. The intentions are ex-
pressed in classical Hoare logic “contracts“. Contracts contain pre- and post- conditions ex-
pressing properties that the methods should satisfy when they’re invoked and afterward re-
turning. Constraints are added to keep track of states of objects. 
Based on our experience, we have observed that the feasibility of using JML to capture 
high-level security properties in Object Oriented Java applications turned out worse than ex-
pected. This is due to the design limitations of JML. Namely, JML was designed to primarily be 
used in sequential programming and provide annotations for each class separately. There is 
no support to read, use, or interact in any way, with the specifications that are defined in 
another class.  
This became an obstacle for us, when we wanted to specify with JML annotations the ab-
straction of the programe implemented in multiple classes. 
In our opinion, using JML for verification purposes increases dependability during soft-
ware production. It contributes to a better understanding of the program behavior and a pre-
cise definition of its requirements. 
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8.1. Discussion 
In the method that we have used to specify high-level security properties the assumption of 
the predecessor state from another class remains the greatest challenge. 
When two consecutive state transitions occur in different classes, it is not possible to ex-
press the occurrence of the predecessor state as a precondition for the current state – which 
would allow us to model the continuity of the program flow in one state automaton. 
In our work we managed to model the continuity of state transitions in one automaton 
by assuming the value of the predecessor state. During these transitions we instruct the run 
time annotation checker to assume the value of the state that the program was previously in. 
We observe that this approach introduces scaling issues. If the model of the program that 
is being specified with this method has a relatively large amount of states, keeping track of 
the inter-class states and providing assumptions them can become overwhelming.  
During the modeling of the behavior of our prototype we abstract away from the actual 
implementation details that establish the (high-level) security properties. However, care 
must be taken during this abstraction, in order not to miss, modeling the important details of 
the implementation which ensure the properties in the program level. 
8.2. Future Work 
We have stated previously that this prototype has only one class to substitute for the client 
software. This class simulates the client that is using the software by statically invoking (re-
mote) methods. We plan on restructuring the client class by including additional methods 
which can be invoked from the user interface. 
We plan on continuing the specification of the remaining classes of the prototype appli-
cation so we could verify the correctness of all the classes in the prototype.  
During the threat analysis of the case study scenario, besides authentication and autho-
rization we have identified other security properties necessary to secure this application. 
From these properties, we intend to implement confidentiality and integrity in the prototype 
and try the approach we have used here to specify these properties. We intend to implement 
a protocol for these properties and try to specify this protocol with our approach. 
Explore the possibility of doing refinements to the states of the model with the aim of in-
creasing precision during abstraction by adding more states and implementation details in 
the model. 
Finally, we plan to investigate the feasibility of using Petri nets (59) to represent the ab-
straction of our programe. Petri nets are a mathematical modeling language. They are good 
for visualizing processes. They show states, actions and conditions for actions to be executed. 
These constructs seem quite close to the ones available in the Java Modeling Language. They 
can also show interactions between processes. 
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Appendix A 
D. Running the prototype 
The code of the prototype application was developed on the Microsoft Windows platform us-
ing the Eclipse IDE26. It was compiled with Java version 1.4.2_09.  
To run this prototype application, please create a new project in the Eclipse IDE. Add 
new packages in the project with same directory tree as the one we have provided. Include 
all the java files in the corresponding packages. 
Put all the JAR, policy and configuration files, in the root directory of the newly created 
project.  
Before you run the application, ensure that your current configuration of the Virtual Ma-
chine allows you to install a security manager. 
Instruct your Virtual Machine to use the following arguments: 
 
-Djava.security.manager 
-Djava.security.auth.login.config=LoginModule.config 
-Djava.security.policy=codePermissions.policy 
-Djava.security.auth.policy=Authorization.policy 
 
These arguments instruct the VM to install a security manager and to read the provided 
policies. 
The JAR archives 
Since this application installs a security manager, the class files are put into JAR archives27 in 
order for the security manager to be able to control the system resources used by the arc-
hives. The JAR archives have to be imported in the root directory of the project. 
                                                        
26 Integrated Development Environment 
27 Note that security policies can only be defined for JAR archives, and not for .class files. 
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Since we use the JDK version 1.4, we had to generate manually the stubs and the skeleton 
classes of the remote objects28 in the server by using the rmic tool. These files are placed in 
the server.jar file. 
 
Using the assertion checker to verifying the JML annotations 
We used an Eclipse plugin named JML2 to check assertions at runtime. This plugin is devel-
oped and maintained at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland.  
It is freely available for download for from:  
 
http://pm.inf.ethz.ch/research/univer-ses/tools/eclipse/  
 
Note that we could not install this plugin on the latest version of Eclipse. We had to use 
the version 3.4.1 of the Eclipse IDE to use this plugin. The latest version of Eclipse was not 
able to detect the plugin from this link. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
28 The stub and the skeleton files unable the remote objects programmed with the RMI technology to 
communicate remotely.  
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Appendix B 
E. Source code listings 
Client.java 
package src.client; 
 
import java.rmi.Naming; 
import java.util.Date; 
import src.common.*;  
  
public class Client { 
 
/* The Server and the port used is localhost, port:6000 */  
 private static final String server = "127.0.0.1:6000"; 
 // Change this string if you wish to use a different port 
  
 private String /* spec_public */ user, pass; 
 // Username and pasword of the identity to be authenticated 
    
 private static final String serverObject = "rmi://" + server + "/" 
           + "RemoteLoginServer"; 
 // Full adress and name of the remote object. 
  
 private /* spec_public */ LoginInterface loginServer; 
 // Interface to the login object that authenticates users 
  
 private /* spec_public */ ServerInterface theServer; 
 
 /** 
  * The ghost variable used to mark the state that  
  * the program is currently in 
  */ 
 //@ private static ghost String state=null; 
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 /*@ invariant  
   @  ( state==INITIAL || state==CONNECTED ||  
   @     state==AUTHENTICATED || state==REQUEST_METHOD ||  
   @    state == CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT || state==TERMINATE );  
   @*/ 
  
 /*@ constraint 
   @  ( state==INITIAL ==> \old(state==null ) && 
   @  ( state==FOUND ==> \old(state)==INITIAL ) && 
   @  ( state==AUTHENTICATED ==> \old(state)==FOUND ) && 
   @  ( state==REQUEST_METHOD ==> \old(state)==AUTHENTICATED ) && 
   @  ( state==TERMINATE ==> \old(state)==INITIAL 
   @      || \old(state)==FOUND 
   @      || \old(state)==AUTHENTICATED 
   @      || \old(state)==CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT 
   @      || \old(state)==REQUEST_METHOD )); 
   @*/ 
  
  
 //  CONSTRUCTOR 
 /*@ requires state==null; 
   @ 
   @ ensures  state==INITIAL && 
   @    loginServer==null && theServer==null &&  
   @    \only_called(start);  
   @*/ 
 public Client() { 
  //@ set state = INITIAL; 
  loginServer = null; 
  theServer = null; 
  start(); 
 
 }            
  
 /** 
  * Looks up the reference to the remote object; if found attempts to 
  * athenticate the user and then calls methods for him. If any of the 
  * methods called by this method returns false it exits the programe. 
  */ 
 /*@ requires state==INITIAL; 
   @ 
   @ ensures  (lookupRemoteObj() && requestLogin() ==> 
   @       \only_called(performTask) ) && 
   @  
   @    (!lookupRemoteObj() || !requestLogin()) 
   @          ==> \only_called(exit)) 
   @         
   @*/ 
 private void start() { 
  //@ set state = INITIAL; 
  if (lookupRemoteObj()) { 
   if (requestLogin()) { 
    performTask(); 
   } 
      
  } else { 
   exit(); 
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  } 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * Looks up the reference to the remote object on the server 
  */ 
 /*@ requires state == INITIAL && serverObject != null 
   @            && loginServer == null; 
   @ 
   @ assignable loginServer; 
   @ 
   @ ensures   \only_called(lookup) && 
   @     ( (loginServer==null ==> result==false) && 
   @    
   @       (loginServer!=null ==> result==true) && 
   @        \fresh(loginServer) ); 
   @*/ 
 private boolean lookupRemoteObj() { 
  try { 
   loginServer = (LoginInterface) Naming.lookup(serverObject); 
    
   //@ set state = FOUND; 
       
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   return false; 
  } 
 return true; 
 } 
  
 /** 
  * Attempt to login the user. 
  */ 
 /*@ requires state == FOUND && loginServer != null; 
   @ 
   @ assignable user, pass, theServer; 
   @ 
   @ ensures   \only_called(forwardCrds) && 
   @     ( (theServer==null ==> result==false) && 
   @    
   @       (theServer!=null ==> result==true) && 
   @        \fresh(theServer) ); 
   @*/ 
 private boolean requestLogin() { 
  user="admin1"; pass="admin1"; // USERNAME AND PASSWORD   
       // YOU WANT TO AUTHENTICATE WITH 
  // update these fields with credentials of the identity  
  // you want to authenticate 
  try { 
    
    theServer=(ServerInterface) loginServer.forwardCrds(user,pass); 
    //@ set state = AUTHENTICATED; 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   //@ assume state == CREATE_NEW_LOGIN_CONTEXT; 
   return false; 
  } 
  return true; 
 } 
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 /** 
  * Call a remote method for the (authenticated) user  
  */ 
 /*@ requires state==AUTHENTICATED && theServer!=null; 
   @  
   @ ensures   \only_called(insert, exit); 
   @*/ 
 private void performTask() { 
  try { 
   //@ set state = REQUEST_METHOD; 
   theServer.insert("cpr", "Stephen", "Nielsen",  
     "Elektrovej 330, Lyngby 2800", new Date(901205)); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   //@ assume state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION; 
   // User is not authorised for this method. 
   exit();  // Exit the program 
  }  
  exit();  // Method completed successfully. Exit program. 
 } 
  
 /*@ reqiures true;  
   @ ensures  state==TERMINATE; 
   @*/ 
 private /* spec_public */ void exit() { 
  //@ set state = TERMINATE; 
  System.exit(0); 
 } 
} 
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LoginImpl.java 
package src.server; 
 
import java.rmi.RemoteException; 
import java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject; 
 
import javax.security.auth.*; 
import javax.security.auth.callback.*; 
import javax.security.auth.login.*; 
 
import src.common.LoginInterface; 
import src.common.ServerInterface; 
 
public class LoginImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements LoginInterface { 
 
 // The referece to the object in the server where functionality  
 // of the methods is implemented. 
 private /* spec_public */ ServerInterface myServer; 
  
 //@ private static ghost String state; 
  
 private /* spec_public */ LoginContext lc; 
  
 /*@ invariant  
   @  state==CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT ||  
   @     state==NEW_SUBJECT || state==NEW_PROXY;  
   
   @*/ 
  
  
 /*@ constraint 
   @  (state==NEW_SUBJECT ==> \old(state)==CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT) && 
   @  (state==NEW_PROXY ==> \old(state)==NEW_SUBJECT) && 
   @  (state==CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT ==> \old(lc)!=lc); 
   @*/ 
  
 // Constructor 
 protected LoginImpl(ServerInterface theServer) throws RemoteException { 
   myServer = theServer; 
 }  
 
 /** 
  *  Allows the client to login by creating a proxy for him and   
  *  returning him the reference so that he can call methods on it 
  */ 
 /*@ normal_behavior 
   @  requires username != null && password != null; 
   @  assignable lc, user; 
   @  ensures  \fresh(lc, subject); 
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior 
   @  requires lc==null; 
   @  signals  (LoginException le)  
   @      le.getMessage()!=null && \fresh(le); 
   @ also 
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   @   exceptional_behavior 
   @    requires lc!=null || lc==null; 
   @  signals  RemoteException; 
   @     
   @*/ 
 public ServerInterface forwardCrds(String username, String password)  
      throws RemoteException, LoginException { 
 
  //@ assert state==FOUND; 
  lc = new LoginContext("JAASLogin",  
     new RemoteCallbackHandler(username, password)); 
 
  //@ set state==CREATE_LOGIN_CONTEXT;   
  lc.login(); 
   
  Subject subject = lc.getSubject(); 
  //@ set state==NEW_SUBJECT;   
   
 // Return the reference of a proxy to the calling client.    
 return createNewProxy(subject); 
 } 
  
 /*@ normal_behavior 
   @  requires subject!=null && myServer!=null;  
   @  ensures  \result==(ServerProxy(subject, myServer)); 
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior 
   @  requires lc!=null; 
   @  signals  RemoteException; 
   @*/ 
 private ServerProxy createNewProxy(Subject subject)  
        throws RemoteException { 
  //@ set state==NEW_PROXY; 
  return new ServerProxy(subject, myServer); 
 } 
 
} 
 
 
 
 
 /** 
  * The inteface between the user input and the security mechanisms. 
  * It decouples the service provider from the specific input device  
  * being used to enter credentials. 
  */ 
 
class RemoteCallbackHandler implements CallbackHandler { 
 private String username; 
 private String password; 
  
 RemoteCallbackHandler(String username, String password){ 
  this.username = username; 
  this.password = password; 
 } 
 public void handle(Callback[] cb) { 
     for (int i = 0; i < cb.length; i++){ 
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   if (cb[i] instanceof NameCallback){ 
    NameCallback nc = (NameCallback)cb[i]; 
    nc.setName(username); 
   } else if (cb[i] instanceof PasswordCallback){ 
    PasswordCallback pc = (PasswordCallback)cb[i]; 
    pc.setPassword(password.toCharArray()); 
    password = null; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
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ServerProxy.java 
package src.server; 
 
import java.rmi.RemoteException; 
import java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject; 
import javax.security.auth.Subject; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Date; 
 
import src.permissionvalidation.*; 
import src.common.ServerInterface; 
 
/** 
 * Proxy implements the same interface as the server. 
 *  
 * Protects the server from direct calls by clients. All calls by  
 * clients have to pass security checks in the proxy. 
 * Hides the implementation of the actual methods on the server. 
 *  
 * All the methods check is the caller has permissions, and only then 
 * call methods for him. If the user doesnt have permission they throw 
 * a SecurityException. 
 */ 
 
public class ServerProxy extends UnicastRemoteObject implements ServerInterface { 
 
 // A reference to the REAL server 
 private /* spec_public */ ServerInterface theServer; 
 // The particular user that is associated to this proxy 
 private /* spec_public */ Subject theUser; 
 
 //@ public ghost String state; 
  
 // Constructor 
 /*@ requires   true; 
   @ ensures   subject!=null && theServer!=null; 
   @ signals_only RemoteException; 
   @*/ 
 protected ServerProxy(Subject subject, ServerInterface theServer)  
          throws RemoteException { 
  this.theServer = theServer; 
  this.theUser = subject; 
 }  
 /*@ invariant (subject!=null && theServer!=null) && 
   @     (state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION || state==CALL_METHOD);  
   @*/ 
  
 /*@ constraint 
   @  (state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION ==>  
   @    assert \old(state)==REQUEST_METHOD) && 
   @  (state==CALL_METHOD ==> \old(state)==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION); 
   @*/ 
  
 /*@ normal_behavior 
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   @  requires cpr!=null && fName!=null && lName!=null &&  
   @            adress!=null && DOB!=null;  
   @  ensures  \only_called(checkPermission,insert);   
   @       
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior 
   @   signals_only  RemoteException, SecurityException; 
   @*/ 
 public boolean insert(String cpr, String fName,  
    String lName, String adress, Date DOB)  
       throws RemoteException, SecurityException { 
  //@ set state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION;  
  checkPermission("insert"); 
  //@ set state==CALL_METHOD; 
  return theServer.insert(cpr, fName, lName, adress, DOB); 
 } 
  
 /*@ normal_behavior 
   @  requires cpr!=null;  
   @  ensures  \only_called(checkPermission, findP) &&  
   @       \result=!null && \fresh(\result); 
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior 
   @   signals_only  RemoteException, SecurityException; 
   @*/ 
 public String findP(String cpr)  
     throws RemoteException, SecurityException{ 
  //@ set state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION; 
  checkPermission("findP"); 
  //@ set state==CALL_METHOD; 
  return theServer.findP(cpr); 
 } 
  
 /*@ normal_behavior 
   @  requires cpr!=null;  
   @  ensures  \only_called(checkPermission, editP) && 
   @          \fresh(\result); 
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior 
   @   signals_only  RemoteException, SecurityException; 
   @*/ 
 public boolean editP(String cpr, String fName, String lName,  
     String adress) throws RemoteException,SecurityException { 
 
  //@ set state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION; 
  checkPermission("editP"); 
  //@ set state==CALL_METHOD; 
  return theServer.editP(cpr, fName, lName, adress); 
 } 
  
 /*@ normal_behavior 
   @  requires cpr!=null && date!=null && test!=null &&  
   @        comment!=null && totalCost!=null; 
   @  ensures  \only_called(checkPermission,  
   @       addMedicalRecords)&& \fresh(\result); 
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior 
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   @   signals_only  RemoteException, SecurityException; 
   @*/ 
 public boolean addMedicalRecords(String cpr, Date date,  
    ArrayList test, String comment, Double totalCost)  
      throws RemoteException, SecurityException { 
   
  //@ set state==VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION; 
  checkPermission("addMedicalRecords"); 
  //@ set state==CALL_METHOD; 
  return theServer.addMedicalRecords(cpr, date, test, comment, totalCost); 
 } 
  
 /*@ normal_behavior 
   @  requires cpr!=null; 
   @  ensures  \only_called(checkPermission, listRecords) && 
   @          \fresh(\result); 
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior 
   @   signals_only  RemoteException, SecurityException; 
   @*/ 
 public ArrayList listRecords(String cpr)  
   throws RemoteException, SecurityException { 
   
  //@ set state=VERIFY_AUTHORIZATION; 
  checkPermission("listRecords"); 
  //@ set state=CALL_METHOD; 
  return theServer.listRecords(cpr); 
 } 
  
 
 /** 
    * Check if the current client can call a certain method. 
    * The check is made through JAAS and its policy file. 
    *  
    * @param methodName The name of the method to verify if  
    *      the user has permission to run. 
    */ 
 /*@ normal_behavior 
   @  requires methodName!=null && theUser!=null; 
   @  assignable \nothing; 
   @  ensures  \only_called(doAs); 
   @ also 
   @   exceptional_behavior  
   @   signals_only  SecurityException; 
   @*/ 
 private void checkPermission(String methodName) throws SecurityException { 
  Subject.doAs(theUser, new MethodcallValidate(methodName)); 
 } 
  
} 
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ServerImpl.java 
package src.server; 
 
import java.io.*; 
import java.rmi.RemoteException; 
import java.util.*; 
 
import src.common.ServerInterface; 
 
  /* 
   * The class where the use cases are actually implemented. 
   */ 
 
public class ServerImpl implements ServerInterface { 
 
 private Patient P; 
 // The patient class 
 private MedRecord M; 
 // The Class containing a single medical record entry for a patient 
 private ArrayList medicalRecords; 
 // The list containing all medical records of a single Patient 
  
 private Hashtable patientList; 
 // Maps CPR-ids to the patient object  
  
 private HashMap patientRecords; 
 // Maps Patient CPR-ids to the ArrayList containing his records 
   
  
 // CONSTRUCTOR 
 public ServerImpl() { 
  patientList = new Hashtable(); 
  patientRecords = new HashMap(); 
 } 
  
 /** 
  * Check if this patient ID exists, if it doesnt; insert a new patient  
  * in the patient list 
  */ 
 public boolean insert(String cpr, String fName,  
    String lName, String adress, Date DOB)  
     throws RemoteException, SecurityException { 
   
  if (patientList.containsKey(cpr)==false) { 
   // Patient does not exist. Insert it 
   patientList.put(cpr, new Patient(fName, lName, adress, DOB)); 
   return true; 
   } else { 
    return false; 
    // This Patient already exists. Do nothing. 
   } 
     
 } 
  
 /** 
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  * Looks for the patient registered with this cpr ID.  
  * If found it returns the patient data.  
  * If NOT found it returns null. 
  */ 
 public String findP(String cpr) throws RemoteException, SecurityException { 
   
  if (patientList.containsKey(cpr)) { 
   P = (Patient) patientList.get(cpr); 
   return P.toString(); 
  } else   
   return null; 
   
 } 
 /** 
  * Edits patients name, lastname or adress. Edits them only if the value  
  * of their parameter is NOT an empty string. If it is an empty string  
  * is given, then that field is not updated. 
  */ 
 public boolean editP(String cpr, String fName, String lName, String adress)  
       throws RemoteException, SecurityException { 
         
  // Check which of the fields has been provided by the caller  
  // to be update that field 
  if (patientList.containsKey(cpr)){ 
   P = (Patient) patientList.get(cpr); 
    if (fName!="") 
     P.setfName(fName); 
    if(lName!="") 
     P.setlName(lName); 
    if(adress!="") 
     P.setAdress(adress); 
    
   // Place the newly updated object into the hashtable 
   patientList.put(cpr, P); 
   return true; 
  } 
 // no user exists with this cpr ID. 
 return false;  
 } 
  
 /** 
  * Check if patient exists. If not, no data is added. 
  * If yes, check if he as previous records and append the newest record 
  * to his list, if no he as previous records then create a record 
  * list for him and append the newest record to his list. 
  *  
  */ 
 public boolean addMedicalRecords(String cpr, Date date, ArrayList test,  
      String comment, Double totalCost)  
        throws RemoteException, SecurityException 
{ 
   
  if (patientList.containsKey(cpr)) { 
  // This Patient exists in the list of patients 
    
   // Check if he has a privious history 
   if(patientRecords.containsKey(cpr)) { 
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    // Patient has already a history of records 
    medicalRecords = (ArrayList) patientRecords.get(cpr); 
    // Get his list of medical records    
    M = new MedRecord(date, test, comment, totalCost); 
    // Create a new Record with the data recieved  
    // through parameters to add it to his previous records. 
    medicalRecords.add(M); 
    //Insert the newly created record in his list 
    return true; 
     
   } else {  
    // This is the first record being entered for this patient 
    medicalRecords = new ArrayList(); 
    // Create an (empty) history for him 
    M = new MedRecord(date, test, comment, totalCost); 
    // Create a new Record with the data recieved  
    // through parameters 
    medicalRecords.add(M); 
    //Insert the newly created record in his list 
    return true; 
   } 
  } 
  return false; 
  // This patient is not registered in our patients list thus,  
  // no records can be added for him. 
 } 
 
 /** 
  * List records of the patient with the given CPR ID number. 
  * Return NULL if patient does not exist 
  */ 
 public ArrayList listRecords(String cpr) throws RemoteException,SecurityException{ 
  // Check if this patient ID exists 
  if (patientList.containsKey(cpr)) { 
   // This Patient exists 
    medicalRecords = (ArrayList) patientRecords.get(cpr); 
    // Get the history of Patient 
 
   return medicalRecords; 
   // Return the ArrayList with history objects 
  } 
  return null; 
  // Patient does not exist 
 }  
  
} 
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ServerInterface.java 
package src.common; 
 
import java.rmi.Remote; 
import java.rmi.RemoteException; 
import java.util.*; 
 
/** 
 * Server interface.  Containes the privileged 
 * methods that require permissions to be executed. 
 *  
 * @throws SecurityException when the client  
 *     doesn't have proper permissions to invoke the method. 
 */ 
 
public interface ServerInterface extends Remote { 
  
 
 public boolean insert(String cpr, String fName,  
    String lName, String adress, Date DOB)  
     throws RemoteException, SecurityException; 
  
 
 public String findP(String cpr)  
     throws RemoteException, SecurityException; 
 
 
 public boolean editP(String cpr, String fName,  
    String lName, String adress)  
     throws RemoteException, SecurityException; 
  
 
 public boolean addMedicalRecords(String cpr, Date date,  
    ArrayList test, String comment, Double totalCost)  
       throws RemoteException, SecurityException; 
  
 
 public ArrayList listRecords(String cpr)  
    throws RemoteException, SecurityException; 
   
 
} 
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LoginModule.java 
package src.server; 
 
import javax.security.auth.*; 
import javax.security.auth.callback.*; 
import javax.security.auth.login.LoginException; 
import java.util.*; 
 
/** 
 * Extends the built-in class of JAAS that makes the yes/no decission  
 * related to the user authentication. 
 * LoginModule authenticates users from credentials, and adds the  
 * permissions that were listed for that user in the policy. 
 */ 
 
public class LoginModule implements javax.security.auth.spi.LoginModule { 
 
 private boolean debug = false; 
  
 private Subject subject; 
 private MyPrincipal entity; 
 private CallbackHandler callbackHandler; 
 private Map sharedState; 
 private Map options; 
  
 /* Table holds credentials of the registered users. 
  * It holds their usernames and their passwords.  
  */ 
 private Hashtable userList; 
  
 // tracking the authentication status 
 private static final int NOT = 0, OK = 1, COMMIT = 2; 
 private int status; 
  
 // current user 
 private String username; 
 private char[] password; 
  
 //CONSTRUCTOR 
 protected LoginModule() { 
  userList = new Hashtable(); 
   
  // Username & passwords of registered users in the clinic. 
  // Inserted for testing of the application. 
  userList.put("admin1", "admin1");  
  userList.put("admin2", "admin2"); 
  // users with Administration priveleges 
  userList.put("med1", "med2");  
  userList.put("med2", "med2"); 
  // users with Medical staff priveleges 
 } 
 
 /* 
  * This method is called if the LoginContext's overall authentication  
  * failed. Cleans up any state if any of modules succeded but the overal 
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  * authentication doesnt succed. 
  */ 
 public boolean abort() throws LoginException { 
  if(status == NOT) { 
      return false; 
  } else if( status == OK ) { 
      // login succeeded but overall authentication failed 
      username = null; 
      if( password != null ) password = null; 
      entity = null; 
  } else { 
      // overall authentication succeeded and commit succeeded, 
      // but someone else's commit failed 
      logout(); 
  }//end if/else 
  status = NOT; 
  return true; 
 } 
 
 /* 
  * Called if the overall authentication succeeds. Associates a 
     * MyPrincipal object with the Subject located in the LoginModule. 
  */ 
 public boolean commit() throws LoginException { 
  if(status == NOT || subject == null) { 
      return false; 
  } else { 
      // add a Principal (authenticated identity) to the Subject 
  
      // assume the user we authenticated is the MyPrincipal 
      entity = new MyPrincipal(username); 
      Set entities = subject.getPrincipals(); 
      if( !entities.contains(entity) ) 
    entities.add(entity); 
  
      // in any case, clean out state 
      username = null; 
      password = null; 
  
      status = COMMIT; 
      return true; 
  } 
 } 
 
 /** 
     * Initialize the LoginModule 
     */ 
 public void initialize(Subject subject, CallbackHandler cbH,  
         Map sharedState, Map options) { 
   
  status = NOT; 
  this.subject = subject; 
  this.callbackHandler = cbH; 
  this.sharedState = sharedState; 
  this.options = options; 
  
 } 
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 /** 
     * Authenticate the user based on provided credentials.  
     * If the credential matches the expected one, 
     * authentication succeeds - otherwise it doesnt. 
     */ 
 public boolean login() throws LoginException { 
  if( callbackHandler == null ) 
      throw new LoginException( "Error: no CallbackHandler " + 
          "available to retrieve user credentials"); 
  
  Callback[] callbacks = new Callback[2]; 
  callbacks[0] = new NameCallback( "\nuser name: " ); 
  callbacks[1] = new PasswordCallback( "password: ", false ); 
   
  try { 
   callbackHandler.handle(callbacks);  
   //get the user credentials 
      username = ((NameCallback)callbacks[0]).getName(); 
       
      char[] tmpPassword =  
       ((PasswordCallback)callbacks[1]).getPassword(); 
       
      if (tmpPassword == null)  
       // treat a NULL password as an empty password 
        
   tmpPassword = new char[0]; 
      password = new char[tmpPassword.length]; 
       
      System.arraycopy( tmpPassword, 0,password, 0,  
             tmpPassword.length ); 
      ((PasswordCallback)callbacks[1]).clearPassword();  
      //wipe out occurrences in memory 
  }  
  catch( java.io.IOException ioe ) { 
      throw new LoginException(ioe.toString()); 
  }  
  catch( UnsupportedCallbackException uce ) { 
      throw new LoginException( "Error: " +  
         uce.getCallback().toString() + 
      " not available to authenticate user." ); 
  } 
   
   
  // Lookup the given credentials in our HashMap to see if they're  
  // legitimate users of the clinic   
  if (lookupUser(username, password)) 
   // because the given username and passwords is 
   // found in list, authentication succeeded! 
   return true; 
   else 
    // authentication failed 
    return false; 
 } 
  
 /** 
  * Check if username and password exist in the userList HashTable. 
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  *  
  * @param  usr  username provided by the client 
  * @param  pwd  password provided by the client 
  * @return  true  if username and password was correct 
  *    false if username and/or password incorrect 
  */ 
 private boolean lookupUser(String usr, char[] pwd) { 
   
  if(userList.containsKey(usr)) { 
   String key = (String) userList.get(usr); 
   // Retrive that username 
   if((userList.get(key)).toString().toCharArray()==pwd) { 
    // The password maches.  
    // This is a valid user. 
    key = null;//Clean up the String location in the memory 
         //containing the password of the user; 
    return true; 
   }    
  } 
  return false; 
  // Username does not exist 
 } 
 
 
    /** 
     * Logout the user. 
     * Removes the MyPrincipal added by the .commit() method. 
  */ 
 
 public boolean logout() throws LoginException { 
   
  subject.getPrincipals().remove(entity); 
  status = NOT; 
  username = null; 
   
  if( password != null ) password = null; 
  entity = null; 
  return true; 
 } 
 
} 
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LoginInterface.java 
package src.common; 
 
import java.rmi.Remote; 
import javax.security.auth.login.LoginException; 
 
/** 
 * The interface of the login object to which (remote) users connect  
 * to authenticate. 
 */ 
 
public interface LoginInterface extends Remote { 
 
 /** 
  * Remote method that forwards the credentials from the  
  * client software to the server for user authentication. 
  */ 
 public ServerInterface forwardCrds(String username, String password)  
      throws java.rmi.RemoteException, LoginException; 
  
} 
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MethodcallValidate.java 
package src.permissionvalidation; 
import src.permissions.ServerPermission; 
 
import java.security.AccessController; 
import java.security.PrivilegedAction; 
 
/* 
 *  Test if the user has the neccessary permissions to call  
 *  the method in the login context of his authentication. 
 * For verifying the availability of the permission,  
 * a ServerPermission object is required. 
 */ 
public class MethodcallValidate implements PrivilegedAction { 
 
 // Name of the method to be checked 
 private String priveledgedMethodName; 
  
 public MethodcallValidate (String method) { 
  priveledgedMethodName = method; 
 } 
  
 public Object run() { 
  // Check if the appropriate ServerPermission is owned by 
     // the user. If not an exception is thrown. 
  
  AccessController.checkPermission(new  
      ServerPermission(priveledgedMethodName)); 
  return null; 
 } 
 
} 
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ServerPermission.java 
package src.permissions; 
import java.security.BasicPermission; 
 
/* 
 * Class for creating permission objects attached to the Subject class 
 * when the the user is authenticated successfully. 
 */ 
 
public class ServerPermission extends BasicPermission { 
 
 public ServerPermission(String name) { 
  super(name); 
 } 
  
 public ServerPermission(String name, String actions) { 
  super(name, actions); 
 } 
 
} 
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MyPrincipal.java 
package src.server; 
 
import java.io.Serializable; 
import java.security.Principal; 
 
 /* 
  * The implementation of the java.security.Principal interface that adds  
  * an identity to the user. 
  * To this user identity permission objects are added based on 
  * the privileges that the administration has assigned to the user  
  * through the policy file. 
  *  
  */ 
public class MyPrincipal implements Principal, Serializable { 
  
 private String name; 
 // Name of the principal 
  
 // Constructor 
 public MyPrincipal(String n) { 
  name = n; 
 } 
  
 public String getName() { 
  return name; 
 } 
  
  
 public String toString() { 
  return( "MyPrincipal:  " + name ); 
 } 
  
 public boolean equals( Object o ) { 
  if( o == null ) 
      return false; 
  if( this == o ) 
      return true; 
    
  if( !(o instanceof MyPrincipal) ) 
      return false; 
  MyPrincipal that = (MyPrincipal) o; 
   
  if( this.getName().equals(that.getName()) ) 
      return true; 
  return false; 
  } 
  
  
 public int hashCode() { 
  return name.hashCode(); 
 } 
} 
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MedRecord.java 
package src.server; 
 
import java.io.Serializable; 
import java.util.*; 
 
 /* 
  * The medical record contains an ArrayList of test (objects),  
  * the test date, related coments and the cost of the tests during  
  * the visit to the clinic.  
  */ 
public class MedRecord implements Serializable { 
 
 private Date date; 
 // Date when the (medical) test was done 
 private ArrayList tests; 
 // Test objects 
 private String comment; 
 private Double totalCost; 
  
 public Iterator it; 
  
 // Constructor 
 public MedRecord(Date d, ArrayList t, String c, Double tc) { 
  date = d; 
  tests = t; 
  comment = c; 
  totalCost = tc; 
 } 
  
 /** 
  * Return a string representation of a Medical record object 
  */ 
 public String toString() { 
  String allTests = ""; 
  // First, get a string representation of all Test objects  
  for (int index = 0; index <= tests.size(); index++) { 
   Test t = (Test) tests.get(index); 
   allTests = allTests + t.toString() + "\n"; 
  } 
   
  // Join the other records with the tests string 
  String record = date.toString() + " " + allTests +  
      " " + comment + " " + totalCost.toString() + "\n"; 
  return record; 
 } 
  
} 
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Patient.java 
package src.server; 
 
import java.util.Date; 
   /* 
    * The patient class, for holding all the Patient data.  
    */ 
public class Patient { 
 String fName; 
 // First name of the patient 
 String lName; 
 // Last name of the patient 
 String adress; 
 // Adress of the patient 
 Date DOB; 
  
 // Constructor of the patient class 
 public Patient(String fName, String lName, String adress, Date DOB) { 
  this.fName = fName; 
  this.lName = lName; 
  this.adress = adress; 
  this.DOB = DOB; 
 } 
  
 // Getter methods to retrieve values of the fields in the patient object  
 public String getfName() { 
  return fName; 
 } 
  
 public String getlName() { 
  return lName; 
 } 
  
 public String getAdress() { 
  return adress; 
 } 
  
  
 // Setter methods to update values of the fields in the patient object  
 public void setfName(String fn) { 
  fName = fn; 
 } 
  
 public void setlName(String ln) { 
  fName = ln; 
 } 
  
 public void setAdress(String ad) { 
  adress = ad; 
 } 
  
 public String toString() { 
  return fName + " " + lName + "\n " + adress + " " + "\n " +DOB; 
 } 
}  
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Test.java 
package src.server; 
 
import java.io.Serializable; 
 
 /* 
  * Medical Tests done on the patient.  
  */ 
public class Test implements Serializable { 
 
 private String name; 
 private String result; 
  
 public Test(String n, String t) { 
  setName(n); 
  setResult(t); 
 } 
 
 // Getter and setter methods for name & result fields 
 public void setName(String name) { 
  this.name = name; 
 } 
 
 public String getName() { 
  return name; 
 } 
 
 public void setResult(String result) { 
  this.result = result; 
 } 
 
 public String getResult() { 
  return result; 
 } 
  
 public String toString() { 
  return name + " " + result + " "; 
 } 
} 
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Server.java  
package src.server; 
 
  /**  
   * The main class for the server. 
   */ 
import java.rmi.registry.*; 
import java.util.Date; 
import src.common.*; 
 
public class Server { 
 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  /* Ensures that the identifiers generated for the server objects 
      * will be secure 
      */ 
  System.setProperty("java.rmi.server.randomID", "true"); 
   
  try { 
   ServerInterface theServer = new ServerImpl(); 
   LoginInterface loginObject = new LoginImpl(theServer); 
    
   Registry loginRegistry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(6000); 
   //Creates and exports a Registry on the local host  
   // that accepts requests on the specified port. 
   loginRegistry.bind("RemoteLoginServer", loginObject); 
   // Binds a remote reference of the specified object name  
   // in the registry. 
   
   System.out.println(new Date() + ": Server up and running"); 
   // Print a message to know that the server is operational 
    
  } catch (Exception e) { 
        e.printStackTrace(); 
     } 
   
   
 } 
 
} 
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Appendix C 
F. Policy and configuration files 
Authorizations.policy 
 // The Authorization policy file granting executions priveleges  
 // to each user seperatelly, for invoking methods that complete  
 // the use cases. 
 
 // ADMINISTRATION users 
  
grant Principal src.server.MyPrincipal "admin1" 
{ 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "insert"; 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "find"; 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "editP"; 
}; 
 
grant Principal src.server.MyPrincipal "admin2" 
{ 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "insert"; 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "find"; 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "editP"; 
}; 
 
 // MEDICAL STAFF users 
 
grant Principal src.server.MyPrincipal "med1" 
{ 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "addMedicalRecords"; 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "listRecords"; 
}; 
 
grant Principal src.server.MyPrincipal "med2" 
{ 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "addMedicalRecords"; 
 permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "listRecords";  }; 
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LoginModule.config 
 
 
  
 // Name of the login module to initiate. 
 
JAASLogin { 
 src.server.LoginModule required; 
}; 
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codePermissions.policy 
 
 // The list of permissions assigned to to JAR archives about the  
 // system resources thay can use.   
 
grant codebase "file:server.jar" 
{ 
 
     permission java.util.PropertyPermission  
           "java.rmi.server.randomID", "write"; 
            
     permission java.net.SocketPermission "127.0.0.1:1024-","accept"; 
      
     permission javax.security.auth.AuthPermission  
           "createLoginContext.JAASLogin"; 
            
     permission javax.security.auth.AuthPermission "modifyPrincipals"; 
      
     permission javax.security.auth.AuthPermission "addMedicalRecords"; 
     permission javax.security.auth.AuthPermission "editP"; 
     permission javax.security.auth.AuthPermission "findP"; 
      permission javax.security.auth.AuthPermission "insert";  
      permission javax.security.auth.AuthPermission "listRecords"; 
        // Names of the permissions that the users can have 
        // when a login context is created for them. 
      
     permission src.permissions.ServerPermission "*";   
        
}; 
  
grant codebase "file:actions.jar"  
{ 
}; 
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